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This dissertation examines how Polish sexual minorities understand and navigate their national 
identities in the context of recently renewed nationalist sentiment that has framed them as 
enemies of and threats to Poland. Ever since the election of the conservative, nationalist Law and 
Justice party in 2015, sexual minorities have become the primary target for Poland’s Right and 
Far-Right who frame non-heteronormative sexualities and all things “LGBT” as threats to Poland 
and Polish national identity. This framing relies on the idea that Polish national identity is, and 
always has been, determined by one’s adherence to Catholicism and conservative social values. 
As such, the Polish Right and Far-Right have been narrowing the symbolic boundaries of Polish 
national identity to include only those who adhere to this constricted conception of “Polishness”. 
Thus, although Poland remains one of the most ethnically homogenous countries in the world, 
Polish sexual minorities continue to be framed as external threats to the Polish nation and in 
some cases not truly Polish. The author introduces the term “ideological others” in order to 
describe those that are ethnically included in, but symbolically excluded from, the national 
community. Through the use of 60 in-depth interviews with Polish citizens who identify as non-
heteronormative, archival materials, images, and ethnographic fieldwork, this dissertation 
demonstrates how Polish sexual minorities both navigate their own sexual and national identities 
given such widespread exclusion as well as how they challenge exclusionary notions of 
“Polishness”.  Findings show that while some of those interviewed struggled to identify with 
their national identity given the current strength of the Polish Right, most respondents were able 
to identify with their “Polishness” because they had reframed what being Polish meant to them. 
 xi 
Reframing, it is argued, is an important strategy by which ideological others can find meaning in 
their national identity and continue to feel an attachment to their national community despite a 
political and social climate that often marks them as enemies of the nation and therefore outside 
the symbolic boundaries of national belonging. In addition, findings show that in order to contest 
the Polish Right’s framing of Polish national identity as being premised on conservative 
Catholicism, sexual minorities and their allies have begun an aesthetic revolt (Zubrzycki 2013) in 
order to expand the symbolic boundaries of “Polishness”. These actions, it is argued, represent a 
form of aesthetic revolt that does not entail a wholesale rejection of Polish national identity and 
its attendant symbols, but rather seeks to reframe and reimagine traditional Polish symbols in 
ways that are more inclusive of sexual and other minority communities. The inclusion of in-
depth interviews helps to demonstrate the important role that intrapersonal processes can play in 
the eventual realization of aesthetic revolt. The dissertation concludes by analyzing the career of 
openly gay Polish politician Robert Biedroń, who has been fighting to expand the symbolic 
boundaries of Polish national identity through activism and vocal criticism of the Polish Catholic 




In February of 2019, mayor of Warsaw Rafał Trzaskowski signed the first ever LGBT 
protections bill in Poland. Known locally as the “LGBT Charter,” the local legislation was 
adopted in order to provide services and assistance to Warsaw’s LGBT community, such as an 
intervention hostel for LGBT youth who have been shunned by their families, a community 
center for members of the LGBT community to gather and share experiences, as well as a clause 
elaborating the importance of allowing symbols representing the LGBT community in the public 
sphere. Given that the International Lesbian and Gay Association of Europe (ILGA) has 
consistently ranked Poland as one of the most difficult places to live as a sexual minority in 
Europe, passing such legislation was an important step towards realizing equal rights and 
protections for Poland’s LGBT community as well towards mitigating the social stigma around 
non-heteronormative sexualities in this highly Catholic country1. It was also an important 
symbolic gesture which signaled that, at least in the nation’s capital, Poland has a vocal and 
motivated community that advocates for progressive social changes.  
While the developments in Warsaw were optimistic, residents and officials of several 
smaller Polish cities and towns began actively protesting similar protection bills in their 
communities. In order to protect their communities from what they understood as threatening and 
increasingly pervasive ‘LGBT ideology’, numerous cities began declaring themselves as “LGBT 
                                               
1 Although Church attendance has declined over the years, approximately 93% percent of Poles still 
identify as Roman Catholic (CBOS 2012).  
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Free Zones” in the summer of 2019. During the same summer, the Far-Right weekly newspaper 
The Polish Newspaper (Gazeta Polska) included stickers featuring an image of a rainbow flag 
crossed out and surrounded by the slogan “LGBT-Free Zone” (Strefa Wolna od LGBT) in an 
effort to further mobilize their readers in their anti-LGBT cause. Several of these stickers have 
since been found on kiosks, automobiles, and private businesses throughout the country2. 
 
Figure I.1: “LGBT Free-Zones” Sticker. These stickers were found in issues of The Polish 
Newspaper (Gazeta Polska). Image taken from: www.gaytimes.co.uk/life/polish-town-becomes-
first-to-rescind-lgbt-free-zone-claiming-it-was-misunderstood/. Accessed 12 Apr. 2021. 
 
Perhaps most disturbing, however, were the words of Archbishop of Kraków Marek 
Jędraszewski during a homily he delivered in 2019 on the anniversary of the 1944 Warsaw 
Uprising, an important national commemoration. In this homily, he declared that “the red plague 
                                               
2 The appearance of these stickers was not limited to small, conservative cities, as a restaurant in Kraków 
–one of Poland’s largest as well as more liberal cities- was criticized for placing one on its front door. The 
owner of the restaurant is closely aligned with the Polish Catholic Church.  
 3 
no longer walks on our earth, but a new neo-Marxist one that wants to conquer our souls, hearts, 
and mind…it is not a red, but a rainbow plague” (Catholic World Report, 8/16/2019)3. Although 
Jędraszewski’s words were harshly criticized by a number of prominent liberal politicians and 
public personalities, they also registered with a significant portion of the Polish population, as 
the Church remains one of the primary sources of legal and moral authority in the country 
(Zubrzycki 2006; Grzymała-Busse 2015). Thus, days later Jarosław Kaczyński, leader of the 
illiberal and currently in power Law and Justice party, voiced his support of Archbishop 
Jędraszewski’s statement by claiming that Poles must “live in freedom, and not be subjected to 
all that is happening to the west of our borders…where freedom is being eliminated” (Catholic 
News Agency, 8/19/2019)4. In this context, freedom means a life unencumbered by ideas such as 
LGBT rights. Thus, while a number of organizations and politicians are actively fighting for 
LGBT rights and attempting to mitigate stigmatization of, and discrimination against, sexual 
minorities in the public sphere, there also exists a strong and dedicated resistance to this mission.  
Such resistance is evident in the rhetoric of the Law and Justice party. Indeed, ever since 
their rise to political prominence in 2015, Law and Justice has emboldened purveyors of 
extremist ideologies and helped legitimize extreme views, while castigating and sanctioning 
those who voice any perspectives that deviate from traditional understandings of Polish national 
identity. These traditional understandings are premised on a mythology that frames Poland as an 
inherently Catholic nation of martyrs whose mission is to protect both Poland and Europe from 
any and all threats to conservative, Catholic sensibilities (Davies 1997; Zubrzycki 2011). At the 
                                               
3 https://www.catholicworldreport.com/2019/08/16/krakows-archbishop-jedraszewski-under-fire-for-
remarks-about-rainbow-plague/. Accessed 12 Apr. 2021.  
4 https://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/42053/law-and-justice-party-leader-praises-polish-
archbishop-for-lgbt-opposition. Accessed 12 Apr. 2021.  
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time of their election in 2015, this primary threat was refugees from the Middle East, who were 
framed as threats not only to public safety but to Polish culture and traditional ways of life5. 
More recently, Law and Justice and other groups on the Right and Far-Right have focused their 
efforts on a new “other”; the LGBT community and, more broadly, “LGBT ideology.” While 
there has also been a concerted focus on the perceived threats of “gender ideology,” since the 
introduction of the “LGBT charter” emphasis has moved even more towards the LGBT 
community and “LGBT ideology”6.  
The condemnation of all things “LGBT” was particularly salient as Law and Justice ran 
for re-election in the most recent parliamentary elections held in the Fall of 2019. The primary 
focal point of their campaign was the need to protect traditional Polish values and Polish national 
identity from “LGBT ideology.” During a speech given at a conference organized by the 
Catholic organization “Catholic Action,” Kaczyński claimed that “these ideologies, 
philosophies…all of this is imported…these are not internal Polish mechanisms. They are a 
threat to Polish identity, to our nation, to its existence and thus to the Polish state” (The 
Guardian, 10/25/2019)7. Further, president of Poland Andrzej Duda’s recent campaign for re-
election was also premised on the notion that Poland had a duty to fight “LGBT ideology” in 
order to protect traditional Polish values. His challenger, aforementioned liberal mayor of 
Warsaw Rafał Trzaskowski, ran a campaign based largely on progressive values including the 
                                               
5 Historically, Jews have served as an ultimate “other” in the Polish nationalist imagination (Michlic 
2006; Zubrzycki 2006).   
6 Many on the Right refer simply to “LGBT” as opposed to more specific concepts such as the “LGBT 
community” or “LGBT ideology.”   
7 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/25/anti-lgbt-rhetoric-stokes-tensions-in-eastern-europe. 
Accessed 12 Apr. 2021.  
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introduction of civil unions for same-sex couples8. The race was thus emblematic of the deeply 
rooted cultural struggle over national identity that is currently animating much of Polish politics, 
one in which the very idea and concept of “sexual minorities” and the “LGBT lobby” play a 
crucial role.   
 In the following section, I provide more context regarding the role that sexual minorities 
have played in recent struggles over national identity in Poland before turning to my research 
questions.  
 
Sexual Minorities and Polish National Identity 
In contemporary Poland, sexual minorities are increasingly excluded from articulations of 
national identity that are promoted by conservative, nationalist groups. This prevailing notion of 
Polish identity is based on a national mythology that envisions Poland as an essentially Catholic 
nation whose mission is ‘defending Europe against the infidel (however defined)’ (Zubrzycki 
2011: 55).  In this struggle, the primary axis of disagreement centers on whether Poland should 
embrace the more liberal and progressive ‘Western’ values embodied by the European Union or 
remain tied to traditional, conservative and ethno-nationalist understandings of Polish national 
identity. On the right, there is a highly conservative faction that is intimately tied to the Church 
and stands in staunch opposition to the directives of the European Union. This group opposes the 
E.U. primarily because they see it as a corrupt Western institution that is trying to enforce certain 
norms and values that are contrary to the traditional values of Poland, namely Catholicism and 
                                               
8 Numerous critics have claimed that Trzaskowski and the Civic Platform party only appeal to these 
progressive issues for votes, and in practice do little to help struggling minorities. Duda won his re-
election campaign against Trzaskowski by a narrow margin, receiving approximately 51% of the vote and 
Trzaskowski 49% with a nearly 70% turnout.  
 6 
traditional family models (Gaisbauer 2007; Machaj and Białas-Zielińska 2014; Porter 2001). 
Proponents of this vision therefore believe that Polish national identity ought to be tied to the 
Church and to traditional social norms and values (Davies 1997; Zubrzycki 2006). On the center 
and left stands the pro-E.U., progressive and liberal faction which believes that Poland’s national 
identity should be one of pluralism and openness.  
  At the core of this cleavage, then, is a battle over Polish national identity; between 
maintaining tradition and embracing progressive social changes (Koczanowicz 2014; Mach 
2007). Recent manifestations of this national mythology posit sexual minorities as one9 of the 
primary threats to Polish national identity. 
This is not to say, however, that sexual minorities and “Polishness” are framed as 
mutually exclusive at all times and in all contexts. As Lucas Szulc has pointed out (2011), it is 
not sexual minorities in general that are criticized but those who openly demonstrate and 
celebrate their diversity. The issue, therefore, is not with one’s sexual orientation per se but with 
their “queerness.” This observation then leads Szulc to claim that while Poland may be open to 
“tolerating” sexual minorities (insofar as they keep to themselves and assimilate to the 
heterosexual status quo), it is still far from being open to accepting their “queerness” (2011; 170-
171). Nor is it to claim that religion is always seen as antithetical to queerness, or that all sexual 
minorities in Poland are hostile towards Catholicism. Indeed, there is a prominent organization in 
Poland known as “Faith and Rainbow” (Wiara i Tęcza) that advocates on behalf of sexual 
minorities who also maintain strong religious faith and dedication to the Catholic Church10. The 
                                               
9 Polish feminist activists, in addition to the more general notion of ‘gender ideology,’ are also often the 
targets of such debates. 
10 A recent article by Magdalena Mikulak (2019), however, has argued that despite the importance of the 
organization, Faith and Rainbow is largely assimilationist and therefore does little to challenge 
heteronormativity and traditional patriarchal structures. 
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intersection of (homo)sexuality, religion, and Polish national identity is therefore quite complex. 
However, the primary point I wish to underline here is that for the Church and the Polish Right 
and Far-Right the issue is what sexual minorities –to them- represent; a deviation from and 
threat to conservative, Catholic values that are understood as the immutable pillars of 
“Polishness.”  
Questions and Theoretical Frameworks 
Given the Polish Right’s elevation of “LGBT” and “LGBT ideology” to the role national 
“other,” and the fact that Poland is one of the most ethnically homogenous countries in the world 
(Zubrzycki 2006), Polish citizens who identify as non-heteronormative have been placed in a 
precarious position. Despite being ethnically Polish, sexual minorities are often portrayed in 
Right-wing discourse as being incompatible with, and often antithetical to, “true Polishness.” As 
a consequence, Polish sexual minorities are being increasingly maligned in the public sphere and 
framed as external threats to the Polish nation despite their ethnic ties to it.  
This contentious political and social context leads to important empirical and theoretical 
questions. While ample research has been conducted on the ways in which “ordinary” citizens 
understand, and the extent to which they relate to, their national identity, scant attention has been 
paid to the ways in which minority members of the ethno-national majority navigate their place 
in the national community. I thus ask: How do Polish sexual minorities navigate the increasingly 
narrowing boundaries of national identity advocated by Far-Right groups? How do they 
reconcile their national and sexual identities, given that the latter is often portrayed as 
incompatible with the former?  How are the symbolic boundaries of national identity understood 
and navigated by members of an ethnic majority who are increasingly framed as outsiders and 
threats to the nation? 
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I refer to communities that are ethnically-included in, but symbolically-excluded from the 
national community as ideological others. By focusing on a particular case of this population –
Polish sexual minorities- my dissertation contributes to literatures examining how nationhood 
and national identity are understood in everyday life (Fox and Miller-Idriss 2008) as well as 
literature concerned with how members of vulnerable minority communities understand and 
navigate group boundaries (Moon 2010; Zubrzycki 2016; Lamont et.al 2017). 
 
Everyday Nationhood, Nationalism and Sexuality 
The everyday nationhood perspective seeks to understand nationalism and national 
identities not as things existing in the world but as perspectives on and ways of seeing the world 
(Brubaker et.al 2004, Fox and Miller Idriss 2008). Such research departs from scholarship in 
which the primary focal point of analysis is the formation and diffusion of the nation-state as a 
macro-political formation (Anderson 1983; Gellner 1983: Wimmer and Feinstein 2010). Thus, as 
Jon Fox and Cynthia Miller-Idriss (2008) have emphasized, nationhood must be understood as 
something that is practically accomplished in everyday interactions and situations in the lives of 
average national citizens in addition to being the result of macro-level, political dynamics. The 
focus on nationhood and national identity among ordinary members of the nation –how and the 
extent to which people think about and with the nation- has therefore become a central and 
fruitful endeavor for many scholars studying nationalism and national identity in recent years 
(Bonikowski 2016; Fenton 2007; Phillips and Smith 2000; Skey 2011; Thompson 2001)  
A key example of this approach is Rogers Brubaker and colleagues’ account of national 
identity and ‘everyday ethnicity’ among Hungarians and Romanians in Cluj, Transylvania 
(Brubaker et.al 2006). Through in-depth interviews and ethnographic fieldwork, they found that 
the nationalist rhetoric of political entrepreneurs was seldom salient to those they interviewed 
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and observed. Such observations led them to conclude that the ways in which people think 
“with” the nation may not have much to do with how the nation is constructed in elite discourse 
by political entrepreneurs. Cynthia Miller-Idriss took a similar approach in her empirical work 
comparing levels of national identification among German vocational schoolteachers and their 
students (2006; 2009). Through interviews and ethnographic observation, she found that while 
older generations were still averse to the notion of German nationalism due to its association 
with Nazism, their students were more likely to embrace their national identities as a source of 
strength and pride. Generational differences, then, played a major role in citizens’ national 
identifications.  
In the British case, Michael Skey (2010) showed how an individual’s strong attachment 
to their nation and national identity can provide what he, following Anthony Giddens (1991), 
calls a sense of ontological security. This taken-for-granted sense of national belonging is 
particularly salient, Skey argues, in times of economic and social unrest (2010: 731). Finally, 
Fenton (2007) demonstrated that many of the British youths he interviewed showed indifference 
to the idea of having a “British” or “English” identity. Such findings led him to argue that 
national identity may not be as important as some scholars (cf. Calhoun 1997; Greenfeld and 
Chirot 1994) make it out to be.  Overall, research on everyday nationhood has been helpful in 
elucidating the myriad ways in which members of a national community understand national 
identity and their relationship to it, as well as the significance of it in their day-to-day lives. Yet 
despite the valuable insights of the everyday nationhood tradition, it has not explicitly focused on 
the ways in which sexual and other ideological others navigate their relationship with national 
identity.  
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There is, however, a robust body of scholarship that has emphasized the relationship 
between sexuality and the nation. One of the exemplars of this tradition is George Mosse, who in 
Nationalism and Sexuality (1985) explicitly placed dominant visions of sexuality at the forefront 
of his theory of nationalism. Mosse demonstrated how the rise of the modern nation-state 
entailed a politics of respectability (1985: 4) which categorized homosexuality (seen as the 
antithesis of the “manliness” needed to forge strong nations) as threatening to the nation. Yet 
Mosse’s take on the relationship between nationalism and sexuality centered on the creation of a 
politics of respectability and the formation of social norms concerning sexuality, and not on how 
sexual minorities themselves understood their relationship to the nation and national identity. His 
focus, therefore, was more on the creation of national norms through the construction of sexual 
others rather than on the navigation of national identity by those others.  
Much research mining the intersections of nationalism and sexuality has followed in 
Mosse’s footsteps by demonstrating the significant role that sexual and gendered norms have 
played in the formation of exclusionary forms of nationalism. An early take on the role between 
nationalism and sexuality came in a volume of case studies written by comparative literary 
scholars (Parker et. al 1992). This collection of essays discussed the various ways in which 
gender and sexuality tie into nation building projects in various national contexts. The 
contributing authors discussed (among other things) how literatures, fashions, and films helped 
solidify certain ideas of what the relationship between the nation and sexuality ought to be. This 
early work examining the relationship(s) between nationalism and sexuality thus showed how 
national values –particularly how they relate to sexuality- are communicated through various 
modes of art and culture.  
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Similarly, a number of feminist scholars (McClintock 1995; Nagel 1998; Yuval-Davis 
1993) have argued that narratives of masculinity, gender and sexuality —particularly those that 
celebrate patriotic masculinity and the woman’s roles as the exalted mother of the nation— have 
been essential to nearly all national projects. Such narratives frame the ways in which people 
understand how to belong to their given national community, as well as what ought to be 
considered as deviant from and hazardous to the status quo of the nation. Building off of these 
studies, Sam Pryke (1998) argued for a more robust conceptualization of the relationship 
between nationalism and sexuality, suggesting three focal points for scholarship; national sexual 
stereotypes, the role of sexuality in national conflict, and the role of sexuality in nation building.  
These earlier studies then helped set the stage for more empirical work mining the 
relationship between nationalism and sexuality in specific national contexts. Through in-depth 
archival research, Matti Bunzl (2004) showed both how sexual minorities and Jews served as 
outsiders which the newly reconstructed Austrian nation strived to define itself against, and how 
these communities began to advocate for themselves in the public sphere in the latter part of the 
20th century. More recently, Richard Mole (2011, 2016) has examined how what he refers to as 
“political homophobia” operates in both Central and Eastern Europe. Mole’s research has 
demonstrated the ways in which politicians in Latvia, Serbia, and Russia have instrumentally 
used homophobic discourses to frame homosexuality and homosexuals as foreign threats to the 
nation (2016: 111), much like Mosse had shown to be the case in Nazi Germany. These 
discourses, Mole argues, serve to reinforce the idea that homosexuality is a foreign import — an 
unwelcome consequence of Europeanization— that can and should be resisted. Thus, in the 
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Latvian case, some politicians have gone so far as to claim that homosexuality did not exist in 
their country until joining the European Union.11  
Similar themes have also been explored in scholarship focusing on Poland and a number 
of Polish scholars have written about the ways in which Polish nationalism has specifically 
targeted sexual minorities. In a series of essays (2006, 2009, 2010) Agnieszka Graff examined 
how nationalist discourses in Poland are not only strongly gendered, but laden with derogatory 
references to non-heteronormative sexualities. The various “political uses of homophobia” 
(2010), she argues, came in the wake of Poland’s E.U. accession and have served as a means by 
which nationalist Poles can draw firm boundaries between what is “truly Polish” and what is 
simply an undesirable European import. Among these undesirable imports are LGBT and Gender 
“Ideologies,” which nationalists believe pose a grave threat to traditional Polish values (2010: 
585). 
In another insightful study, Adam Ostolski (2007) compared Right-Wing periodicals 
from the pre-War and contemporary eras, showing that the discourses of exclusion operated 
similarly against Jews in the 1930s as the do against sexual minorities today. His analysis 
demonstrated how both groups were characterized as “conspirators, corruptors, and pariahs,” and 
similar to Graff, Ostolski argued that the logics of anti-Semitism and homophobia in Poland 
share a similar structure. More recently, Robert Kulpa’s discursive analysis of a speech given by 
Jarosław Kaczyński –the leader of the conservative Law and Justice party- revealed that sexual 
minorities are also often construed as an “enemy within” Polish borders (2019: 12). Such 
                                               
11 Such ‘political homophobia’ has therefore become a focal point of research in political science 
concerned with the impacts of ‘Europeanization’ on a number of recent E.U. member states, particularly 
in Central and Eastern Europe (O’Dwyer 2010; Ayoub 2016; Mole 2016). 
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research has thus been important in unveiling the ways that the Far-Right in Poland talk about 
sexual minorities in relation to the nation, and much like the research in other national contexts 
described above, it tends to underline the idea that non-heteronormative sexualities are very often 
framed as foreign threats (be they internal or external) to the wellbeing of the nation. Yet in all of 
these studies, the analytic focus rests on the discursive construction of sexual qua national 
otherness, and not on how sexual minorities themselves construct and interpret their national 
identities and the relationship between their national and sexual identities.  
A number of scholars, however, have also focused more directly on the experiences and 
actions of Polish sexual minorities. In a recent (2016) examination of the websites of several 
LGBTQ organizations in Poland and Turkey, Łukasz Szulc argued that by utilizing national 
symbols in conjunction with those of the LGBT community, these groups engaged in the practice 
of “domesticating the nation online.” Borrowing Billg’s concept of “banal nationalism,” Szulc 
demonstrated that many of these organizations —though not self-consciously nationalistic— still 
engage in banal “flaggings” of the nation on their webpages. Although many of these websites 
still tended to “reaffirm the world as a world of nations” (2016: 318), they would also queer 
national symbols, thereby attempting to make the nation a more hospitable and inclusive space 
for queer identities. Yet while Szulc’s study usefully shifted focus from discourses about the 
LGBT+ community to the actions of LGBT+ groups, his attention was on the organizational 
level, and not the firsthand, micro-level experiences of sexual minorities.   
Some research has specifically relied on in-depth interviews in order to examine the 
experiences of Polish sexual minorities. Joanna Mizielińska’s (2001) study of Polish lesbians 
included both a critical analysis of Polish nationalist discourse in addition to interviews with 
Polish lesbians. However, her interviews were primarily focused on these women’s relationship 
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to the Church and Catholicism, not how they navigate their sexual and national identities. 
Similarly, Gregory Czarnecki’s (2006) interview-based study showed how the experiences of 
discrimination of both Polish Jews and sexual minorities led to similar feelings of being “in the 
closet.” Yet his study was primarily focused on the comparative experiences of Polish sexual 
minorities and Jews, and thus did not take as its primary departure point the ways in which 
Polish sexual minorities interpret and navigate their relationship to national identity. The latter is 
one of the two primary foci of this dissertation.  
In addition to focusing on the lived experiences of Polish sexual minorities my 
dissertation will address, through a detailed analysis of Polish LGBT activists’ strategic uses of 
national and religious symbols, broader theoretical questions concerning the role of symbolic 
structures and material objects —such as national icons— in ushering in social change (Sewell 
1992; Zubrzycki 2016): Why have national symbols figured so prominently in LGBT Poles’ 
responses to Far-Right criticisms and attacks? Can symbolic structures—such as national 
symbols and flags— help produce social change? If so, how and why can they do so? 
 
Aesthetic Revolt and the Power of Material Objects  
 Social scientists have long been concerned with examining how symbols work to 
encapsulate important aspects of communities’ belief systems and forge a sense of solidarity 
among members of a collective (Durkheim 1912; Turner 1967). Recently, the material turn in 
social research has begun to focus more specifically on the roles that the very materiality of 
objects and symbols themselves play in social life and in bringing about social change 
(Alexander 2008; Keane 2005; McDonnell 2010; Mukerji 1997; Zubrzycki 2013). While 
scholarship focusing on the relationship between social actors and material objects takes many 
forms, most perspectives are informed by the notion that social research must take seriously the 
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myriad relationships that obtain between social actors and material objects. Further, this line of 
research often emphasizes the idea that material objects exert a form of agency, in that they can 
either call forth or inhibit responses and actions from social actors (Gell 1998; Gibson 1977; 
Latour 2005)12. Such objects can therefore be understood both as a means of expressing group 
solidarity through ritual (Durkheim 1912; Turner 1967), as well as being the basis for efforts to 
impact social change (Morgan 2005; Zubrzycki 2011).  
 With this material turn, sociologists examining a wide variety of empirical topics have 
begun focusing on the role of material objects in social life and on their materiality in particular. 
A key example is Jeffrey Alexander who, in his focus on “iconic consciousness,” has claimed 
that “icons can be seen…as symbolic condensations that root social meanings in material form” 
(2010: 782). His theory argues against materialism — in seeing material objects simply as 
things— which he claims is rooted in the “relentless utilitarianism of everyday life, which insists 
on the concrete, on the practical, efficient and useful” (2010: 783). The antidote to such 
reductionism, Alexander argues, is an enthusiastic embrace of materiality, a perspective that 
seeks to understand how meaning can be manifested through material objects.  
In a similar vein, Robin Wagner-Pacifici has argued for treating works of art as a focal 
point of social analysis, claiming that “art models social reality, rather than simply refracts it” 
(2010: 108). Artistic images, she claims, not only reflect but actually contain within them “the 
inchoate, sometimes violent, energy of actual social life” (2010: 110). In addition, Terence 
McDonnell’s research on AIDS awareness campaigns in Africa has demonstrated the important 
role that the materiality of objects plays in successfully conveying their messages. Through his 
                                               
12 Much of these ideas are inspired by the pioneering work of ecological psychologist J.J. Gibson, whose 
concept of “affordance” stressed the importance of the relationship between perceiver and environment.  
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ethnographic analysis of AIDS media in Ghana, he showed that media —such as billboards and 
posters— can easily transform due to conditions such as the weather, ultimately hindering their 
ability to communicate their message effectively. An emphasis on material culture and 
materiality has thus proven a productive theoretical lens for scholarship examining a wide range 
of social phenomena.   
Given its applicability across a range of research areas, the material turn has also found 
footing in scholarship examining nationalism and national identification. An early attempt to 
articulate the importance of social objects and actors’ built environments in the national context 
was Chandra Mukerji’s (1997) analysis of the gardens of Versailles and their role in fostering a 
collective understanding of French identity. Through her research, Mukerji demonstrated how 
and why objects — such as gardens— that appear to be simply aesthetic creations can be utilized 
to reach political ends in the name of the nation. More recently, Virag Molnar has argued that 
material culture is an important political resource that is not only engaged by elites, but by 
average citizens who are able to “normalize radical political ideas by turning them into everyday 
commodities” (2016: 207). She has empirically demonstrated this idea through an analysis of the 
ways in which radical right-wing, nationalist politics in Hungary have been largely fueled by an 
industry that produces “patriotic” commodities such as clothing, books, and rock music. Such 
studies have provided helpful insights into the ways that material objects work to solidify certain 
understandings of the nation. However, what they haven’t shown is how material objects can be 
utilized to bring forth new understandings of the nation and national identity. 
 Given this lacuna, some scholars have started focusing specifically on the role that 
material objects play in bringing about new understandings of national identity. Geneviève 
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 Zubrzycki, in her articulation of the concept of the national sensorium, argues that scholarship 
examining national identity and identification ought to look closely at how the nation is 
perceived and inculcated through images, sounds, and even smells. She argues that embodied 
practices such as “wearing a crown of thorns brooch; carrying a cross at a political 
demonstration; singing patriotic hymns at church” are all ways to make the abstract notions of 
national identity and belonging more concrete to national subjects (2010: 32). Importantly, she 
also discusses the ways in which activists and artists have subverted national symbols in order to 
critique the nation and certain framings of national identity. In the case of Poland, for example, 
Zubrzycki demonstrated how artists created controversial works utilizing important symbols of 
the nation — such as the Polish Pope as well as the Cross— to criticize Polish national 
mythology and advocate for renewed understandings of Polish national identity.  
Further, in her study of the Quiet Revolution in Quebec, Zubrzycki demonstrated how 
both material objects and rituals can serve as vehicles for identity (trans)formation “as they not 
only express but propel political transformations” (2013: 464). Through her examination of what 
she terms “aesthetic revolt,” Zubrzycki showed how changing the form and content of national 
icons —in her case, the icon of St. John the Baptist— can be an important resource for those 
advocating for new understandings of national identity. In the case of Quebec, left-wing 
nationalists consistently contested and reworked the physical form of the national icon of St. 
John the Baptist to better suit their vision of Quebecois national identity. In order to explain this 
process, she coined the term aesthetic revolt, which refers to the “dual process whereby social 
actors contest and rework iconic symbols in the public sphere; those symbols acquiring, through 
those material manipulations, significations that push forward the articulation of new identities 
and provide momentum for institutional reforms” (2013: 428). Ultimately, her analysis led her to 
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propose a framework for a cultural sociology of national identity that aims to “take into account 
the power exerted by material symbols” (2013: 467).  
The concept of aesthetic revolt thus proves a valuable theoretical resource for researchers 
interested in examining and explaining how and why material objects, particularly salient 
national symbols, can be implicated in social change. However, given that Zubrzycki’s study was 
based on a single empirical case, it is difficult to glean from her analysis whether, and the extent 
to which, aesthetic revolts can vary in the forms that they take. While in the case of the Quiet 
Revolution aesthetic revolt took the form of a complete disavowal of the Catholic model of 
Quebecois national identity and its attendant symbols (namely through the eventual “beheading” 
of St. John the Baptist), it is possible that activists could engage in aesthetic revolt without 
engaging in a full subversion and disavowal of national symbols. Thus, when attending to the 
actions of Polish LGBT activists and their engagement with national symbols, I pay particular 
attention to the ways in which they engage with these symbols in order to determine the extent to 
which their aesthetic revolt may differ from the one detailed by Zubrzycki in her analysis of the 
Quiet Revolution. Attending to these subtle but important distinctions will help extend the 
concept of aesthetic revolt in new directions.   
In addition, while I agree with Zubrzycki that cultural objects such as national symbols 
can be powerful and help to usher in social change, I differ slightly on the question of precisely 
how and why this is possible. Primarily, I contend that while the concept of aesthetic revolt is 
useful in advancing our understandings of how material objects are both powerful and can serve 
as important catalysts for social change, it has done so without emphasizing the important role 
played by the internal, mental worlds of social actors as they engage with such symbols. In her 
articulation of the concept, Zubrzycki argues that material symbols “allow social actors…to 
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contest given representations and narratives and rearticulate new ones” (2013: 464). Yet this 
approach to examining the power of cultural objects —given that Zubrzycki was dealing with 
historic materials— focuses primarily on the role of the objects and less on the equally important 
aspects of human cognition that work to bring forth meanings and interpretations from these 
objects, thereby allowing social actors to engage with them in meaningful ways. Thus, I argue 
that for a more complete understanding of how cultural objects can be powerful and help to 
produce social change, scholars examining aesthetic revolt should pay equal attention to both 
processes13. The present study, through its inclusion of in-depth interviews, is an initial attempt 
to expand the concept of aesthetic revolt in this way.  
 
The Symbolic Boundaries of National Identity 
 By examining the ways that sexual minorities navigate their national identity as well as 
LGBT activists’ engagement in aesthetic revolt, this dissertation also addresses broader 
theoretical questions concerning the process of symbolic boundary work (Lamont and Molnar 
2002). Specifically, it addresses the ways in which the symbolic boundaries of national identity 
can be extended and redefined within a single ethno-national community (Zubrzycki 2014).  
 The foundational work articulating the importance of attending to the boundaries formed 
between groups in research on ethnicity and nationalism is Frederik Barth’s Ethnic Groups and 
Boundaries (1969). In this seminal text, Barth sought to shift analytical focus from the “cultural 
stuff” existing within group boundaries to the formation and maintenance of boundaries 
themselves (1969:15). Barth’s explanation for the persistence of ethnic groups thus popularized 
                                               
13 Importantly, extending the concept of aesthetic revolt in this way does not require a radical departure 
Zubrzycki’s original formulation. Rather, it simply means to draw greater attention to the important role 
that human interiority plays in the complex process of aesthetic revolt.   
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the idea that ethnic groups do not exist as inevitable things-in-the-world to which individuals 
naturally belong, but rather reflect the constant interactions between collectives that help to 
shape their identities. According to this perspective, belonging to an ethnic —or by extension 
national— group depends on active processes of inclusion and exclusion as groups are not 
constituted by “‘objective’ differences, but only those which the actors themselves regard as 
significant” (1969:14).  
 While Barth helped to introduce and popularize the concept of boundaries to the 
comparative study of ethnicities (Wimmer 2013), the concept began gaining traction in sociology 
due to the work of Michèle Lamont. In her classic work Money, Morals, and Manners (1992), 
Lamont distinguished between two types of boundaries that are often drawn in social life: social 
and symbolic. While social boundaries are objective manifestations of social differences that can 
promote inequality, Lamont defined symbolic boundaries as “conceptual distinctions used by 
social actors to categorize objects, people, practices, and even time and space” (Lamont and 
Molnar 2002: 168). These conceptual distinctions are formed by collectives as ways to think 
about complex concepts such as immigrants and immigration (Bail 2008), what constitutes 
“high” and “low” culture (Lamont 1992), or what criteria determine belonging in the national 
context (Theiss-Morse 2009; Zubrzycki 2016).   
 Given that nationalism is a phenomenon largely premised on the delineation between 
“insiders” and “outsiders,” the concept of symbolic boundaries has proven fruitful in much 
research on the topic (Onasch 2017; Phillips 1996; Theiss-Morse 2009; Wimmer 2013)14. 
                                               
14 It is worth noting that Brubaker and colleagues’ (2006) study of nationalism in the Transylvanian town 
of Cluj, while not explicitly utilize the concept of symbolic boundaries, introduced an important challenge 
to traditional ways in which the concept of boundary is used in nationalism research. Instead of assuming 
the existence of boundaries, their methodological approach was designed to reveal whether or not, as well 
as when, such conceptual distinctions were invoked by people in their everyday lives. This general 
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However, due to their empirical foci, much of the existing literature has focused on examining 
the ways in which symbolic boundary work is conducted between groups. Given that Poland 
remains a nation where the vast majority of citizens belong to the same ethno-national 
community, my research, following Zubrzycki’s, examines and contributes to scholarly 
understanding of “the process through which boundaries are redefined within one national 
community” (2016: 71). In her research, Zubrzycki outlines three overlapping processes related 
to such boundary work: softening, stretching, and reshaping and shows how non-Jewish Poles’ 
interest in and mainstreaming of Judaism is part of a complex process of modifying the 
boundaries of Polish national identity.   
While similar, my case differs in one important respect. Zubrzycki’s examination of 
Polish “philosemitism” examined the ways in which Poles, but not Polish Jews themselves, 
worked to soften, stretch, and reshape the boundaries of national identity. As such, the empirical 
focus was primarily on actions taken in the realms of discourse (by contesting the dominant 
place of the Catholic Church in Polish society), social activism (by mainstreaming the idea that 
“Jewishness” is not foreign to “Polishness”), and memory work that aimed to show the deep 
roots of Jewish culture in Poland. While my research too focuses on activists’ attempts to lessen 
the Church’s grip on Polish society, it also examines how sexual minorities themselves navigate 
and possibly contest the narrow boundaries of national identity advocated by the Church, Right 
and Far-Right. Focusing on the intrapersonal navigation of boundaries in addition to boundary 
work through activism thus enables me to illustrate the relationship between symbolic boundary 
work as it occurs at the level of intrapersonal identifications and social and political activism. In 
                                               
approach to understanding nationalism and national identification has since become the hallmark of the 
“everyday nationhood” perspective (Fox and Miller-Idriss 2008).   
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addition, through my analysis of openly gay politician Robert Biedroń and his political 
movement in the final chapter, I demonstrate how this boundary work has also entered the realm 
of official politics.  
My dissertation therefore makes the following contributions: First, it contributes to the 
literature on everyday nationhood by addressing the empirical question of how Polish sexual 
minorities navigate their national and sexual identities in a time of ardent nationalism and anti-
LGBT sentiment. Second, it adds to research examining the formation of symbolic boundaries 
and how such boundaries are navigated and negotiated within a single ethno-national 
community. Third, by examining how the Polish LGBT community has engaged with and 
modified prominent national symbols and by underscoring the relationship between the mental 
and material worlds, my dissertation extends the concept of aesthetic revolt in new directions.  
 
Data, Methods, and Chapter Outlines 
Following the literature on everyday nationhood (Brubaker et.al 2006; Fox and Miller-
Idriss 2008; Skey 2010), I interviewed what is considered “ordinary” members of the national 
community, which the literature has defined as “those normally deemed to be on the receiving 
end of state, institutional and intellectual efforts to shape national identity, as compared to 
‘elites’ or ‘intellectuals’” (Miller-Idriss and Rothenberg 2012: 151). More specifically, I 
conducted in-depth interviews with Polish citizens who identified as non-heteronormative, were 
18 years or older, and came from a variety of social backgrounds. I interviewed a total of 60 
individuals. Initial contacts for these interviews were made through an advertisement that the 
Campaign Against Homophobia (KPH), Poland’s largest LGBT rights organization, helped me 
launch in the Summer of 2017. I met the first respondents through this advertisement, and the 
remainder through snowball sampling. Before returning to the field to conduct more interviews 
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in the Fall of 2019, I re-established contact with previous respondents in order to find more 
willing participants through snowball sampling. Respondents spanned a wide range of 
educational backgrounds and careers, and ages ranged from 18 to 64.  
My interview questions were primarily designed to understand levels of national 
identification among my respondents. Some of the literature on everyday nationhood has 
discussed the pros and cons of direct solicitation of nation-talk through interviews (Fox and 
Miller-Idriss 2008; Fox 2017). When aiming to discover when the nation matters to people, 
scholars have suggested that ethnographic observation is the best approach, as interviews seldom 
allow researchers to access the more situational aspects of national identification. However, 
when aiming to uncover what the nation means to individuals, scholars in the everyday 
nationhood tradition have claimed that direct-solicitation via interviews is the most useful way 
forward (Miller-Idriss and Rothenberg 2012). In-depth interviews are therefore considered to be 
the best way to capture the wide range of contents of national identity, or what the nation and 
national identity mean to respondents. My approach therefore closely mirrored that of George 
Gaskell, who argues that “the real purpose of qualitative research is not counting opinions or 
people but rather exploring the range of opinions, and the different representations of the issue” 
(2000: 41). 
I began each interview with a more general conversation in order to better get acquainted 
with my respondents before moving into the thematic questions.  After my introductory 
questions, which on average took about fifteen minutes, I moved to the questions that were 
meant to tap into how respondents think about “Polishness” and their identification with their 
national identity. Such questions included prompts to define what it means to be Polish, what 
being Polish means to them personally, as well as the extent to which they identify with their 
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“Polishness” or with other identities, such as Cosmopolitanism, more regionally specific 
identities, or their vocations. Overall, my questions were designed to elicit what respondents 
think about Poland and “Polishness” more generally and their own Polish identity specifically, 
what they associate with Poland and “Polishness,” how they view and articulate their personal 
sense of national belonging, and how they navigate and perhaps challenge the boundaries of 
national identity in Poland.  
 While the interview data is essential in helping me illustrate the ways in which sexual 
minorities navigate their national and sexual identities, it is necessary to situate them in a broader 
socio-historical context. My dissertation therefore also examines how sexual minorities have 
been framed in Right-wing discourse beginning when Poland began to consider acceding to the 
European Union in the early 2000s. In my data collection, I focused on three conservative 
periodicals: Do Rzeczy (To The Point) Gość Niedzielny (Sunday Guest) and Nasz Dziennik (Our 
Daily) in addition to the official newsletter of the Roman Catholic Church, Biuletyn Katolickiej 
Agencji Informacyjnej (Bulletin of the Catholic Information Agency, or Bulletin KAI for short)15. 
Both Nasz Dziennik and Do Rzeczy are considered “Far-Right” publications, the former being a 
daily publication and the latter a weekly, and will be useful in capturing the more extreme 
conservative arguments. I have chosen to focus on both in order to include both a weekly and a 
daily publication. Gość Niedzielny is a conservative weekly Catholic newspaper, which helps to 
capture conservative opinions that are not as extreme as those found in Nasz Dziennik and Do 
Rzeczy. Finally, Biuletyn KAI includes interviews, official statements, and letters written by 
Church hierarchy in Poland. Given the continued strength and salience of the Roman Catholic 
                                               
15 I will often refer to eKAI, Bulletin KAI’s electronic newsletter, throughout the dissertation.  
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Church in Poland, it is important to consider the ways Church officials frame issues regarding 
sexual minorities in Poland.  
Other primary source documents include images collected online as well as taken during 
my fieldwork, legal documents, flyers and posters from political rallies and LGBT pride events. 
These data further help to demonstrate the ways the Polish Right frame sexual minorities in their 
attacks on them, as well as how progressive political parties and LGBT Rights organizations 
have worked to counter these framings. Images of national icons, and the ways in which they 
have been modified by those advocating for LGBT rights, play a particularly important role in 
the chapter examining aesthetic revolt.  
Additional data comes from fieldwork conducted in Poland between May 2017 and 
December 2019. During my fieldwork, I attended LGBT pride events in Warsaw, Kraków, 
Poznań, and Wrocław, as well as smaller, informal gatherings of LGBT NGO’s in Poland such 
as the Campaign Against Homophobia (KPH) and Love Does Not Exclude (Miłość Nie 
Wyklucza). In addition, I attended demonstrations organized by the Catholic Church and Right 
wing political parties, including the annual “March for Life and Family” in both Warsaw and 
Kraków in the summer of 2019. Lastly, in the spring of 2019 I spent two weeks following 
progressive politician Robert Biedroń’s campaign for E.U. parliament. During this time, I 
traveled with the campaign on their tour bus to several cities in southeastern Poland where I 
attended press conferences, campaign speeches and rallies, as well as informal meals and 
gatherings with the campaign staff.  
 
Outline of Chapters 
 The first chapter consists of a broad overview of Polish national mythology, 
demonstrating the ways in which the traditional national myths have been integral to political 
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discourse in Poland throughout the last century. It also details the rise of the institutional 
Catholic Church in Poland, both providing crucial context for the primary focal point of this 
dissertation. Chapter two provides a more detailed account of the ways in which sexual 
minorities in Poland have been framed by the Church and Polish Right by focusing on how 
criticisms and attacks on the LGBT community have taken place in various spheres of public 
life.  
 Chapters three and four detail the ways in which sexual minorities navigate the political 
and social contexts outlined in the preceding chapters. Chapter three focuses exclusively on in-
depth interviews, demonstrating the various ways in which Polish sexual minorities navigate 
national identity and belonging at a time of heightened hostility towards the LGBT community 
and “LGBT Ideology.” Chapter four moves to examine the ways that LGBT activists and allies 
have attempted to challenge traditional understandings of national identity by engaging in 
aesthetic revolt. In the concluding chapter, I focus on the career of openly gay progressive 
activist and politician Robert Biedroń, including my time spent on the campaign trail with 
Biedroń and his political party Spring (Wiosna) in May of 2019. In this chapter I show how both 
his work as an LGBT activist and his political campaign —while not directly nor exclusively 
focused on LGBT rights— marked a significant attempt to delegitimize the role of the Catholic 
Church as the central moral force in Poland and thereby reshape the symbolic boundaries of 
Polish national identity.  
 Taken together, my chapters show how the symbolic boundaries of national identity are 
navigated and negotiated at the micro, meso, and macro levels, thereby demonstrating how such 
boundary work consists of a multitude of processes from the intrapersonal navigation of one’s 
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Chapter 1: “Catholic” Poland and the Rise of a New “Other” 
 
 Since the conclusion of the Second World War, Poland has been one of the most 
ethnically and religiously homogenous countries in the world (Casanova 1994; Zubrzycki 2006). 
Approximately 97% of the population is ethnically Polish, and since 1990, 90% to 97% of Poles 
claimed to be believers and Catholics, while those identifying as only partial or non-believers has 
ranged from only 3% to 8% (CBOS 2014)16. Poland also maintains a strong and vibrant national 
sensorium, and as Zubrzycki has shown the salience of religious symbols, icons and monuments 
dedicated to important Catholic figures in the public sphere help to inculcate the notion that 
Polish national identity is, and always has been, intimately tied to Catholicism (2006, 2011). In 
addition to the salience and strength of Catholic ideology, the institution of the Roman Catholic 
Church is one of the most powerful in Poland. Indeed, the Catholic Church of Poland is one of 
the largest non-governmental organizations in all of Europe and owns a substantial amount of 
property throughout the country (Zuba 2010: 117). Given the ubiquity of the institutional 
Catholic Church and the values and ideals it upholds, traditional Catholic values still play a 
central role in Poland’s political, social, and educational realms17 (Zielińska and Zwierdżyński 
2013).  
                                               
16 https://www.cbos.pl/EN/publications/reports/2012/049_12.pdf, Accessed 22, Mar 2020.  
17 Thus, it is well known in Poland that religious figures such as bishops often play a central role in 
political decision-making, often acting as an interest group promoting conservative, Catholic values (Zuba 
2010). The Church also plays a significant role in the educational sector, and Article 53 of the Polish 
constitution specifically outlines that parents have “the right to religious and moral upbringing and 
teaching of their children in accordance with their convictions” (Zielińska and Zwierdżyński 2013). 
Although participation in religious education is optional, the Education System Act of 1991 mandated 
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However, it would be mistaken to assume that Poland has always been this way. Indeed, 
before the tragic demise of Polish Jewry and other minority populations during and after the 
Second World War, Poland was —for most of its history— home to a variety of ethnic, 
linguistic, and religious groups. Although Polish Catholics comprised approximately 96% of the 
population by the end of World War II, in 1931 only 65% of Poles declared themselves Catholic 
(Tomaszewski 1993). Yet if one were to listen to the speeches from many contemporary 
members of the Church hierarchy or those of conservative politicians, it would appear as if 
Poland has always been a predominately Catholic nation. This is largely because the myths of 
Poland’s inherent Catholicism as well as that of its status as the martyrological “Christ of 
nations” are deeply woven into Polish national consciousness (Zubrzycki 2011).  
In this chapter, I demonstrate how and why contemporary attacks on the LGBT 
community in Poland are rooted in a deeper cultural and political struggle driven by the desire to 
preserve the image of Poland’s unassailable ties to Catholicism. Through an analysis of both 
primary and secondary source data, I illustrate that in both contemporary Poland and throughout 
the last century of Polish history, proponents of the idea that Poland is —and always has been— 
an immutably Catholic nation frame identities that do not conform to this standard as anti-
national and threatening to the well being of the nation. Although numerous studies (O’Dwyer 
2018; Ostolski 2007; Graff 2006; Shibata 2009) have examined the logics of the Polish Right’s 
targeting of sexual minorities, the scope of these analyses has remained focused primarily on 
contemporary discourses from the E.U. accession period and onward. Some studies have taken a 
deeper historical arc when addressing such questions (O’Dwyer 2018; Ostolski 2007; Shibata 
                                               
that all state schools are obligated to organize religious education classes beginning in elementary 
education. This act was extended to Kindergartens in 1999.  
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2013), yet have not directly focused on the role that conceptions and pronouncements of national 
identity have played in the “othering” of Polish sexual minorities. My analysis therefore extends 
these works by demonstrating how appeals to preserving “traditional” understandings of national 
identity are intertwined in such arguments.  
I begin with a brief genealogy of Polish national identity. My genealogy starts with a 
discussion of the legacy of Roman Dmowski, leader of the National Democratic Party (1893-
1939) who is now largely understood as the godfather of extremist Right-Wing ideologies and 
contemporary Far-Right parties and groups in Poland (Pankowski 2010; Walicki 2000). I 
conclude this portion of the chapter by focusing on the post-World War II period, particularly the 
1970s and 80s. In the following section, I detail how two major structural and cultural 
transformations —the fall of state socialism and Poland’s accession to the European Union 
(E.U.)— brought about fears that Poland may lose touch with its intrinsic Catholicism, in 
addition to how sexual minorities began to fit into this picture. The chapter concludes with a 
detailed discussion of post-accession Poland and the ways in which this new political and social 
environment fostered room for the growth for LGBT organizations and activism, but also helped 
to bring about fierce criticism of what is now often referred to as “LGBT ideology.” I 
demonstrate that throughout all of these periods, a central premise for the Right was the desire to 
preserve a conservative, Catholic notion of Polish national identity and frame those who deviated 
from it as existing outside of and against “true Polishness.”18  
 
                                               
18 Importantly, this desire was not always tied to the denigration of “others.” This is particularly the case 
during the state socialist period, when the Church represented a challenge to the socialist state. Yet this 
could also be explained by the fact that during this period, non-heteronormative sexualities were largely 
assumed not to exist, and thus remained largely underground and entirely apolitical.  
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Polish National Identity as Catholic, Oppositional, and Defensive  
Poland, which lost independence when it was partitioned by Prussia, Russia, and Austria 
in the late 18th century, regained independence in 1918 and was once again able to exist as a 
sovereign nation with an independent state. However, as Zubrzycki (2006) has argued, one of the 
consequences of this long partition period was that Polish national identity began to be premised 
primarily on having a common language, culture, and faith, making the formation of a civic 
nationalism more difficult. Given the long and persistent periods of repression that came with 
partition, there grew a movement19 whose aim was to firmly align Polish national identity with 
the tenets of Roman Catholicism while also castigating and denying any other interpretation of 
what it might mean to be Polish. Thus, as Rogers Brubaker has aptly put it, in this period Poland 
was increasingly seen as a state of and for ethnic Poles (1996). Such understandings of national 
identity were strongly advocated and firmly implanted by Roman Dmowski, leader of the 
National Democracy and “the main ideologist and undisputed leader of modern integral 
nationalism in Poland” (Walicki 2000).  
 At the time of his rise to political significance in late 19th century Poland, Dmowski 
represented a new type of nationalism that was critical of elite heritages and nobility. Himself 
coming from a humble background as the son of a stonecutter, Dmowski came to epitomize what 
Walicki refers to as a “plebian nationalism” (2000: 3). His general outlook was highly influenced 
by Social Darwinism (Millard 1995), as he emphasized the harsh realities of survival in the 
world that necessitated ethnic rivalry in addition to an intolerance for ethnic diversity. Another 
                                               
19 Although the National Democratic Party was officially formed in 1893, the serious institutionalization 
of its ideas came in the period following the first World War (Pytka 2013). See Pytka 2013 for a 
fascinating and in-depth analysis of the various logics of exclusion occurring in Poland in the late 19th and 
early 20th centuries.  
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important tool in Dmowski’s ideological arsenal that helped to legitimize such notions was 
positivism, which promoted the idea that the nation is best understood as a social organism that 
was subject to the laws of nature20 (Porter 2000; Pytka 2013). By understanding the Polish nation 
in this way, and as positing Poles as “sharing ‘objective’, concrete characteristics such as 
language, faith, and history” (Zubrzycki 2006: 53), Poland began to see a nationalism that was 
no longer driven by Romanticism21, but by a logic of inclusion and exclusion (Porter 2000). As 
the rest of this chapter will demonstrate, such ideas are still fertile in the rhetoric of the Polish 
Right and Far-Right today. 
 The intolerant and discriminatory attitudes held by Dmowski and the National 
Democracy were far-reaching and included nearly anyone that was not deemed “properly” 
Polish. One of the primary scapegoats in this period were Jews, who Dmowski often condemned 
as a community that wished to undermine and take control of Poland22. Such paranoia was also 
directed towards Germans, who Dmowski believed were collaborating with Jews in order to once 
again divide and dismember Poland (Mendelsohn 1983: 38). A passage from one of his novels 
titled Heritage clearly expresses these sentiments: “A Jewish woman will always be a Jew, a 
Jewish man, a Jew. They have another skin, they smell differently, they carry the evil among the 
nations” (quoted in Kossert 2011). At the core of Dmowski’s beliefs, then, was the fear that 
Polish culture was under siege by a threatening non-Catholic “other” and therefore in need of 
                                               
20 This notion of positivism became popular after the failed Uprising of 1864, as a direct contradiction of 
Romantic visions of the nation (Davies 1982). Although this was before Dmowski’s time, the positivist 
movement certainly helped to influence his views.  
21 Romanticism in Poland was an intellectual and literary period largely driven by reflections on Poland’s 
status under the partitions and the desire to see Poland become a free country. Romantic poets and authors 
would therefore often write on topics regarding freedom and sovereignty.  
22 Such sentiments were expressed clearly in his 1925 polemical essay, “Żydzi wobec wojny” (Jews in the 
War), among other places.  
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protection. Although he never advocated for physical violence (Walicki 2000), he fully 
advocated measures such as boycotting businesses owned by Jews (and various other ethnic 
minority groups), which helped to further solidify the “oppositional” and fundamentally Catholic 
conception of Polish national identity that began forming in the late 19th century (Zubrzycki 
2006).  
 In addition to its ethnically driven prejudices, Dmowski’s nationalism was also bolstered 
by misogyny. Indeed, after the partition period Dmowski bemoaned a situation in which “wives 
now ruled their husbands” (quoted in Pytka 2013: 233). He believed that if women had any 
power, they would then have a say in Poland’s moral development, thereby making it a weaker 
and more effeminate nation. Such worries extended to the realm of education, as Dmowski 
believed that any teachings of Romanticism were “effeminate” and resulted in a “feminization” 
of pedagogy in Poland. He described Romantic approaches to nationalism —those that did not 
entail a defensive devotion to the protection of a strictly “Polish Poland”— as “moral gangrene” 
(quoted in Pytka 2013: 234). Thus, according to the Social Darwinian logic that prevailed in 
Dmowski’s mind, a nation that dabbled in such “feminine education” was destined to falter and 
fail.  
After World War I the effort —largely led by Dmowski— to further cement the notion 
that Poland was a Catholic nation and that a Polish national identity ought to be rooted in 
Catholicism, continued through tangible policies and actions.  As Pytka argues, this was a period 
when Polish nationalism “crossed the threshold from defensive posturing to offensive pursuit of 
governmental policy” (2013: 309). Such policies, however, were not simply advocating for the 
Church and its teachings, but also entailed the systematic exclusion and stigmatization of ethnic 
minorities. Thus, this era saw official boycotts of Jewish businesses as well as a quota system 
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that limited the number of Jews that could be admitted to universities (Zubrzycki 2006: 58). 
Throughout the interwar period, the National Democracy continued to publish articles and essays 
whose purpose was to inculcate the inseparability of the concepts “Polish” and “Catholic.” A key 
example is a brochure Dmowski published in his later years titled Church, Nation, and State in 
which he claimed: 
Catholicism is not an appendage to Polishness, coloring it in some way; it is, 
rather, inherent to its being, in large measure it constitutes its very essence. To 
attempt to dissociate Catholicism from Polishness, and to separate the nation 
from its religion and Church, is to destroy the very essence of the nation.  
 
The ideas proposed in Church, Nation, and State are far from controversial in contemporary 
Poland. Indeed, Dmowski still enjoys praise as one of the fathers of independent Poland who 
helped establish new schools of political thought in the tumultuous years of the early 20th 
century. As a tribute, a statue of him stands at a prominent intersection near one of Warsaw’s 
major city parks, and a major traffic roundabout in the center of Warsaw also bears his name. In 
addition to these physical memorials, in 1999 the Polish Sejm voted to adopt a resolution paying 
tribute to Dmowski that passed with little controversy, which some scholars have argued is a 
testament to just how far Right Polish politics had moved by that time (Walicki 2000). Although 
the Sejm lauded many aspects of Dmowski’s career, according to them his greatest contribution 
was “underlining the tight association of Catholicism with Polishness for the survival of the 
Nation” (Zubrzycki 2006).  
 
State Socialism and the Further Reification of a “Catholic Poland” 
After the Second World War, Poland’s demographic make-up changed dramatically. 
Even though approximately 65 percent of the population was ethnically Polish and 
denominationally Catholic during the interwar period (Tomaszewski 1993), the rise of Nazism 
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brought well-known devastation to Poland’s Jewish community. By the war’s end, the 
population was approximately 95 percent ethnically Polish and 96.6 percent Catholic (Casanova 
1994). Given this profound demographic shift, hardly any minority groups now existed to help 
shape the historical narrative of Poland’s national identity (Zubrzycki 2006). Therefore, by the 
late 1970s, the prominent understanding of Polish identity increasingly became the notion of the 
“Polak-Katolik,” or Catholic Pole. As one scholar has aptly noted, this period marked a time 
when “confronted with two powerful authoritarian Creeds —Catholicism and Marxism— the 
society opted for its Church” (Walaszek 1986: 131).  
 Before its rise to prominence, the Catholic Church was largely overshadowed by the 
socialist state in the latter’s quest for legitimacy. However, such legitimacy hardly took root. By 
1980 polls showed that nearly 92 percent of Poles disapproved of the state socialist regime and 
wanted to see the involvement of more non-party affiliated in positions of power, and that 
approximately 80 percent desired a more active role of the Church in public life (Walaszek 1986: 
129). One of the first shifts in this direction came when the primate of Poland, Cardinal Stefan 
Wyszyński, came to occupy a more active and political role in society. Wyszyński would deliver 
sermons that often focused on the problems of anti-religious sentiment under the current regime, 
and during his tenure he was increasingly seen as Poland’s spiritual father and leader. Crucially, 
Wyszyński continued to refer to the Polish nation as a living organism that was in need of 
protection, while also further advocating for and thus helping solidify the idea that Poland was an 
inherently Catholic nation (Lewandowski 1989; Zubrzycki 2006). The important role of 
Wyszyński, in addition to Karol Wojtyła being elected as the first ever Polish Pope in 1978, 
helped further fuel the idea —dormant for some time under state socialism— that Catholicism 
and Poland were and always have been two sides of the same coin.  
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 The strength and salience of the Church and of the Polish-Catholic identity became even 
more pronounced with the rise of the Solidarity movement in the 1980s. Although Solidarity 
initially formed as a secular response to widespread dissatisfaction with the party state, it soon 
affiliated itself with the Church. At this time, the Church was increasingly seen as the primary 
bastion against the increasingly illegitimate system of state socialism. Working together, 
Solidarity and the Church delivered a powerful narrative of Poland’s suffering under the 
totalitarianism of the party state. On one side there was the oppressive state, commensurate to 
previous regimes that subjugated Poland during the partitions and the Second World War, while 
on the other stood the Church and the Polish people. In addition to the perpetuation of this 
powerful narrative, churches also became important meeting places for the movement, which 
helped to further imbricate religion and politics. Once Solidarity and the Church joined forces, 
there was little the party state could do to exert its authority, as the primary source of legitimacy 
and main vector for Polish identity had now become the Church23. Thus, by the end of the 1980s, 
87% percent of Poles stated they trusted the Church, while 68% believed the government to be 
trustworthy (Ramet 2006: 121).  
 
Poland’s Sexual Minorities: Emerging from the Fringe  
 During the era of Solidarity, there was little concern regarding sexual minorities and 
homosexuality in Poland. As one scholar has stated, the period of state socialism was one where 
“the communist political system discriminated against everybody and everything considered to 
be a social and/or cultural ‘deviation’,” and therefore sexual minorities did not stand out (Mucha 
                                               
23 For more detailed analyses of the fusion of Solidarity and the Church, see Walaszek 1986, Zubrzycki 
2006 (esp 67-75). For an excellent analysis of the Church’s political strategy after the fall of state 
socialism, see Zuba 2010.  
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1997). However, it was still common for authorities to close down meeting places such as bars, 
baths, and clubs once they were discovered to be meeting places for members of the gay 
community (Szulc 2011). Sexual minorities in this era therefore kept a low profile, as it was still 
considered taboo and improper to discuss issues such as sexuality in the public sphere. At the 
time, it was common for sexual minorities to resort to secretive measures such as devising 
surreptitious signals in order to identify each other in public spaces (Giza 1963). There was 
therefore a tacit agreement in Polish society at this time that as long as one’s sexuality was kept 
private, it would not be subject to interrogation, criticism, or punishment. For this reason, very 
few if any formal organizations for sexual minorities existed at the time (Mucha 1997; Szulc 
2011).  
 Life for sexual minorities in Poland took a drastic turn in November of 1985, however, 
when police raided all known gay establishments as well as the apartments of known members of 
the gay community (Mucha 1997). Similar raids continued until 1987, and by then over 11,000 
documents had been compiled containing the personal data of sexual minorities throughout 
Poland. Scholars believe that this raid, known as operation Hyacinth, was driven by fears around 
HIV/AIDS, unsubstantiated claims that gay men committed a disproportionate amount of crimes, 
in addition to concerns around a growing political movement among Poland’s gay community 
(Szulc 2011). The raids did not have the intended effect, however, as it is precisely after 
Operation Hyacinth that Poland’s gay community began to organize. Thus, by 1987 a number of 
regional gay activist groups held a conference in Warsaw, and in 1988 a group of Warsaw gays 
formally applied to register their organization with the Warsaw regional court (Mucha 1997)24. 
                                               
24 For an in-depth discussion of the various gay magazines and journals at this time in Poland, see Szulc 
2017.  
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Their application was accepted two years later, and by this time Poland had become a democratic 
country. However, as the following sections will detail, problems for Poland’s sexual minorities 
were only just beginning.   
 
Protecting the Catholic Nation 
The Early Years of Polish Democracy: 1990-2003 
 The fall of state socialism in Poland was a monumental structural and cultural transition 
after which the Polish nation and state again became —for the first time since before World War 
II— congruent (Gellner 1983; Zubrzycki 2006). Poland was now a democratic state and was 
once again a nation of and for Poles (Brubaker 1996). With this profound change came 
opportunities for new groups and organizations to form. On the one hand, this new plurality was 
an optimistic development, as interests and causes —such as gay rights groups— that would 
have struggled to find a place during the last several decades could now effectively organize 
(Graff 2006; Gruszczyńska 2009). On the other hand, this newly formed space for civil society 
created competition and legitimacy issues for the Church. Although the Church proved to be an 
essential force in the Solidarity-era struggles against the socialist party state, its status as societal 
savior could not simply be assumed in the newly democratic Poland. The post-transition period 
was therefore one in which the discursive field of what should constitute “Polishness” was once 
again open for negotiation (Zubrzycki 2001).  
Indeed, during the early period of Poland’s transition, the Church struggled to maintain 
legitimacy. As Irena Borowik (2002) has noted, at this time a large number of organizations 
began to form in direct opposition to what was seen as the Church’s overreach into certain 
institutions such as education, in addition to their complete intolerance for abortion Thus, by 
1993, public support for the Church had fallen to 30% when it had been at 90% only four years 
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earlier (Zubrzycki 2006: 78). Another obstacle for the Church was Poland’s newfound 
“Westward” re-orientation of foreign policy, which many thought would give rise to secular 
norms and values. Faced with an uphill battle, the Church attempted to gain more influence in 
the newly pluralized post-transition Poland through various means. As Krzysztof Zuba (2010) 
has shown, during this period the Church strived to retain its grasp on Polish society by directly 
supporting Catholic nationalist parties, continuing to promote religious teachings in schools, as 
well as by acting as an interest group working to attain concrete, material benefits. The following 
quotation from Bishop Adam Lepa paints a clear picture of the Church’s views at the time: 
The task for believers is to introduce Christ into public life without any 
enclaves or exceptions, including the sphere of politics…If the Church does 
not deal with politics, then politicians will deal with the Church (quoted in 
Zuba 2010, emphasis added) 
 
Thus, according to church officials like Lepa, there is no situation where Poland can be detached 
from the Church. Indeed, according to this statement, the Church ought to involve itself in all 
spheres of Polish life, whether people liked it or not.  
Meanwhile, as the Church and its political allies struggled to maintain their power and 
relevance, Polish civil society was expanding and LGBT organizations began forming. In the 
1990s, however, such organizations were still uncommon and those that existed were not 
politically driven. Rather, the primary focus of early LGBT organizations in the 1990s was to 
help build a sense of community amongst Polish sexual minorities as well as focus on the 
HIV/AIDS crisis (O’Dwyer 2018; Szulc 2011). As Helena Flam has described it, the situation of 
sexual minorities in Poland at the time was one of “institutionalization without mobilization” 
(2001: 13).  Further, while these organizations were legally allowed to form, they struggled to 
find consistent sources of funding and office space, as landlords would often be reluctant to 
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“pollute their property” by renting to gays (Mucha 1997: 307). Although Poland’s sexual 
minorities now had the ability to formally organize, the overt social stigma that still existed 
regarding homosexuality kept them at a marginal position in society and, perhaps most 
importantly, continued to portray them as simply another eccentric and morally deficient group 
(Szulc 2011). Thus, by the end of the century, there was only one formally registered LGBT 
organization in Poland (O’Dwyer 2018).  
 The tide began turning, however, once it appeared almost certain that Poland would 
accede to the European Union. At this crucial moment, there were many questions circulating 
among the Church hierarchy25 concerning what Poland’s future as an E.U. member would look 
like. Most vocally against Poland’s integration was a faction of the Church that has become 
known as “Rydzyk’s circle,” a highly conservative collection of Church officials led by Tadeusz 
Rydzyk, founder of the popular and extremely conservative radio station Radio Maria. Critics of 
Poland’s integration focused primarily on issues of culture and bemoaned “Western” traditions 
that would impose unfavorable changes on traditional patterns in Polish life (Szumigalska 2015). 
In addition to installing deleterious cultural changes, some Church officials worried that E.U. 
accession would also promote secularization, and thus numerous appeals were made for the need 
to preserve the “Polish Soul” if Poland did accede to the E.U. (Czaja 1999).  
After much deliberation, and also due in large part to Polish Pope John Paul II’s 
enthusiasm for Poland’s accession (Hall 2015), Poland officially joined the E.U. in May of 2004. 
Although a number of Church officials remained concerned about the continued strength and 
                                               
25 There is a well known schism in the Polish Catholic Church between conservative and more liberal 
outlooks on social issues. The conservative perspective finds its voice in newspapers such as Gość 
Niedzielny (Sunday Guest) while the more liberal perspective is often articulated in the pages of 
Tygodnik Powszechny (The Catholic Weekly).  
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salience of the “Polish-Catholic” myth after Poland’s accession, many of them believed that a 
strongly religious Poland could once again serve as the soul of Europe.  
 
 
The Emergence of the “LGBT Threat” in Pre-Accession Poland  
 The pre-accession period brought renewed focus to Poland’s sexual minorities. Although 
criticisms of the LGBT community truly gained fervor after Poland joined the E.U., it is 
important to note that such sentiments were already brewing prior to Poland’s official accession 
in 2004. According to Dorota Hall, certain events occurring in the year 2000 proved crucial for 
the solidification of the stark opposition between homosexuality and the traditional values 
heralded by the Church (2015). A key example can be found in the ways in which numerous 
Polish periodicals framed the World Pride event that took place in Rome in 2000. Although only 
the most conservative publications were directly critical of the event, Hall shows how all sources 
framed the Pride as composed of “the Other that opposed not only the Church, but also the Polish 
nation and the values pertaining to its Christian heritage” (2015: 80). Thus, during this crucial 
period, sexual minorities began to be transformed in public discourse —by the Church and 
nationalist political parties and groups— from a deplorable yet harmless community of 
eccentrics into a political and ideological force that was incompatible with and hostile to “true 
Polishness.”26 Crucially, this new framing adhered strongly to the tenets of national identity 
championed by Dmowski and his followers who sought to instill the notion that Poland was an 
                                               
26 The most detailed and comprehensive account of this transition to date can be found in chapter 3 of 
Conor O’Dwyer’s (2018) excellent book, Coming Out of Communism: The Emergence of LGBT Activism 
in Eastern Europe.   
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inherently Catholic nation of martyrs that was in constant need of protection from harmful 




The Formation of Poland’s Politically Oriented LGBT Rights Organizations 
Now that Poland was going to be a part of the larger European project, it would be held 
accountable to certain standards whose purpose was to protect vulnerable minority communities. 
Given these optimistic new circumstances, there was renewed enthusiasm and growth for Polish 
LGBT activism27 in the years preceding Poland’s official accession. This period saw the 
formation of organizations that were clearly politically motivated and made issues such as same-
sex marriage and anti-LGBT discrimination measures their priorities. The hopes of numerous 
activists and progressively minded citizens at the time can be understood as an inversion of the 
ideals maintained by the Church and conservative politicians; instead of seeing Poland as the 
Catholic savior of a troubled Europe, Europe could help rescue Poland from antiquated 
mythologies whose perpetuation continued to harm various minorities in the region. Such 
aspirations, however, would prove increasingly difficult to realize.  
In this period, LGBT organizations in Poland began to frame their demands politically 
and “according to the logics of difference” (Hall 2015: 82). While a number of LGBT 
organizations were forming, arguably the most significant were the Campaign Against 
Homophobia (KPH) and Lambda Warsaw, as they were the only organizations at the time to 
adopt a formal and professional structure (O’Dwyer 2018: 116). Among these two groups, KPH 
                                               
27 The primary reference for my discussion of the growth of Poland’s LGBT movement is O’Dwyer’s 
2018 book, chapters 4-6.  
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was particularly active in the political sphere. Founded by Robert Biedroń28, KPH formed in 
Warsaw in 2001 and was immediately focused on tangible political gains for Polish sexual 
minorities such as promoting marriage equality and anti-discrimination legislation. Even the 
name “Campaign Against Homophobia” was meant to be testament to this political mission. 
Rather than focusing on a benign, non-threatening name, KPH’s founders wanted to emphasize 
that there was indeed a serious problem with societal homophobia in Poland that needed to be 
addressed head-on (Krzemiński et.al 2006).  Overall, KPH was the first LGBT rights 
organization in Poland that emphasized the importance of hybridizing aspirations for political 
rights while also helping to foster a stronger sense of group identity amongst Polish sexual 
minorities (O’Dwyer 2018).  
A primary example of this mission can be found in one of KPH’s first campaigns, “Let 
Them See Us” (Niech Nas Zobaczą), which many scholars consider one of the primary 
catalyzing moments for the LGBT movement in Poland (Graff 2006; Shibata 2009; Szulc 2011). 
The purpose of this campaign was to counter the increasingly vitriolic rhetoric, coming from 
both Far-Right organizations and political parties and the conservative faction of the Church, 
claiming that homosexuality posed a serious threat to Polish values and culture (O’Dwyer 2018: 
119). It also aimed to discredit arguments framing sexual minorities as eccentric perverts whose 
primary goal was to corrupt youth and destroy traditional models of the nuclear family (Hall 
2015; Mizielińska and Stasińska 2017). To achieve these goals, the campaign posted photos of 
gay and lesbian couples holding hands on billboards throughout Poland29. These couples were 
not holding rainbow posters or fulfilling any other common stereotypes regarding sexual 
                                               
28 Biedroń, who was the first openly gay member of parliament in Polish history, is now one of the most 
famous politicians in Poland and was a candidate for President in the 2020 election.   
29 The images were also shown in some small art galleries (Graff 2006).  
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minorities popular among the Right and Far-Right, but rather were depicted as average, everyday 
Poles. The only difference, of course, was that these average everyday Poles happened to be 
holding hands with partners of the same sex.  
   
Figure 1.1: Poster of the “Let Them See Us” Campaign. Taken from: 
https://karolinabregula.com/portfolio/let_them_see_us/, Accessed 12 Apr 2021.  
 
 
Despite, or perhaps because of, the fact that the “Let Them See Us” campaign simply showed 
images of gay and lesbian couples holding hands, KPH faced many hurdles in its realization. 
Many local governments chose not to authorize the campaign and organizers struggled to find 
spaces where they could rent billboards in multiple locations (O’Dwyer 2018). However, the 
campaign still managed to find some spaces to display their images and, although the majority of 
the billboards were destroyed or defaced within a few days, “Let Them See Us” sparked a heated 
debate concerning the place of sexual minorities in Poland’s public sphere (Graff 2006; 
Warkocki 2004). I discuss the Right-Wing backlash to this event, as well as the growth and 




Figure 1.2: Defaced poster of the “Let Them See Us” Campaign. Taken from: 
http://www.interalia.org.pl/en/artykuly/the_manchester_seminar/05_extremes_meet_anglopolish
_perspective_on_sexual_politics.htm, Accessed Apr 12 2021.  
 
 In addition to campaigns such as “Let Them See Us,” the pre-accession period saw the 
first attempts at organized pride demonstrations. While the earliest Polish Pride events saw few 
participants and faced fierce criticisms and sometimes violent counter-demonstrations, they too 
marked an important transition to a politics of visibility for the Polish LGBT movement (Ayoub 
2016).  
 
The League of Polish Families, Law and Justice and the Return of “Protective” Nationalism  
While shifting to a predominately political framing was a crucial milestone for the 
growth of Poland’s LGBT movement, its mobilization faced severe backlash. Such backlash was 
largely driven by the rhetoric and actions of two particularly significant political groups at this 
time; The League of Polish Families30 and Law and Justice. Crucially, it is essential to remember 
                                               
30 I will occasionally refer to the League of Polish Families as the “League.”  
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that in order to denigrate the LGBT population, these groups —following Dmowski’s protective 
nationalism— often framed sexual minorities as un-Polish threats to the status quo of a 
conservative, immutably Catholic Poland. In doing so, they adhered to the traditional myths that 
Poland is an inherently Catholic, martyr nation constantly under siege by anti-Catholic, and 
hence anti-Polish, forces.   
In the period following Poland’s transition from state socialism, the primary political 
divide was between groups on the “Left” that supported liberal social policies and secularism, 
and those on the “Right” that were staunchly focused on the “de-Communization” of Polish 
society, maintaining conservative social values, and promoting an active role for the Church in 
political and social life (de Lange and Guerra 2009; Szczerbiak 2001). However, given the high 
levels of fragmentation among the Polish Right, they often struggled with electoral successes (de 
Lange and Guerra 2009: 535). Indeed, until Law and Justice swept the elections of 2015, the 
most successful political parties were often either socially democratic or centrist31. Table 1 
describes the platforms of salient parties up until 2005 and Table 2 illustrates the breakdown of 
seats held in the Polish parliament from 1993 to 2005 32. It was not until Poland’s accession to 
the European Union became a near certainty that the political field began to open for the 
nationalist Far-Right and the League of Polish Families was able to win seats —albeit a small 




                                               
31 Law and Justice did win a majority in the 2005 elections, but was soon ousted in 2007 due to scandals 
and the centrist Civic Platform party remained in power until 2015.  
32 A number of the parties listed were either renamed versions of earlier parties, or coalitions.  
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Party Platform 
Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) Early progressive, social-democratic party 
that had recently joined with other 
progressive groups to form the “Left” 
(Lewica) coalition. 
Polish Peasant’s Party (PSL) Agrarian, Christian-democratic party that 
entered into coalition with the Civic 
Platform after the 2007 election cycle. 
Democratic Union (UD), Freedom Union 
(UW), Civic Platform (PO).  
UD: A liberal Christian-Democratic party 
that merged with other unsuccessful liberal 
parties after the 1993 elections in order to 
form UW. After the 1997 elections, both 
the UD and UW morphed to become PO, 
which remains as one of the two major 
political parties in Poland. 
Labor Union (UP) Small progressive and social-democratic 
party that merged with the Democratic 
Left Alliance in 2001. 
Self-Defense of the Republic of Poland (SRP) Agrarian, populist party with left-wing 
economic views and religious, 
conservative social views. Eurosceptic.   
Solidarity Electoral Action (AWSP) Large coalition party fusing liberal, 
conservative and Christian-Democratic 
perspectives. 
Law and Justice (PiS) Conservative, nationalist party that is 
currently the dominant political force in 
Poland. 
League of Polish Families (LPR) Far-Right, anti- E.U., nationalist party that 
traces its roots to Roman Dmowski’s 
National Democracy party. 
Table 1.1: List and description of Political Parties in Poland, 1993-2005 
 
Year/Ranking 
by % seats 
won 
1 2 3 4 5 6 










































































Table 1.2: Parties elected to Polish Sejm and Percentage of Votes, 1993-2005. From 2007-2015, the 
Civic Platform held a majority in parliament as well as the presidency, and was the prominent political 
voice in Poland. Since then, Law and Justice has held a strong majority. Spaces left blank mark spots held 
by parties that disbanded and did not merge with other parties. Highlights demarcate parties with similar 
views or those that eventually morphed into other parties (i.e. Democratic Union and Freedom Union both 
became part of the Civic Platform).  
 
 As Table 1.2 shows, the majority of parties that held power from 1993 until 2001 were 
generally social-democratic in nature. While some of them emphasized “Christianity,” such as 
the Polish People’s Party and the Democratic Union, their embrace of Christianity was not 
related to extremism as it was with the League of Polish Families. Indeed, extremist and/or Far-
Right groups (highlighted in red) only started to make it onto the political map in 2001. 
However, as the table shows, in 2001 the majority of seats (41%) were still held by the coalition 
of the Democratic Left Alliance and the Labor Union parties, followed by the centrist Civic 
Platform party which held 12.7% of seats. Together, these two parties controlled over 50% of the 
seats in parliament. What is striking here is to see how significantly matters changed between 
2001 and 2005. In a matter of a few years, not only did the Democratic Left Alliance (no longer 
in coalition with the Labor Union party) manage to descend from 41% to approximately 11% of 
seats, Law and Justice propelled upward from holding just below 10% up to nearly 30% of seats. 
Table 1.2 therefore clearly shows how quickly Polish politics began shifting from Center-Left to 
Right during Poland’s pre-accession period.  
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The League of Polish Families, although they are no longer part of Poland’s political 
landscape, was a significant political and social force in pre-accession Poland and into Poland’s 
first few years as an E.U. member33. While similar groups existed on the political fringe in the 
early years of Poland’s democratic statehood, it was not until the early 21st century that they 
were able to gain any meaningful traction in the political and public spheres with representatives 
in the parliament, government and various state agencies (Płatek and Płucinniczak 2017). While 
the League of Polish Families was not the only Far-Right group to emerge at this time, it was the 
largest and most organized due to its early support by one of Poland’s most conservative priests 
—and founder of the conservative Catholic radio station Radio Maria— Tadeusz Rydzyk 
(Pankowski 2010). The League considered itself a continuation of Dmowski’s National 
Democrats, and one of its founding members —Roman Giertych— had direct familial roots to 
members of Dmowski’s party. 
 Ideologically, the League of Polish Families represented a strain of “protective 
nationalism” (de Lange and Guerra 2009) that was motivated primarily by strict adherence to 
conservative Catholicism and fierce criticism of Poland’s accession to the E.U. Relatedly, their 
outlook was colored by a severe distrust of anything related to “parties,” given the still fresh 
connotation to “communist” party rule (Szczerbiak 2016: 116). Armed with these two 
motivations, the League was able to forcefully blend the myth of Poland’s inherent Catholicism 
with the myth of messianic martyrdom into a coherent political ideology which proclaimed that 
traditional, Catholic Polish values were under siege by corrupt “Western” (i.e. Western 
                                               
33 It is important to bear in mind, however, that although the League of Polish Families was able to pass 
the threshold to make it into parliament, they only occupied 7.87% of the seats. Yet despite their small 
official representation, they proved to be a very vocal coalition during their tenure in the Sejm, further 
abetting anti-LGBT sentiment in public discourse.  
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European, American, or simply not Polish) forces that wanted to subjugate and control Poland34. 
What was needed, according to the organization, was strict adherence to Catholicism, the nation, 
and patriotism (de Lange and Guerra 2009).  
While such ideas may have been on the political fringe only a decade earlier, the extreme 
perspectives of the League of Polish Families were able to take root at this time due to the 
favorable political and discursive opportunity structure available during the pre-accession period 
(de Lange and Guerra 2009; Płatek and Płucienniczak 2017). Specifically, anxieties concerning 
the consequences of Poland’s accession to the E.U. were still felt at the time, with 26% of the 
population claiming they would vote against accession in a poll conducted in 2000 (CBOS 
2000). Thus, while the majority of Poles still favored accession, there was still a significant 
contingent of the population that was hostile to the idea or simply undecided. The League’s focus 
on keeping Poland “Polish” and rooting out harmful influences to traditional Polish culture 
resonated among some of Poland’s “Euroskeptic” population, giving them 7.87% of votes in the 
2001 elections (de Lange and Guerra 2009).  
Once in the political limelight, members of the League of Polish Families expressed their 
ideological concerns in numerous ways. In addition to working through formal political 
channels, members —often joined by the radical extremist group the All Polish Youth— would 
engage in street demonstrations such as E.U. flag burnings, disruption of pro-E.U. meetings, and 
physical attacks on sexual and religious minorities (Pankowski 2010: 114), thereby blending 
political lobbying with tactics of intimidation and violence all in the name of protecting and 
preserving the Catholic, Polish nation.  
                                               
34 Their platform was also driven by a desire to halt any foreign investment into Poland, which was also 
seen as a way in which external, foreign forces could further control and subjugate the Polish nation.  
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The League had a wide range of targets. While they focused on traditional scapegoats 
such as Jews, they also began turning their attention towards the newly forming LGBT 
movement, which was largely seen as a corrupt import and consequence of E.U. accession. The 
following quotation from popular35 Far-Right daily Nasz Dziennik (Our Daily) in 2004 aptly 
summarizes their attitudes towards sexual minorities36: 
We are dealing with a radical movement, a wide-ranging network of 
organizations, pressure groups, radical intellectuals and activists, who not only 
seek to protect their interests but also to change our laws, our customs, our 
morality, and even our Catholic religion…. This is not about the purported 
struggle for gay rights: it is about the destruction of traditional society based on 
the primacy of the family…Their main goal is the destruction of society 
(quoted in Ostolski 2007: 165).  
 
The above quotation is both striking and telling. From the outset, the author makes clear that 
what “true Poles” are struggling against is something “radical,” something exerting great 
pressure on Polish culture and society. The author makes clear that the purported movement for 
gay rights is simply an illusion, one to take away from its true mission of societal destruction. In 
addition, it is important to note the order in which the author discusses the goals of the LGBT 
movement. According to him, not only does the LGBT movement want to change “our” laws 
and “our” customs —this usage of the term “our” clearly indicating an “us versus them” logic 
that frames the LGBT community as non-Polish— but “even our Catholic religion.” Such 
ordering —in addition to the use of the term “even”— implies that from the perspective of this 
author, of all the aspects of Polish culture and tradition that the LGBT movement is striving to 
                                               
35 Nasz Dziennik (est 1998) is owned by controversial conservative Priest Tadeusz Rydzyk, who became 
famous for his right-wing Catholic radio station, Radio Maryja. It is released daily, except Sundays, and 
has a circulation of roughly 100,000 (https://www.eurotopics.net/en/148726/nasz-dziennik).  
36 While this was not written by a member of League, O’Dwyer (2018: 66-70) shows how this statement 
is nearly identical to ones made by League parliamentarian Wojciech Wierzejski.  
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change, the most troubling is their purported attack on Catholicism. Such language therefore 
demonstrates not only how closely Catholicism and Polish national identity are intertwined in the 
minds of many on the Right and Far-Right in Poland, but how easily this connection can be 
mobilized to justify and support a logic of exclusion.  
 Such rhetoric was becoming more commonplace among the Polish Far-Right at this time. 
Adam Ostolski’s (2005) comparison of inter-war newspapers with those of the pre-accession 
period demonstrated that the rhetoric used to criticize Jews in the 1930s was strikingly similar to 
the League of Polish Families’ rhetoric targeting sexual minorities. Following his lead, a number 
of scholars (Shibata 2009, Graff 2010) have pointed out how in this period gays were becoming 
Poland’s “new Jews,” meaning that sexual minorities were starting to take the place of Jews as 
the new threatening “Others” in the minds of Poland’s nationalist groups37. In the most detailed 
analysis of League of Polish Families’ rhetoric to date, Yasuko Shibata showed how much of 
their rhetoric made sexual minorities out to be a community of depraved pedophiles and 
symbolic murderers of the Polish nation (2009: 267-268). The goal of the League, then, was to 
protect traditional, Catholic Poland from the threats brought by this group38. It was therefore 
common at this time for Far-Right MPs to refer to the “homosexual lobby” when discussing the 
actions of LGBT NGOs or sexual minorities in general.  
The League’s hateful rhetoric was not only visible in Far-Right periodicals, however. 
Since the party held roughly 8% of the seats in the Polish Sejm between 2001 and 2007, such 
comments became more commonplace in political discourse which, in turn, trickled out to the 
                                               
37 As Shibata has argued, a major reason for this shift was due to the fact that anti-Semitism was no longer 
“politically correct.”  
38 It is important to re-emphasize that sexual minorities were not the only target of the LPR at this time, 
but that they were a particularly important one especially once it became clear that Poland was going to 
join the E.U.  
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rest of Polish society. Perhaps the most controversial situation occurred when League of Polish 
Families leader, Roman Giertych, was elected as Minister of Education in 200539. During this 
period, the League seemed obsessed with eradicating anything remotely related to “homosexual 
content” from Polish schools. Specific actions taken included barring the Campaign Against 
Homophobia from accessing any educational funds from the E.U., initiating an internet filter for 
Polish schools that blocked access to any websites that even mentioned homosexuality, among 
other policies (O’Dwyer 2018: 67-69). Perhaps most disturbing, though, was the attempt to pass 
legislation that would prevent sexual minorities from becoming teachers (Czarnecki 2006: 31). 
At one point, Giertych fired the head of the national teacher training center for encouraging 
teachers to arrange meetings with LGBT groups and NGOs (O’Dwyer 2018: 65-66). 
 
                                               
39 Giertych’s election was met with widespread protests, mostly by University students, which he 
denounced as being led by “left-wing and homosexual organizations” (Czarnecki 2006: 27).  
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Figure 1.3: Homophobic Banner at Polish Soccer Match. The banner reads “Warsaw Free of 
Faggotry” with “LGBT” visibly crossed out. Taken from: https://noizz.pl/lgbt/warszawa-wolna-






Figure 1.4: Right-Wing Activists Holding Anti-LGBT poste. It reads “Family yes! Depravity 
No!” with an image common to Right-Wing rallies. Taken from: 
https://www.dw.com/en/intolerance-rife-in-polands-lgbt-free-communities/av-53471430, 
Accessed 12 Apr 2021.  
 
 
The opportunities for Poland’s LGBT community to thrive in this political and social 
climate were bleak. Although the League was unable to retain its seats in the Polish Sejm after 
2007, and was ultimately unable to formally institutionalize any of their anti-LGBT policies, 
their visibility and fervor posed numerous hurdles for the newly burgeoning LGBT movement to 
contend with. First, they helped to increase and promote the viability of anti-LGBT rhetoric in 
the public sphere. Second, they set a precedent for the introduction of discriminatory legislation 
meant to further curtail sexual minority rights in Poland. Lastly, and most crucial to the story 
being told here, they forcefully and consistently emphasized the idea that Poland was an 
inherently and immutably Catholic nation and that Catholic Poland had a new existential threat: 
sexual minorities.  
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The League of Polish Families, however, were not alone in their mission to protect 
Poland from the looming threat of “Europeanized” homosexuality (O’Dwyer 2018). During their 
time in the Sejm, the League often allied itself with the conservative, Catholic Law and Justice 
party. While the latter was staunchly opposed to the proliferation of the LGBT movement and to 
what they now refer to as “LGBT Ideology,” Law and Justice was not as extreme as the League 
of Polish Families. However, the de-facto leader of Law and Justice, Jaroslaw Kaczyński, often 
defended Roman Giertych’s assertions that homosexuality had no place in Polish schools and, as 
the following statement makes clear, decried homosexuality as something that was merely a 
passing fashion: 
I assure you that if a man from [Law and Justice] were Minister of Education, 
he would take the same direction as Giertych…I want to say it clearly, I am 
also against the promotion of homosexuality in school…I don’t see any reason 
to support the fashion for promoting homosexuality (quoted in Pankowski 
2010: 182. Emphasis added.) 
 
In addition, members of Law and Justice often criticized what they saw as the deceiving nature 
of the LGBT movement, which they believed was simply interested in pursuing an ideological 
agenda that would like to see Poland’s traditions destroyed. Not only did they frame sexual 
minorities and homosexuality as a threat to Catholic Poland, they often took the position as 
victim, claiming that tyrannical “Western” overreach was beginning to oppress “true Poles.”  
Thus, as Kaczyński once said, “In Western Europe they want to ban the Christmas tree and they 
have criminalized people who criticize homosexuality. In a moment they will go after the 
churches…it is a question of facts, not opinions” (quoted in Pankowski 2010: 158, emphasis 
added). Law and Justice therefore also helped perpetuate the “Polak-Katolik” myth at this time 
as well as the idea that Poland’s Catholic roots were under siege.  
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By the time Law and Justice rose to political prominence in 2005 by gaining a majority 
(27%) of seats in parliament as well the presidency, debates and controversies surrounding the 
LGBT community had become so salient that traditional focal points of the Far-Right, such as 
abortion and religious education, had faded into the background (Millard 2006). Not 
surprisingly, one of the first moves Law and Justice made once in power was to abolish the 
Government Plenipotentiary for the Equal Status of Men and Women, the only government 
organization whose official mandates included protecting the LGBT community (Czarnecki 
2006). Together, between 2001 and 2007, the League of Polish Families and Law and Justice 
helped to make the LGBT community the primary scapegoat for nearly all the problems that 
Catholic Poland was facing since joining the European Union.  
 
Pride and Prejudice: The Kraków, Poznań, and Warsaw Marches for Equality  
 This section demonstrates how and why the equality marches in Kraków (2004), Poznań 
(2005), and Warsaw (2004 and 2005) were crucial for Poland’s LGBT community. These events 
marked some of the earliest confrontations between Far-Right groups such as the League of 
Polish Families and the LGBT community, and will be instructive in further illustrating the 
extent and logic of anti-LGBT sentiment in post-accession Poland. Further, this discussion will 
also demonstrate the ways in which the newly burgeoning LGBT movement began to fight back 
and draw more national and international attention.  
 The Kraków40 march for equality in 2004 is an important place to begin because it 
occurred only one week after Poland officially joined the E.U. on May 1st. Plans for the march 
had been in the works since 2003 through the local branch of KPH, which was part of a larger 
                                               
40 My retelling of this event is based on the in-depth analysis provided by Grażyna Kubia (2006).  
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event called the Festival of Culture and Tolerance. The festival was sponsored by the 
Plenipotentiary for Equal Status of Women and Men and the Jagiellonian University’s sociology 
department, but was met with general disapproval from the University Rector, who happened to 
be a Catholic Archbishop (Kubica 2006). Despite some disapproval from the University, 
however, the events of the festival —which included a film screening, an art exhibition and open 
air concert— went on as scheduled and were left undisturbed.  
 Problems arose, however, with the march that was scheduled to be the concluding event 
for the festival. Unfortunately for the event’s coordinators, the original date for the march for 
equality overlapped with the Feast of St Stanisław, an important religious procession that takes 
place annually in Kraków. Saint Stanislaw was the first Polish saint to be canonized, and served 
as the Patron Saint of Poland until his murder by King Boleslaus II. He was soon after declared a 
martyr, and to this day represents the victory of religion over secularity. Although this oversight 
was allegedly more of an error of the municipality than of the event organizers, and despite the 
fact that the march was then moved back two days, it provided an impetus for anger and protest 
among the the more conservative, religious and Far-Right communities. Poland’s most popular 
daily newspaper, Gazeta Wyborcza, qualified the event as a simple misunderstanding, yet in the 
story also included an image showing two processions: one with believers holding a cross and 
another with activists holding a rainbow flag41. This image would soon symbolize one of the 
most significant political and cultural battles in contemporary Polish history.  
 Given the controversy leading up to the march for equality, it is not surprising that once 
the event took place, it was met with overt hostility. What was meant to be a small event quickly 
                                               
41 On the social importance of processions and potential political salience of parades, see Zubrzycki 2016. 
Chapter 4 will focus exclusively on the important of the symbolic aspects of Polish religious and national 
symbols and the rainbow.  
 59 
evolved into, from the perspective of the Polish Right and Far-Right, a national crisis. Thus, once 
the march started, members of the League and the neo-fascist group All Polish Youth (Młodzież 
Wszechpolska) as well as other disapproving citizens lined the streets jeering at participants in 
the march. Some threw eggs and even sometimes glass bottles. While many of those protesting 
the march simply yelled profanities, they also brandished banners with statements such as “The 
Wawel Dragon42 was straight” and “Stop Homosexuality.” Opponents also distributed a leaflet to 
passersby titled “Say No to homosexual promotion in Kraków,” which juxtaposed an image of 
the Wawel castle with an image of two drag queens. As Kubica points out in her analysis of the 
events, this image was meant to depict the primary motivation of the League and other radical 
groups present that day; to draw a stark contrast between what ought to be considered the 
formidable bulwark of Poland —the Wawel castle— and the newest threat to Polish national 
identity; sexual minorities.  
 While the events in Kraków illustrate how the Far-Right in Poland began framing the 
terms of the debate as “true Poles” versus “deviant and threatening homosexuals,” the 2005 
March for Equality in Poznań is a clear example of how LGBT organizing in Poland became 
more strategic. Like in Kraków, Poznań’s march was part of a larger event called the “Days of 
Equality and Tolerance,” which consisted of several events. However, the march in Poznań 
became controversial not because of overlapping with a religious holiday or procession, but 
because Mayor of Poznań Ryszard Grobelny decided to refuse a permit for the march four days 
before its scheduled occurrence. His decision was met with the approval of various other local 
politicians who were concerned with the promotion of homosexual behavior in public as well as 
for more tangible concerns such as possible property damage (Gruszczyńska 2009; Kowalczyk 
                                               
42 The Wawel dragon is a part of traditional Polish folklore, a story told to practically all Polish children. 
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2006). Further, one week before the scheduled march, a Poznań archbishop received a standing 
ovation after stating the following at a large ceremonial mass, showing how some Church 
officials often helped fuel the sentiments of the more active Right and Far-Right: 
…agreeing to organize this event- which in its essence is violating the most 
fundamental divine rights- is an insult to the memory of John Paul 
II…Freedom to assemble cannot be used as a smoke screen for offending 
public morality and promoting homosexual behavior (Quoted in Gruszczyńska 
2009) 
 
However, after a few days of legal struggles, it was ruled that the attempt to ban the parade 
violated the right to freedom of assembly under the Polish constitution, and the event was set to 
continue. While the event did not draw as large a crowd of counter-protestors as the march in 
Kraków, it remains a controversial event in Polish LGBT history because of the actions of local 
police once the march ended. The following account by an event organizer succinctly 
summarizes the controversial events that day: 
This is the moment that the police run up to the people putting together a 
pacifist symbol and arrest them. People are scared (the police are brutal and do 
not seem to care that somebody might be hurt) and sit down on the ground, 
some fall over…people are dragged out in a brutal way, they are pulled and 
beaten. First they take out Marta, who is sitting on the ground, and they 
brutally pull our Agata, then Gaja and Asia (quoted in Gruszczynka 2009) 
 
According to personal correspondence with scholar and activist Adam Ostolski, the accounts of 
police brutality in Poznań helped to launch the event into the national spotlight:  
There was an image of a girl who was dragged by her hair by a policeman over 
her statements. So people started to identify with it. They started to think about 
their freedom as well. So in 2005, thanks to the brutal actions on the part of the 
government, there was a shift in the public support for gay rights.  
 
While concerning, the events in Poznań also served as a catalyst for more public 
acknowledgment and support of sexual minorities in Poland. Further, the march in Poznań was 
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important because it relied upon a framing that likened the struggle for LGBT rights as similar to 
the struggles faced by the Solidarity movement two decades earlier (Gruszczyńska 2009). 
Activists speaking at the event that day therefore recalled either their or their parents’ 
experiences with Solidarity, and claimed that they faced similar struggles with LGBT rights 
today (Gruszczyńska 2009: 322). Framing the event in this way allowed LGBT activists in 
Poland to now frame their demands and grievances in a way that resonated with Polish citizens 
who were not part of the LGBT community, but nonetheless understood and sympathized with 
the idea of combating state-sponsored oppression. Further, as O’Dwyer has aptly pointed out, the 
virulent backlash from the Far-Right helped the LGBT movement gain legitimacy and resonance 
in framing their struggles as overtly political (2018: 141), thereby helping it gain more allies 
outside of the Polish LGBT community. 
 The movement found an international audience when then mayor of Warsaw and Law 
and Justice member Lech Kaczyński attempted to ban Warsaw’s equality marches in both 2004 
and 2005. The decision to ban the 2004 march came only a few months after Poland’s E.U. 
accession, which allowed Law and Justice to cement its reputation as staunch protector of 
Catholic Poland and opponent of the perceived decadence of E.U (O’Dwyer 2018: 145). 
Although Kaczyński appealed to a number of practical concerns such as increased traffic and the 
possible threat of violence (still a common tactic today among politicians attempting to block or 
ban Prides), his ideological concerns were also evident. Thus, regarding his decision to ban the 
march, he said “I will prohibit the parade regardless of what I find in the organizers’ application. 
I can’t see a reason for propagating gay culture” (Quoted in Kosc 2005). Yet activists had 
learned valuable lessons from both the Kraków and Poznań marches, and actively resisted 
Kaczyński’s actions in both years by appealing to the narrative of fundamental rights guaranteed 
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under E.U. laws as well as free speech provisions provided in Poland’s constitution. They 
managed to push back against Kaczyński’s bans and still held marches, albeit with truncated 
routes and aggressive resistance from members of the League of Polish Families and All Polish 
Youth.  
However, international human rights organizations such as Human Rights Watch and 
Amnesty International soon began to take notice of the events unraveling in Warsaw and 
published official reports condemning Poland’s “official homophobia” (Amnesty International 
2006). While they specifically condemned Kaczyński’s actions in attempting to ban pride 
marches, they also criticized several of the official actions of the League discussed above. 
Poland’s LGBT movement had now found an international audience. Within a few years, the 
movement continued to burgeon and frame their mission as one focused on tangible political 
gains. Although the struggles at the Kraków, Poznań, and Warsaw prides were arduous, they 
proved to be catalysts for the formation of a formidable and politically viable LGBT movement. 
Yet as the following sections will illustrate, despite the growing visibility of the LGBT 
movement and its increasing transnational connections, resistance to their mission remained 
strong and found renewed strength with the re-election of Law and Justice in 2015.  
 
A Changing Tide? The LGBT movement and Poland’s Centrist Civic Platform Party 
 Although 2001-2007 were challenging years for the Polish LGBT movement and 
community due to the virulent attacks from the League of Polish Families and Law and Justice, 
the struggles faced in these years allowed the movement to forge its overtly political framing. 
Then, in 2007, Law and Justice no longer held a majority in the Sejm and the League of Polish 
Families was unable to retain any seats. The centrist and Euro-enthusiast Civic Platform (PO) 
party was now in the majority, and LGBT activists were hopeful that this change would help 
 63 
them realize some of their demands. However, while the Civic Platform was not overtly hostile 
to the LGBT community as was the Far-Right, they did little to address their concerns and 
mostly left LGBT organizations to their own devices. While they condemned anti-gay politics 
and rhetoric, they still did nothing to tangibly help sexual minorities43 (O’Dwyer 2018: 156).  
 The most concrete changes came in 2009 when a Polish millionaire, Janusz Palikot, 
decided to form his own political movement known as Palikot’s Movement (Ruch Palikota). The 
Palikot Movement formed due to widespread frustrations with PO, namely their political 
centrism and ties to the Church, as well as to stand up to the Catholic nationalism of Law and 
Justice. Although the Palikot movement was not formed around LGBT rights, it was sympathetic 
to them. As an example of this solidarity, in 2007 Palikot (himself a heterosexual) appeared on a 
television program wearing a t-shirt that read “I am gay.” It was during this television 
appearance that he stated his dissatisfaction with PO and their inaction on issues such as minority 
rights protections. This appearance helped lay the seeds for the movement he would start soon 
after, a movement that would prioritize progressive causes such as LGBT rights44.  
 The Palikot movement was finally able to enter the political spotlight in 2011 after two 
years of organizing and campaigning. The party’s program emphasized, among other progressive 
measures, increased tolerance for homosexuality as well as advocacy of same sex-partnerships 
and adoptions. However, the most impactful gain for the LGBT community and movement came 
with the historic election of Robert Biedroń and Anna Grodzka, the first openly gay man and 
transgender woman to be elected to parliament. Their election showed that sexual minorities 
                                               
43 Thus, it is possible to argue that PO was more detrimental to the LGBT movement than the League and 
Law and Justice because of their inaction.  
44 This appearance was part of a campaign for inclusivity for various minority groups, including Jews 
(Zubrzycki 2015).  
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were no longer only activists, but politicians. Although the Palikot Movement did not last long in 
the Polish Sejm, it was instrumental in both legitimizing official debates over same sex marriage 
legislation and solidifying LGBT rights as being part of a larger struggle for the maintenance of 
democratic norms and values. Importantly, and as will be elaborated in chapter 5, the Palikot 
movement also took a strongly anti-clerical stance.  
Yet despite these gains, the appeal of Law and Justice and their populist, nationalistic 
message became too loud to ignore, and in 2015 they won a decisive victory. Not only did Law 
and Justice achieve an overall majority in parliament as well as the presidency, but they did so 
without working alongside a coalition partner, meaning that they would now have total 
legislative control without the need to appease another party. With this dramatic shift, the 
staunchly Catholic Law and Justice party now had the power to pursue their agenda with little 
formal resistance.  
 
The Rise of “LGBT Ideology”   
Law and Justice’s sweeping victory in the 2015 parliamentary elections was a sign that 
the struggle for LGBT rights in Poland would only become more challenging and contested45. 
Law and Justice gained 85 parliamentary seats in the 2015 election, putting them at a total of 242 
while the Civic Platform retained only 133, giving Law and Justice an absolute majority. While 
it is beyond the scope of this chapter to reflect on the various reasons for Law and Justice’s 
overwhelming victory in 2015, part of their strategy during the campaign season was to focus on 
the migrant crisis. Indeed, de-facto leader of Law and Justice Jarosław Kaczysnki made 
numerous speeches in which he claimed that Muslims coming into Poland would attempt to 
                                               
45 However, as Conor O’Dwyer (2018) has argued, increased backlash to the LGBT movement by 
conservative and Far-Right groups may actually help bolster its growth and support in society.  
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impose Sharia law. He also claimed that refugees carried a variety of diseases and parasites 
foreign to Poland that would almost certainly be a health hazard if they were allowed into 
Poland, thus appealing to the fears and uncertainties held by many Poles (Deloy 2015). 
Importantly, the numerous speeches and appeals made by Kaczyński and other Law and Justice 
party members emphasized the importance of protecting Poland’s Catholic roots and of keeping 
Poland “Polish.”  
 Thus, as Fomina and Kucharczyk (2016) argue, Law and Justice’s rise can largely be 
understood as a reaction to liberal cultural trends. It is therefore not surprising that soon after 
their 2015 victory Law and Justice, as well as other Right-wing parties and conservative factions 
of the Polish Church, began to target sexual minorities and the LGBT movement. One of the 
primary ways in which they pursued this agenda was by consistently attacking what they framed 
as “LGBT Ideology.” In this perspective, “LGBT” has the same ontological status as 
“communism” or “authoritarianism,” and as such it is framed as an oppressive force impinging 
upon the nation as opposed to a community of people ethnically tied to the nation advocating for 
their rights. 
 Given the virulent attacks on “LGBT Ideology” that began gaining momentum at this 
time, an opinion poll46 published by OKO press —an independent investigative journalism and 
fact-checking website— in 2019 showed that a majority of younger men as well as older Poles 
found “LGBT Ideology,” as well as “gender ideology,” to be the greatest threat to Poland in the 
21st century. According to the same survey, while the majority of respondents (38%) agreed that 
climate change proved to be the greatest existential threat to Poland, the second largest threat 
                                               
46 The poll, conducted by IPSOS, was conducted by phone on a nationally representative sample of 1006 
people.  
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was seen to be “LGBT” and “gender” ideologies among all who participated. When the sample 
was stratified to consider only Law and Justice voters, only 12% cited climate change, while 
54% cited “LGBT” and “gender” ideology. When focused on individuals who voted for the 
Civic Platform, the survey found that only 2% cited “LGBT” and “gender” ideology as a threat 
to Poland. Such findings thus indicate that the rhetoric of Law and Justice party members, as 
well as that of other Right-wing parties and members of the clergy, has had a strong impact on 
the ways everyday Poles perceive sexual minorities and their relationship to Poland.  
 Yet despite their ardent attacks on sexual minorities since 2015, Law and Justice has been 
framed as “weak” on this issue by the Far-Right party named Confederation Liberty and 
Independence (Konfederacja Wolność i Niepodległość), or Confederation for short. According to 
members of the Confederation, Law and Justice has been inefficient in fighting against “LGBT 
Ideology,” and part of their platform in the 2019 elections was to fight against it more 
aggressively. Such sentiments are evident in the following statement made by Confederation 
politician Witold Tumanowicz: 
We are going to fight for the separation of LGBT and the state. We are going 
to pass an anti-LGBT law…to make sure that public spaces are free from 
provocative symbols and behaviors (Do Rzeczy, 9/29/2019)47.   
 
Comments like this are the norm for members of this Far-Right party, who claim that their 
strongly Catholic and anti-LGBT platform is the best thing for Poland. While the Confederation 
only managed to secure 7% percent of the vote in the most recent parliamentary elections, their 
                                               
47 Taken from: https://dorzeczy.pl/kraj/115550/konfederacja-rozdzielimy-lgbt-od-panstwa-wprowadzimy-
ustawe-anty-lgbt.html. Accessed 12 Apr 2021.  
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words strongly echo those of the League of Polish Families from nearly two decades ago48. Thus, 
despite the substantial gains made by Polish LGBT rights organizations since the beginning of 
the 21st century, the resistance to these gains —in the name of protecting “Catholic Poland” from 
foreign threats— by the Church and political Right has been consistent and formidable.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has detailed how and why sexual minorities and “LGBT Ideology” have 
become the primary scapegoat for the Polish Right and Far-Right in recent years. The rise of 
“LGBT-Free Zones” as well as the frequency of attacks by prominent conservative politicians 
and religious figures in public discourse indicate how salient sexual minorities have become in 
contemporary Poland. Yet, as I have shown, the current attacks on sexual minorities have deep 
roots in Polish history. These roots begin in early 20th century Poland with the protective 
nationalism of Roman Dmowski, who promoted exclusionary and nationalist discourse and 
policies intended to solidify Polish national identity as being premised on conservative, Catholic 
values. Although such sentiments underwent a period of abeyance during Poland’s period of 
state socialism (a socio-political reality that, as I discussed above, helped to reinstate the Catholic 
Church as a primary moral force in Poland), it returned with full force after the fall of the party 
state. However, the rise of the Polish Right and Far-Right did not come until Poland’s accession 
to the European Union. Ever since Poland’s accession, sexual minorities have become a prism 
through which larger debates over the direction of Polish national identity are fought.  
                                               
48 One of the leaders of the Confederation and their most recent candidate for Polish President, Krzysztof 
Bosak, got his political start working with the League of Polish Families and All Polish Youth.  
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This chapter has also detailed how Poland’s LGBT movement evolved into a significant 
social movement with political goals. Yet despite the positive gains of the LGBT movement and 
community in Poland, consistent and virulent backlash from the Far-Right and conservative 
factions of the Church has remained formidable. As this chapter has demonstrated, such backlash 
is fueled by rhetoric referring to the depth and immutability of Poland’s Catholic identity as well 
as the need to protect it from foreign, anti-Catholic threats. Despite their ethnic ties to the nation, 
sexual minorities are now often framed as one of these dangerous foreign threats.  
As a result, although the LGBT movement in Poland has done much in order to increase 
visibility of Poland’s sexual minorities (Ayoub 2017), few legislative49 goals have been realized. 
Thus, there is still no formal hate crime legislation in Poland regarding sexual minorities, as 
gender and sexual identities are not recognized as protected under the Polish criminal code 
(Godisz et.al 2018). As a result, no data exists on gender or sexuality based hate crimes in 
Poland, making it impossible to compile statistics and write formal policy proposals based on 
hard data. The lack of these protections is particularly troubling because approximately one third 
of Polish municipalities have now declared themselves “LGBT Free Zones.” The political 
climate in Poland is thus rife with division, and sexual minorities lie at the center of this divisive 
socio-political context.  
                                               
49 Rafał Trzaskowski’s LGBT+ Declaration of 2019 notwithstanding.  
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Chapter 2: Framing the Other: Sexual Minorities in the Polish 
Nationalist Imagination  
  
In this chapter, I move to examine particular instances of how the Polish Right and Far-
Right have characterized sexual minorities in different spheres of life in Poland in the last 
decade, showing how commonplace these attacks have become over the past 15 years.  I first 
examine Right-Wing responses to and framings of sexual minorities in Polish media and the 
public sphere. I then examine conservative backlash to initiatives designed to lessen anti-LGBT 
stigma in Polish schools, as well as how conservative groups have initiated marches aimed to 
criticize LGBT pride events. I conclude by scrutinizing the most recent manifestation of virulent 
anti-LGBT sentiment: the formation of “LGBT-Free Zones.” In all of these instances, I 
demonstrate how appeals to the need to protect traditional Catholic and conservative notions of 
Polish national identity are central to the criticisms promoted by both Right-wing politicians and 
members of the clergy, and how sexual minorities —despite their ethnic ties to the nation— are 
often framed as existing outside of and against the Polish nation. 
 
Sexual Minorities in the Public Sphere 
 Prior to the mid-2000s, sexual minorities were seldom featured in Poland’s public media. 
If they were, sources would often portray them as members of a small fringe community largely 
detached from the mainstream of Polish society (Oliwa 2012). However, in the first decade of 
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the new millennium, there was an increased presence of sexual minorities and topics relating to 
the LGBT community in the public sphere and at this time, sexual minorities were becoming 
increasingly visible not only as a strange and troubled subculture, but as ordinary Polish citizens. 
Yet despite the increase of visibility for the LGBT community in this period, they still faced 
formidable challenges in the public sphere. Thus, numerous public controversies arose 
concerning the increasingly public face of sexual minorities in media, often initiating critical 
voices in Far-Right publications as well as publications of the more conservative factions of the 
Catholic Church. Public media thus proved to be an important early battleground for the 
promotion of, and resistance to, LGBT rights in Poland.  
A prime example is a controversy that arose in 2014 over the Campaign Against 
Homophobia’s (KPH) attempt to broadcast a commercial advocating support for same-sex 
marriage on Telewizja Polska (TVP)50, the state-run news agency. The commercial was a central 
part of a social campaign organized by KPH called “I Support Unions” which attempted to 
promote support for same-sex marriages among the population as well as to de-stigmatize 
domestic partnerships among same-sex couples. The ad was thirty seconds in length and was 
meant to be broadcast on five TVP channels for a period of two weeks. The commercial featured 
a day in the life of a young woman and her partner. In it, the voice of a narrator says:  
I wake up in front of a stranger…laugh with a stranger. With a stranger I 
celebrate another anniversary of our relationship. Why with a stranger? 
Because according to Polish law, people living in partnerships are completely 
alien to each other (KPH, 10/30/2014, my translation)51.  
 
                                               
50 This public network has, since the time of Law and Justice’s (PiS) election in 2014, often been referred 
to critically by liberal critics as “TVPiS.”  
51 Taken From: https://kph.org.pl/popieram-zwiazki-informacja-prasowa/, Accessed 12 Apr 2021.  
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According to KPH, the message was meant to do two things. First and foremost, it was meant to 
normalize the fact that people of the same sex could choose to live together, countering the belief 
that a same-sex relationship was scandalous or immoral. In so doing, the creators of the ad hoped 
they would gain solidarity among more Poles who were not against LGBT rights, but simply 
unfamiliar with the issues that sexual minorities in Poland were facing. In order to exemplify the 
fact that sexual minorities were indeed a normal part of Polish society, in one of its segments the 
ad strategically featured the couple praying at church. Prior to the initial airing of the 
commercial, a spokesman for TVP stated that “Telewizja Polska is focused on promoting 
openness and tolerance, and the spot is an example of a well-executed campaign, both visually 
and substantively, that highlights the problems of society” (Queer.PL, 10/22/2014)52.  
However, even before the airing of the first commercial, Right-wing criticism of the 
campaign abounded. The official online newsletter of the Church, eKAI, in an article titled “TVP 
will join the promotion of homo unions” published an opinion lamenting the choice of Polish 
Television to “join in the promotion of homosexuality” (eKAI, 10/22/2014)53. After detailing the 
contents of the commercial, the article stated: 
The social campaign “I support unions” was launched in April. Its aim is to 
embed in the minds of Poles the belief that there is an alleged discrimination 
against homosexuals in Poland and to convince society for the need for 
changes in the law, e.g. by introducing the institution of partnerships in Poland.  
 
The overall tone in the eKAI opinion article is relatively neutral, especially when compared to the 
fiery rhetoric discussed by Far-Right politicians in chapter one. However, its appeals to the need 
to protect Poles and traditional, conservative understandings of “Polishness” are evident. By 
                                               
52 https://queer.pl/news/195141/zwiazki-partnerskie-tvp-telewizja-geje-lesbijki, Accessed 12 April 2021  
53 https://www.ekai.pl/tvp-wlaczy-sie-w-promocje-homozwiazkow/, Accessed 12 April 2021 
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claiming that the campaign wants to “embed” certain beliefs into the minds of Poles, the authors 
use language conveying the idea that the goal of the ad, and the campaign more generally, is to 
manipulate Polish citizens. The decision to focus on “Poles” here and not “people” more 
generally is also deserving of further scrutiny. According to this quote, not only is the goal of the 
campaign to manipulate, but its goal is to manipulate Poles into believing that same-sex unions 
ought to be supported. Behind this claim is the idea that, while other people in other places may 
be fine with supporting same-sex unions, doing so is simply not a Polish thing to do. Thus, by 
using the term “Poles” in this context, the criticism of the campaign reifies the concept of 
“Poles” by making it seem that all Polish citizens are similarly conservative and who do not want 
to be exposed to campaigns of the LGBT community.  
 This subtle and seemingly innocuous statement is brought into sharper focus when 
considered in light of comments made by Marcin Przeciszewski, a member of the TVP board, 
who was quoted in the same article in eKAI. When speaking of the planned campaign ad, he 
proclaimed: 
The promotion of homosexual relationships on public television is contrary to 
its mission, as it is obliged under the Broadcasting Act to strengthen the 
family. Meanwhile, promoting civil partnerships as a legal alternative to the 
family, based on the marriage of a woman and a man, means weakening its 
special status in society.  
 
In his statement, Przeciszewski clarifies that public television in Poland does have a mission and 
that airing the KPH ad would be a clear violation of it. Indeed, the Polish Broadcasting Act of 
1993 states that a “social broadcaster shall mean a broadcaster who…propagates learning and 
educational activities, promotes charitable deeds, respects the Christian system of values, being 
guided by the universal principles of ethics, and strives to preserve national identity,” and also 
that “programmes or other broadcasts shall respect the religious beliefs of viewers/listeners, 
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particularly the Christian system of values.” (Polish Broadcasting Act 1993, my emphasis). The 
arguments put forth by Przeciszewski and the eKAI article more generally are therefore not only 
hollow complaints, but have grounding in laws designed to protect a conservative, Catholic 
notion of national identity. According to this act, while broadcasters are meant to respect 
religious beliefs, the “Christian system of values” is delineated as the priority.  
The criticism of the KPH advertisement, as well as the language of the Polish 
Broadcasting Act on which it is based, thus illustrate two things. First, they most clearly 
demonstrate how closely aligned major institutions, such as TVP, are with the missions of the 
Church and with the promotion of a conservative, Catholic model of Polish national identity. 
However, more important for our purposes is that it shows how “Poles” and thereby “Polishness” 
are often reified as a monolithic collection of conservative Catholics, and that any ideas or 
concepts that go against these conservative, Catholic values are framed as un-Polish and a threat 
to Polish national identity. From this perspective, the LGBT community and organizations like 
KPH —despite their ethnic ties to the Polish nation— are therefore reminiscent of earlier infidel 
groups that have attempted to conquer Poland (cf. Zubrzycki 2011).  
 This sentiment was reaffirmed only two days later in another article, printed in eKAI, that 
summarized the sentiments of Bishop Henryk Tomasik on the topic: 
…Bishop Tomasik recalled that the Constitution of the Republic of Poland and 
the laws on the functioning of public media speak of promoting family values 
as well as maintaining moral order. - So we have a conflict with the 
legislation. This is a clear clash with a healthy feeling, with the normal concept 
of the family as a relationship between a man and a woman - Bishop Tomasik 
told Radio Plus Radom (eKAI, 10/24/14)54.  
 
                                               
54 Taken from: https://www.ekai.pl/bp-tomasik-spot-tvp-koliduje-z-prawem/, Accessed 12 April 2021.  
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In this statement, both KAI and Bishop Tomasik endorse the perspective that KPH’s 
advertisement presents a clear legal challenge given the language of the Broadcasting Act. By 
questioning the legality of the KPH ad spot, both KAI and the Bishop were underscoring the idea 
that Poland and “Polishness” are immutably Catholic, and in order to support their arguments 
they point directly to the Polish constitution and other Polish legislation. They support their 
reasoning by referring to both the Polish constitution and alluding to the 1993 Media and 
Broadcast Act. This point is an important one, as it demonstrates how such presuppositions of 
the nature of Poland’s Catholic identity are written into the country’s foundational legal 
documents55. Also striking in this statement is what Tomasik argues is at stake if the laws 
discussed here are not followed; a loss of moral order and a clash with “healthy feelings.” These 
statements therefore further work to solidify the idea that advertisements such as the one 
promoted by KPH will have a damaging effect on “good” Polish society, and as such they stand 
outside the constitutional bounds of what is properly Polish. The same article then went on to 
state:   
The "Strangers" spot is part of the social campaign “I Support the Unions,” 
prepared by the Campaign Against Homophobia. KPH is a nationwide public 
benefit organization that aims to counteract the alleged discrimination against 
lesbians, gays, bisexuals and trans people (LGBT)... on Monday, October 27 
at 15.00 The Right of the Republic of Poland organizes a demonstration in 
defense of TV Trwam and "against deviation on TVP" in connection with the 
announcement of the broadcast of the spot.  
 
The importance of this statement lies primarily in the final sentence, where the author mentions 
the demonstration that will be held in order to protest the KPH advertisement and support TV 
                                               
55 For an analysis of debates over Christian references in the Polish constitution’s preamble, see 
Zubrzycki 2002.  
 75 
TRWAM, a channel operated by the Church and closely affiliated with conservative radio station 
Radio Maria. The demonstration, instead of being focused on the specific content of the ad, is 
more generally focused on combating deviation, specifically on state funded television. Thus, 
non-heteronormative sexualities are not only framed as a deviation from sexual norms, a 
common way to frame sexual minorities, but from Polish norms. Further, this final statement 
also underlines the important and common claim that sexual minorities are responding to alleged 
discrimination, thereby attempting to undercut the seriousness of their claims. Although this 
controversy only lasted a matter of days, a close analysis of this one conflict demonstrates the 
subtle ways in which the Polish Right attempt to both undermine the struggles of Polish sexual 
minorities and frame their grievances and demands as attacks on Poland and Polish national 
identity.  
Given the strained relationship the Polish LGBT community has had with much of the 
Polish Catholic Church, in 2016 KPH launched a campaign, called “Let Us Offer a Sign of 
Peace” (Przekażmy sobie znak pokoju), with the more liberal faction of Poland’s Catholic 
Church. The campaign was initiated in order to show that religious values and support for LGBT 
rights were not antithetical to one another, but compatible. The non-profit organization Faith and 
Rainbow (Wiara i Tęcza), a group composed of LGBT members of the Catholic Church, was 
also involved with the initiative. In addition to displaying billboards and posters throughout 
various cities, the campaign involved in-depth interviews with LGBT Catholics which KPH 
shared on their website. The ultimate goal of the “Let Us Offer a Sign of Peace” campaign was 
not to achieve a specific policy goal or legal end, but to catalyze a conversation in society over 




Figure 2.1: Poster for the “Let Us Offer a Sign of Peace” Campaign. Taken from: 
https://kph.org.pl/katolicy-i-lgbt-zapraszaja-do-znaku-pokoju-wystartowala-nowa-kampania-
spoleczna/, Accessed 11 Feb 2021.  
 
However, the campaign was met with disapproval by many other members of the Church 
hierarchy, as some claimed it was a deceptive attempt to push for same-sex marriage and the 
legalization of adoption by same-sex partners. These deceptions, they argued, were also framed 
as being unjust discrimination against the Church. An article in the conservative periodical Gość 
Niedzielny thus stated that “the real purpose of the campaign is not only to promote respect, but 
to fully accept…legalization of homosexual relationships and so-called homo-adoption” 
(9/29/2016)56. Thus, the concern amongst conservative and pious Poles that a growing “LGBT 
lobby” was attempting to displace traditional, Catholic values continued despite a campaign 
meant to portray the opposite. 
Numerous important Bishops criticized the campaign in the weeks after its launch. 
Another article featured in Gość Niedzielny quoted three points made by Archbishop and 
chairman of the Polish Bishops Conference Stanisław Gądecki regarding the initiative:  
                                               
56 https://gdansk.gosc.pl/doc/3471588.Znak-pokoju-bez-ideologii, Accessed 11 Feb 2021.  
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The very liturgical sign of peace - to which the organizers of the campaign 
refer - expresses the readiness to reconcile with others and to accept them in a 
holy community of sinners. After all, we are all sinful, which is also expressed 
in the act of penance at the very beginning of each liturgy. Thus, a hand 
extended to another signifies acceptance of a person, never - approval of his 
sin, no matter what his nature is. It should also be emphasized that the 
members of the community assembled at the liturgy have a constant obligation 
to convert, that is, to conform to the requirements of the Gospel and to turn 
away from their own sinful tastes. There is a fear that the action "Let us give 
each other the sign of peace,” extracting the gesture of the extended hand from 
the liturgical context, gives it a meaning that is incompatible with the teaching 
of Christ and the Church (Gość Niedzielny 9/14/2016)57.  
 
In this first point, the bishop begins by recognizing the standard Catholic belief that there is sin 
inherent in every person, regardless of their sexual orientation. He then quickly moves to his 
criticism of the campaign, which centers on what he understands as its desire to have the Church 
recognize and accept members of the LGBT community. Such acceptance, according to the 
Bishop, is impossible unless they renounce “their own sinful tastes.” The Bishop is therefore 
critical of a campaign that, in his view, tries to accept and tolerate both the person and their 
“sinful sexuality” instead of trying to accept the person and rid them of this perceived sin.  
While he does not directly state that such “sinful sexuality” makes it impossible for one 
to be a “good Pole,” this message is implied when considering the quote in light of the fact that 
the Church and Catholicism remain central sources of identification in Poland and that the myth 
of the Polak-Katolik remains pervasive and powerful. The Bishop claims that as members of the 
Catholic community, all people must strive to rid themselves of their sins, as all people are 
sinful. Thus, in order to be fully accepted into the Church, one would have to renounce their 
“sinful sexuality” just as they would any other sin. Failure to renounce one’s sins —such as non-
                                               
57 https://www.gosc.pl/doc/3446398.Archidiecezja-warszawska-krytykuje-kampanie-LGBT, Accessed 11 
Feb 2021.  
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heteronormative sexuality— would therefore put one at odds with the Church and the tenets of 
Catholicism. However, as was detailed in chapter one, “Catholicism” and “Polishness” are 
closely imbricated. Given the fusion of “Polish” and “Catholic” identities, the Bishop’s claim 
implies that if one does not renounce their “sinful sexuality,” they would be contrary to the 
Church and by extension, “Polishness.” For him, then, one cannot be accepted into the Church 
and be, or become, a good Pole unless they denounce their non-heteronormative sexuality. He 
then goes on to say: 
LGBT groups often accuse the Church of depriving them of the dignity of 
homosexual, bisexual or transgender people by proclaiming the 
Gospel. Therefore, it must be said with full force that the Church is the only 
institution which has been tirelessly proclaiming the dignity of every human 
person without exception for two thousand years. This unchanging teaching 
does not change with regard to these persons either. 
 
The importance of this quotation comes from the Bishop’s defensive claim that LGBT groups are 
often unfair to the Church (as opposed to the other way around) in accusing it of being 
discriminatory against them. Accordingly, it is not the Church that has done anything wrong, but 
the LGBT groups, as they simply choose to ignore that they are engaging in sinful behavior. 
Paired with the first point, the Bishop is saying that so long as LGBT people renounce part of 
their identity (framed by him as simply a sinful behavior one can willingly discard), they can be 
accepted as part of the Church. But, since the campaign does not require individuals to renounce 
their sexual orientation, he sees it as problematic. This leads him to his third, and most strongly 
worded, point: 
Respect for the dignity of every person is incompatible with respect for 
homosexual acts themselves. They are objectively morally wrong and as such 
can never be accepted by the Church. The situation is similar with the 
postulates of equating homosexual and heterosexual relationships in the 
law. Such postulates - always, especially in times of deep family crisis - are 
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harmful to societies and individuals… Evil is evil not because it has been 
forbidden by someone, but because - as contrary to God's plan - it harms 
man. Hence the Church - like a good mother - must clearly call them by 
name. An attitude of tolerance towards evil would, in fact, be indifference to 
sinning sisters and brothers. So it would have nothing to do with mercy or with 
Christian love. 
 
The first sentence of this statement concisely captures the essence of what I have discussed 
above; the overall attitude of “love the sinner, hate the sin” as it relates to the LGBT community 
in Poland.  Yet the remainder of this statement goes much further, as in it the Bishop declares 
homosexual acts and homosexual relationships as both “objectively, morally wrong” as well as 
“evil.” It is thus the role of the Church to help excise this evil from people so that it does not 
negatively impact the rest of society. This statement therefore not only further stigmatizes sexual 
minorities by claiming that their sexuality is merely a sinful behavior, but also adds that the 
primary entity capable of helping rid them of their sin in the Church.  
Again, considering the strength and salience of the “Polak-Katolik” myth that was 
detailed in chapter one, it is not hard to follow the implicit logic leading to the idea that sexual 
minorities, at least those who choose not to denounce their “sinful behaviors,” cannot be 
understood as being “true Poles.” If, as the myth has is, part of being Polish means adhering to 
the tenets of the Catholic Church, and the Church cannot accept non-heteronormative sexuality, 
then from the perspective of this Bishop (as well as many other members of the Church and the 
Polish Right and Far-Right) sexual minorities cannot be “true Poles” unless they renounce their 
non-heteronormative sexual identities58. If they do not, they are framed as enemies of and threats 
to the nation.  
                                               
58 Importantly, in all of this the Church is continually framed not as a wrongdoer, but indeed the only true 
moral force protecting from evil. In the concluding chapter of this dissertation, I will discuss how Robert 
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Anti-LGBT sentiment took on a more symbolic form in 2015 when a massive rainbow art 
installation —displayed in one of Warsaw’s prominent central squares since 2012— was 
permanently removed after being repeatedly burnt and rebuilt over a number of years. The art 
installation was destroyed by radical nationalist groups six times before the Adam Mickiewicz 
institute, the cultural organization that owns the sculpture, made the decision to remove it. The 
sculptor, Julia Wójcik, explained that the rainbow was meant to represent many things, primarily 
hope and openness to social change, and that it was not intended to solely represent the Polish 
LGBT community. However, as I have shown, in the minds of many on the Far-Right in Poland, 
both the E.U. and sexual minorities are understood as threats to conservative conceptions of 
Polish national identity. This sentiment is clear in the following statement made by a 
representative of the National Radical Camp (ONR), one of contemporary Poland’s most 
radically nationalist and xenophobic organizations; 
In recent years in Poland, the marginal community of [homosexual] perverts 
has intensified its war on tradition, symbolism, history and national unity. The 
rainbow is the best example of this…It’s a shame the decision to take it down 
took so long. This kind of installation belongs in the garbage (Times, 
08/19/2015)59.  
 
                                               
Biedroń’s political party Wiosna (Spring) attempted to attack the Church’s claims at moral superiority by 
consistently pointing to their involvement in pedophilia scandals.  
59 https://time.com/3988534/warsaw-rainbow-statue-gay-rights/, Accessed 12 Feb 2021.  
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Figure 2.2: Burning of the Rainbow Sculpture in Warsaw. Image taken from: 
https://visegradinsight.eu/the-rainbow-on-fire/, Accessed 12 Feb 2021.  
 
Thus, to the Far-Right Poland’s LGBT community and its associated “ideology” continue 
to represent a serious threat to traditional Polish myths and conceptions of national identity. If 
Polish mythology is premised on the myths of Poland being “the bulwark of Christendom 
defending Europe against the infidel (however defined)” (Zubrzycki 2011), sexual minorities 
have become the most targeted infidel in the Polish nationalistic imagination.  
 
Sexual Minorities and Polish Public Education 
 Similar struggles for sexual minorities pervade the realm of public education in Poland60, 
as the Church and political Right are often vocal critics of any proposed progressive changes in 
school curriculums and programs. While I focused on some of these criticisms in chapter one 
through my brief discussion of Roman Dmowski’s attacks on sexual education, in this section I 
                                               
60 As some have noted (Casanova 1994; Zielińska and Zwierżdzyńki 2013), the rules and regulations 
regarding religious education in schools were made hastily after the fall of communism, and the emerging 
framework was largely shaped by the interests of the Roman Catholic Church without consulting the 
broader society.  
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delve deeper into three events in order to demonstrate how sexual minorities and their efforts to 
introduce progressive changes into the public school system are framed by the Polish Right as 
threats to Polish national identity.   
In 2013, controversy arose regarding a report, titled “School of Silence,” in which a 
number of educators argued for an update to school curricula to include topics related to sexual 
minorities, as virtually all materials only considered heterosexual relationships to be “normal.” 
Further, instead of offering comprehensive sexual education programs, many schools opted to 
teach a course focused on preparing for family life called “Education for Family Life.” A 
passage from the textbook Wandering Towards Adulthood: Education for Family Life High 
School Students, a common choice at the time among educators teaching about the role of the 
family and family life, states: 
The most important strength for a homosexual to confront his inclinations 
cannot, however, be found in psychoanalysis or in a therapist’s advice. It is 
necessary to appeal to the ‘ultimate source of strength’, which is the experience 
of faith in God and conscience…superficial homosexual inclinations may 
reverse quite quickly if they are not accompanied by an active homosexual 
lifestyle (Król, 2009) 
 
It is worth repeating that texts such as this are not only common in private, religious academies, 
but are a standard feature of public education in Poland. Such texts are part of a core curriculum 
decided by the Ministry of Education61, and demonstrate how closely entwined the public 
education system in Poland is with the Church.   
Given the outdated and scientifically inaccurate takes on human sexuality presented by 
popular texts, the authors of the “School of Silence” report argued that such information and the 
                                               
61 Such texts remained a standard part of the curriculum even when the Civic Platform party was in power 
from 2007 until 2015.  
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lack of positive representation of sexual minorities not only led to ignorance, but to bullying and 
discrimination against young students who did not identify as heteronormative. In order to make 
their case, the authors62 analyzed 51 commonly used texts that public school educators used to 
teach the Education for Family Life course. They found that nearly all textbooks utilized 
outdated science to discuss concepts of gender and sexuality, and ignored or discounted the 
outlooks of influential groups such as the American Psychiatric Association and American 
Psychological Association. Their report also concluded that all texts analyzed either included 
explicit homophobia or claimed that the problem of homophobia was a myth, and therefore often 
engaged in victim blaming. Yet while the textbooks relegated the phenomenon of homophobia 
and anti-gay prejudice to the realm of mythology, the texts did address other forms of prejudice 
and discrimination such as anti-Semitism, xenophobia, and racism. I will return to this important 
point below. 
The authors concluded that the curriculum for courses focused on Family Life needed to 
be updated in order to better reflect scientific research on the topic, as well as to prevent the rise 
in prejudice against those with non-heteronormative sexualities. They worried that the 
curriculums would be fodder for increased societal homophobia and anti-LGBT sentiment if 
gone unchecked. When reflecting on the results of the analysis, a spokesperson for an LGBT 
equality center in the town of Toruń, thus stated: 
The worst thing is when the textbook is homophobic…and according to the 
experts, it is a feature of most of the WDJR textbooks. They are great tools for 
raising the next generation of homophobes: convinced that homosexuality is 
“against nature,” that it is a “disorder,” “anomaly,” a dangerous ailment that 
must and can be cured or it will spread. Such nonsense is conducive to 
                                               
62 All of the authors involved in the report were trained researchers. The research team consisted of dr 
hab. Jacek Kochanowski (sociologist), Dr Krzysztof Wąż (educator), and Dr. Robert Kowalczyk 
(psychologist).  
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appealing to beliefs instead of facts, to religion instead of science. In the 
“School of Silence,” it is pointed out several times that even the bibliography 
of textbooks is ideological, and not scientific (Kobiety-Kobietom, 
02/08/2013)63.  
 
This important statement succinctly identifies what was at stake with these textbooks. Not only 
are the riddled with factual inaccuracies, but those inaccuracies can end up promoting the 
homophobic attitudes that the texts themselves claim do not exist. This reality is compounded by 
the fact that, according to the authors of the report, the textbooks analyzed discuss various forms 
of prejudice and discrimination yet claim that homophobia is not a real societal issue. In claiming 
that only some forms of prejudice actually exist —such as anti-Semitism, racism, and 
xenophobia— these texts invalidate the claims of sexual minorities who have been victims of 
prejudice and discrimination. Instead of dismissing all prejudice and discrimination as fiction, 
they create a distorted image of reality that protects some but places sexual minorities outside the 
umbra of not only legal but more general societal protection. As a result, by reading the 
messages in these books, many students could internalize the idea that sexual minorities not only 
go against nature, but pose a threat to social stability and by extension, the stability of the nation 
and national identity.  
Not surprisingly, the view that sexual minorities were threatening to Poland was clearly 
articulated in a number of criticisms of the School of Silence report. Father Józef Augustyn, for 
example, released a statement published in eKAI in which he argued, among other things, that 





ze%F1, Accessed 12, Feb 2021.  
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LGBT organizations premise their arguments on fraudulent scientific evidence that claim that 
one’s sexuality is not a biological fact: 
For years, gay circles have tried to influence school education in Poland. Now 
they are having their first successes…this is true. They have tried and are still 
trying different methods. The first, primitive, was tossing gay leaflets to 
schools, anonymously or officially, during classes organized for young people 
under some pretext, for example, fighting AIDS… But smuggling leaflets into 
schools is an ad hoc action, not very effective, and when caught - 
compromising. After the times of guerrilla warfare, a real battle with the 
Ministry of National Education began to change the content of the textbooks 
on Family Life Education, introducing a parallel between the so-called "Gay 
marriage" and heterosexual… The real terrorism of homosexual communities 
is already visible in many countries, it is enough to mention Canada and 
recently also France. The French took to the streets to protest against 
legislation equating homosexual relationships with actual marriages. The 
question is whether they are too late (eKAI, 3/29/2013)64. 
 
In this lengthy and highly significant excerpt, Father Augustyn not only ardently defends the 
positions of the textbooks that have been criticized in the report, but positions sexual minorities 
(or as he refers to them, “gay circles”) as a threatening force. He refers to their various efforts as 
being tactical in nature, as if there were indeed a war being waged on traditional Polish norms 
and values. Significantly, Father Augustyn concludes by discussing the ways in which the 
“terrorism of homosexual communities” has been visible in countries such as Canada and 
France, where devout defenders of Catholic norms protested legislation that intended to 
introduce legitimate scientific research questioning outdated views regarding homosexuality into 
school curriculums. In drawing these comparisons, Augustyn explicitly instills fear in the reader 
by using terms such as “guerilla warfare” and suggesting that if Poles don’t stand up and fight, 
they will be victimized much like the Canadians and French. His statement also explicitly frames 
                                               
64 https://www.ekai.pl/bierna-batalia-o-podreczniki/, Accessed 12 Feb 2021.  
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sexual minorities as a threat to Poland and “Polishness,” despite the fact that they too are ethnic 
Polish citizens.   
In another critique published in KAI, conservative doctor and co-author of the textbook 
Wandering Towards Adulthood: Education for Family Life High School Students Teresa Król, 
argued that updates to traditional understandings of the family would “lead to a new 
exclusion…this time people accepting the Judeo-Christian foundation of Western civilization” 
(eKAI, 2/12/2013)65. She added, in reference to the LGBT community, that “the purpose of their 
lustration is to undermine the value of marriage and the family and to ridicule and label these 
concepts as Catholic, i.e. intolerant, homophobia, unscientific, and simply bad. This is a step to 
exclusion” (eKAI, 2/12/2013, emphasis added). Thus, much like the traditional myths would 
have it, the responses to to the School of Silence report discussed here portray the sentiment that 
conservative Catholic Poland and good Polish citizens were under siege from a foreign threat and 
needed to employ measures to protect themselves66. 
Conservative backlash was also palpable during the 2019 installment of KPH’s annual 
“Rainbow Friday” event, which the organization has referred to as a “pro-LGBT event in Polish 
schools” (KPH.org, 10/16/2019)67. The point of the campaign was to begin normalizing 
discussions surrounding the LGBT community in Polish schools, including ways to combat 
prejudice and discrimination as well as suicides among Polish LGBT youth. In addition, students 
were encouraged to don colorful apparel and decorate their schools with rainbow items in order 
                                               
65 https://www.ekai.pl/zamach-na-podreczniki/, Accessed 12 Feb 2021.  
66 Although some changes were introduced since the publication of the School of Silence report, few 
significantly altered the implicit message in school curriculums that sexual minorities were still somehow 
deficient. Thus, Jacek Kochanowski –one of the researchers and authors involved in producing the report- 
claimed in 2015 that much of the report’s suggestions for modifying curriculums were still current.  
67 https://kph.org.pl/the-rainbow-friday-a-pro-lgbt-event-in-polish-schools/, Accessed 14 Feb 2021.  
 87 
to show support for and solidarity with their LGBT peers. Although “Rainbow Friday” began a 
few years earlier, the number of participating schools in 2019 was triple that of the previous year 
(211 from 70). This growth occurred despite vociferous criticisms for the event from the Polish 
Right in 2018, which KPH addressed in the following press release:  
The Rainbow Friday event initiated by KPH may be the only day of school 
year when thousands of LGBT teenagers feel safe at schools. Despite its noble 
goal, the event encountered numerous attacks a year ago. This year it’s already 
being tracked by the right-wing homophobic organizations that threaten 
schools with courts, the school superintendent called it “a depravation of 
students,” and the representatives of the ruling party put pressure on schools to 
cancel the event. The Campaign Against Homophobia published a tear-jerking 
spot on the Internet which promotes the event planned for the 25th of October. 
It also serves to protect teenagers planning to take part in the event from 
homophobic and transphobic attack (KPH, 10/16/2019).  
 
However, many schools throughout Poland began to face pressures regarding whether or not to 
participate in the events associated with Rainbow Friday, as Law and Justice party member and 
minister of education Anna Zalewska told media that the event was in violation of education 
laws. As a result, teachers throughout Poland faced threats of punishment if they decided to 
partake in Rainbow Friday events. In order to prevent schools from participating, school 
superintendents held unannounced inspections at numerous schools throughout the country intent 
on punishing those schools and teachers who allowed the events occur. In a statement of support 
for these actions, and against the “Rainbow Friday” initiative, Law and Justice party member and 
member of parliament Kazimierz Smoliński shared the following sentiments on Twitter: 
Tomorrow in Polish schools the ‘Rainbow Friday’ is to be held, which, as part 
of the harmful #LGBT ideology, aims to infect children with the demands of 
this dangerous environment. Please report all cases of inappropriate treatment 
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of children to the board of trustees. Let’s defend the children!” (Do Rzeczy, 
10/25/2019, my emphasis)68.  
 
The language of Smoliński’s tweet is striking. He refers to an attempt, on behalf of the LGBT 
community, to “infect” children with harmful ideology. The choice of this specific term is 
important for two related reasons. First, it functions to dehumanize sexual minorities and turn 
them into an object of fear and/or disgust by likening them to something that can spread disease 
or infection. Second, and most important to the argument being made in this chapter, is that this 
dehumanization serves as another means by which the Right can frame sexual minorities as 
existing outside of and in opposition to Poland and “Polishness.” Thus, in the minds of many on 
the Polish Right, to be gay or lesbian or transgender goes against the natural order intended by 
God, and is therefore treated as being nothing more than a harmful ideology. The Right’s 
framing of “Rainbow Friday” therefore remained unchanged from previous years, as they 
continued to portray it as an encroachment of harmful ideology on innocent Polish children.  
Rainbow Friday was not the only controversial event regarding the LGBT community 
and Polish public education in 2019, however, as the conservative government soon decided to 
introduce a bill aiming to outlaw the teaching of sexual education in schools. Amnesty 
International, in issuing a report on the proposed bill, referred to it as “recklessly retrogressive.”69 
The proposed legislation, termed the “Stop Pedophilia” bill, claimed that sex education is in 
reality a perverse attempt on the behalf of sexual minorities and activists to further its political 
                                               
68 https://dorzeczy.pl/kraj/118437/teczowy-piatek-w-szkolach-bronmy-dzieci.html, Accessed 14 Feb 
2021.  
69 According to the report, “This recklessly retrogressive law would encourage fear and ignorance, putting 
young people at risk. Its impact would be felt well beyond the classroom, creating a chilling effect on 
teachers, activists and even on parents who want to talk to their children about sex.” (Amnesty 
International, 10/16/2019) https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/10/poland-law-criminalizing-
sexuality-education-recklessly-retrogressive/ Accessed 14 Feb 2021).  
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goals, and sought to label those who chose to teach sexual education to those under 18 as 
pedophiles. Further, the promotion of sexual education in schools to people under the age of 18 
would be punishable with up to three years in prison.  In a document written to parliament, the 
proponents70 of the bill claimed: 
Children are sexually awakened and familiarized with homosexuality by the 
LGBT lobby in order to achieve radical political goals. The organizations and 
activists most involved in the promotion of sexual ‘education’ in our country 
are the LGBT lobby. In Western Europe, members of these movements 
involved in implementing sex education in schools were convicted of 
pedophilia (Reuters, 4/15/2020)71.   
 
The controversial bill, spearheaded by the “pro-life” and strongly anti-LGBT group Fundacja Pro 
(Pro-Foundation) collected over 250,000 signatures. According to the organization’s webpage, 
the bill “assumes, inter alia, that promoting sexual intercourse or other sexual activity in 
educational institutions will be punishable by up to three years of imprisonment. The aim of the 
project is to protect children from “sexualization,” and at the same time to complete the legal 
protection of society against pedophilia” (Strona Życia, 10/15/2019)72. Further, the 
organization’s website features a frequently asked questions section, with the third question 
being specifically about why the LGBT movement is considered “pedophile.” The response 
reads: 
There were many pedophiles in the ranks of LGBT activists - their cases were 
reported by the world media. These can be found in articles in the “pedophiles 
                                               
70 Ironically, but not surprisingly, Law and Justice has mostly remained silent on issues surrounding 
pedophilia scandals in the Church, which has become an important topic since the release of a film titled 
“Just Don’t Tell Anyone (Tylko nie mów nikomu) in 2019. In the conclusion I will discuss how a focus 
on Church pedophilia scandals was a central focus of progressive politician Robert Biedroń’s political 
movement.  
71 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-poland-lgbt-education-trfn/poland-mulls-law-denouncing-sex-
educators-as-paedophiles-and-gay-activists-idUSKCN21X2ZA, Accessed 14 Feb 2021.  
72 https://stronazycia.pl/stop-pedofilii/inicjatywa-2019/, Accessed 14 Feb 2021.  
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and their victims” category.” Drag queens belonging to the LGBT movement, 
i.e. men disguising themselves as women and often performing in gay clubs, 
are also convicted of pedophilia. Currently they run, among others an action of 
reading fairy tales about "diversity" to preschoolers. The drag queen 
community also uses children in another way - as the so-called children's drag 
queen. They are often even several-year-old boys who appear disguised as 
girls, mainly in-front of homosexuals (Strona Życia, 10/15/2019).  
 
As this statement shows, the organization implicates not only some individuals but the entire 
“LGBT movement” in the promotion of pedophilia. Thus, by promoting this bill, Law and 
Justice and the other politicians supporting it continue to send a clear message to Poles; members 
of the LGBT community are a threat to Poland, as they and their movement desire to hurt young 
Polish children. Consequently, relying on the traditional model of Polish national identity 
premised on conservative, Catholic values is the best line of defense against this harmful force73. 
This idea was evident in the words of the Ordo Iuris, a highly conservative and powerful interest 
organization closely aligned with the Church, in their analysis and summary of the proposed bill: 
The purpose of the "Stop Pedophilia" Bill postulated by the Applicants is fully 
in compliance with the Polish constitutional axiology. In accordance with 
Article 72 of the Polish Constitution: "The Republic of Poland shall ensure 
protection of the rights of the child. Everyone shall have the right to demand of 
organs of public authority that they defend children against violence, cruelty, 
exploitation and actions which undermine their moral sense." (Ordo Iuris, 
4/15/2020)74 
 
While the Ordo Iuris’ words here convey much of the same content as the other statements 
above, what is important to note is their direct appeals to the Polish constitution. By referring to 
the foundational document of the nation, the organization is indicating that the actions taken by 
                                               
73 Although the bill has not yet passed, as members of parliament voted to delay a decision largely 
because of the need to focus on issues related to the COVID-19 pandemic, it has not yet been defeated. 
74 https://en.ordoiuris.pl/education/civic-project-stop-pedophilia-will-help-protect-children, Accessed 15 
Feb 2021.  
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the proponents of the “Stop Pedophilia” bill are squarely in line with the national interest. As a 
result, the LGBT community in Poland is framed as incompatible with “Polishness” and an 
enemy of the nation.  
 
 
Image 2.1: Anti-LGBT Poster found in Wrocław, May 2019. Photo by author. 
 
 The passionate fight against the perceived threats of the LGBT movement were palpably 
felt at the annual “March for Life and Family” (Marsz dla Życia i Rodzina) in both Kraków and 
Warsaw in the summer of 2019. I attended both of these demonstrations while conducting 
fieldwork in Poland the same summer. These marches, generally planned within days of LGBT 
pride marches in order to counter the messages from those events, have been organized in Poland 
since 2012. The following statement is taken directly from the organization’s webpage, and is 
titled the “Declaration for Life and Family”:  
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Poland needs a change! A change that will make our and future generations 
grow in an environment that allows unfettered development, self-esteem and 
the use of the fruits of their work. We believe that the foundations of the New 
Deal should be based on respect for human life and recognition of the family 
as the central institution of social order. We also recognize there is a need for 
consistent and intensive work to promote these values. The importance of a 
strong family for a shaping a healthy cultural, social, and economic order 
must be noticed and appreciated. That is why we express our willingness to 
cooperate in the implementation of projects aimed at such shaping of the social 
and legal order that will guarantee full protection of human life and respect for 
the family (Marsz.org, my emphasis, Accessed 15 Feb 2021). 
 
While this declaration does not contain any direct criticisms of sexual minorities, the LGBT 
movement, or LGBT ideology as have been found in the words of the conservative politicians 
and clergymen above, underneath the formal prose lies the same message; traditional Polish 
norms and values are in need of protection for the sake of societal stability. This sentiment is 
clearly indicated in the italicized portion of the text, which states that Polish culture, society, and 
even the economy are at stake in this battle. Further, the organization’s webpage is covered with 
photos of happy families marching hand in hand, waving Polish flags, and conveying the image 
that they are indeed the true protectors of Poland.  
 Yet these images belie the atmosphere I experienced when observing these events in both 
Warsaw and Kraków. At both events, I found participants more strongly emphasizing their 
disdain for “LGBT” and “Gender” Ideology than positively affirming the role of the family in 
Polish life. If there were slogans and banners affirming the role of the family, they strictly 
underlined the importance of that family being composed of a man and a woman, striking a 
defensive posture. Thus, two common slogans that participants chanted at both manifestations 
were “husband and wife, family united!” and “sex education is depravity!”   
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Image 2.2: March for Family and Life in Kraków, June 2019. Three signs are visible. The most clearly 
visible says “Stop Homo-Propaganda,” followed by “A Right to Birth for All Children,” and finally 






Images 2.3 and 2.4: March for Family and Life in Warsaw, June 2019. On the left, the banner reads 
“Catholic Poland is not secular!” and on the right “stop sexualization.” Photos by author.  
 
 The images above demonstrate both the desire to maintain a strictly Catholic Poland, as 
well as vehement anti-LGBT sentiment. Most striking, however, is the poster featuring the words 
“Stop Sexualization” on the image of an infant with a rainbow pacifier whose pupils have also 
been painted with rainbow colors. This image indicates both the criticism of sex education 
efforts, as well as the idea that the LGBT community is a dangerous threat to Polish children. 
Thus, despite the efforts of the Polish LGBT movement to combat such sentiments in both the 
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public sphere and the realm of education, the militant anti-LGBT sentiment espoused by the 
Polish Right remains a powerful influence for many citizens.   
 
LGBT Pride, “LGBT Ideology,” and LGBT-Free Zones 
Another major source of backlash for the Polish Right has been the growing number of LGBT 
pride parades, which as of 2018 were being held in 20 cities throughout Poland (compared to 
almost none in 2004, the year when Lech Kaczyński banned the pride parade in Warsaw). Prides 
were also seeing an increase in attendance, and at most demonstrations the amount of pride 
participants easily outnumbered that of counter protestors. The 2018 Warsaw pride, for example, 
brought activists from around Europe and it was estimated that approximately 50,000 people 
attended the event. Further, the 2018 Warsaw pride marked the first year that a Polish mayor —
Rafał Trzaskowski— took part in a pride event. Other major Polish cities, such as Kraków and 
Poznań, also held large pride parades that faced little to no backlash from Far-Right groups.  
Most surprising and controversial, however, was that smaller and more conservative 
cities and towns also began holding pride parades. The first major controversy surrounding these 
events arose in the Southeastern and highly conservative town of Lublin, when the city’s mayor, 
citing security concerns, decided to ban the gathering (the same reason given by Lech Kaczyński 
in Warsaw in 2004). It was reported that the regional governor, Przemysław Czarnek, wrote to 
the mayor of Lublin imploring him to cancel the event on the grounds that the parade would 
promote unnatural, immoral acts such as pedophilia. However, the Polish Court of Appeals soon 
overturned the decision to ban Lublin’s pride, and the event was held with approximately 1,500 
participants. An estimated 200 Far-Right protestors arrived as well and harassed the parade by 
screaming and throwing bottles and small firecrackers at those partaking in the march, 
reminiscent of the first pride held in Kraków in 2004 discussed in chapter one.  
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The events in Lublin paled in comparison, however, to those that took place in Białystok 
in the summer of 2019. Białystok, one of Poland’s most conservative cities in one of its most 
conservative regions, is also a Law and Justice stronghold and home to many Right-wing 
extremist groups. Thus, although the pride parade was an officially sanctioned event, 32 
demonstrations were registered in opposition of it. In addition, prior to the event, Archbishop 
Tadeusz Wojda issued a proclamation that was to be read in all churches in Białystok, as well as 
all churches in the region, condemning prides as blasphemous and devised “by a foreign 
initiative in Podlaskie land and community, an area which is deeply rooted in Christianity and 
concerned about the good of its own society, especially children” (quoted in Rogowska 2019). In 
this statement, Wojda explicitly frames the march as a “foreign initiative.” Later in his 
proclamation, Wojda alluded to a famous protest speech made by Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński in 
1953 in which Wyszyński spoke out against the communist regime, thereby suggesting that pride 
parades were helping to usher in a new era of authoritarian rule. Consequently, the role of the 
Church and of “good Poles” was to resist “LGBT ideology” at all costs. The tensions in 
Białystok were therefore high in the days preceding the city’s first pride event.  
The day of the parade brought violence and mayhem. Unlike Lublin, where 
approximately 200 Far-Right protestors appeared, thousands of Far-Right protestors were present 
in Białystok. Some sources estimate that there were roughly 1,000 Pride participants and 4,000 
Far-Right protestors present in Białystok that day (Rogowska 2019). Given the number of people 
protesting the Pride, it was difficult for the local police to adequately protect those involved with 
the parade from attacks, and numerous participants were injured.  As a result, Amnesty 
International published an official report condemning the events in Białystok, citing what they 
believed to be an inadequate police response to the Far-Right protestors. Thus, although more 
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cities in Poland began holding prides, Białystok served as a difficult reminder that in some 
regions of Poland, particularly those where Law and Justice held strong influence, homophobia 
and violent opposition to Pride parades remains rampant.  
Indeed, Białystok (as well as Lublin) is one of the many cities in Poland that had declared 
itself an “LGBT Free Zone” in early 2019. Following Rafał Trzaskowki’s signing of the “LGBT 
Charter” in Warsaw, many cities swiftly protested his action by declaring themselves as areas 
that would not only avoid similar provisions, but actively oppose them. By February 2020, 100 
municipalities (approximately one-third of Poland) had symbolically declared themselves free of 
“LGBT ideology,” while 30 signed charters known as the “Local Government Charter of the 
Rights of the Family” (Ciobanu 2020). The charters called for all local policies, initiatives and 
funding to focus first and foremost on protecting and advocating for the traditional family (i.e. a 
union between a man and woman). One of the charters, from the Rycki county in Eastern Poland, 
reads: 
The resolution aims to defend children, youth, families, and Polish schools 
from sexual depravity and indoctrination, which lead to many pathologies 
existing in Western countries, such as accepting pornography, abortion, sexual 
criminality, the crisis of the family and many others (Ciobanu 2020).  
 
The language of this charter clearly demonstrates that there is a fear among Polish conservatives 
that Polish society will deteriorate largely due to “pressures exercised by homopropaganda… 
[and the] imposition by LGBT activists of programmes and an ideology leading to the 
depravation of children.” While not all municipalities signed this specific charter, other 
initiatives such as the “anti-LGBT ideology resolution” and “declaration against LGBT 
subculture” have been approved in other cities (Świder 2020). While they all differ in details, 
what all of these charters and resolutions have in common is their denunciation of “LGBT 
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ideology” as a threat to “the Polish nation and its age-old Christian values” (Ciobanu 2020). Due 
to the rapid increase of these “LGBT Free Zones,” activists soon constructed an online map of 
Poland (known as the Atlas of Hate) which delineated which areas of the country had declared 
themselves as an “LGBT Free-Zone.”  
 
Figure 2.3: “Atlas of Hate” Depicting Regions Declared “LGBT Free-Zones”. Red zones indicate regions 
where legislation has been enacted, yellow where it is pending, and green where it has been rejected. 
Image taken from: Atlasnienawisci.pl, Accessed 18 Feb 2021.  
 
The constitutionality of the “LGBT-Free Zones” is still being debated. However, their sudden 
and rapid rise demonstrates both the power and resonance behind the Polish Right’s anti-LGBT 
rhetoric.   
The specter of “LGBT ideology” was also one of the central pillars of Andrzej Duda’s 
platform for re-election to the presidency of Poland in the summer of 2020. During his 
campaign, he claimed that LGBT ideology was more dangerous than communism and 
emphasized the importance of shielding the traditional family model from such threats. He even 
went as far as stating that he would attempt to block any teaching of subjects related to LGBT 
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issues in schools. Such ideas were broadly supported by Law and Justice party members. Law 
and Justice MP Przemysław Czarnek claimed people should “stop listening to the idiocy about 
some human rights or equality. These people are not equal to normal people” (Świder 2020). 
Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki stated:  
We do not want to fund cultural revolutions. Such revolutions are dreamed of 
by our opponents, and this is an attack on our identity, on Polish culture. I 
think that Polish parents do not want their six-year-old children to be taught 
how to stimulate sexually, or nine-year-olds to be encouraged to find 
homosexual tendencies and show them off (Świder 2020).  
 
Again, the recurring theme promulgated in these statements is that the LGBT community and the 
ideology it maintains prove a dangerous threat to Polish national identity, one that is premised on 
conservative, Catholic values. 
 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I have shown how attacks on the LGBT community in Poland have been 
swift and forceful in various sphere of public life within the last decade. My analysis 
demonstrates how, at a time when Poland’s sexual minorities began organizing to affirm their 
status as legitimate Polish citizens as opposed to a small and dangerous subculture, conservative 
voices from the Church and political sphere were quick to retaliate and challenge this new 
framing. Such retaliation consisted of claims that the LGBT community were both threats to the 
nation and national identity and that sexual minorities, because of their deviation from 
conservative understandings of national identity were both outside of and against “true 
Polishness” and in some cases depicted as not “true Poles.” The proliferation of the term “LGBT 
Ideology” thus served to reify sexual minorities as an oppressive force rather than a group of 
ethnically Polish citizens advocating for their rights and interests.   
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My analysis of conservative responses to LGBT rights initiatives has also shed light on 
how attacks on the LGBT community are deeply rooted in the desire to preserve a conception of 
Polish national identity that is premised on conservative, Catholic values. Thus, critics of the 
LGBT movement and their initiatives would often adhere to the enduring myths of Poland’s 
inherent, immutable Catholicism as well as the notion that Poland is a nation constantly under 
siege by foreign threats. Coupled with the context provided in chapter one, the analysis presented 
in this chapter serves to add a deeper historical arc to the large body of discursive analyses 
examining how the Polish Right has framed sexual minorities and LGBT rights since the time of 
Poland’s accession to the European Union. Having now presented this important historical 
context, the remainder of this dissertation focuses on the ideas and actions of Polish sexual 
minorities.  
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Chapter 3: Ideological Others and National Identification(s)  
 
In recent years, research on nationhood and national identification has moved from 
examining the construction of the ‘nation’ through elite narratives, discourses, and events 
(Berezin 1997; Olick 1998; Spillman 1997; Zubrzycki 2006) to probing how ordinary individuals 
understand and interpret the nation and national identity (Bonikowski 2016; Fox and Miller 
Idriss 2008; Hearn 2007; Kiely et.al 2006). Such studies have been helpful in showing the extent 
to which national identities are evoked in everyday interactions in addition to demonstrating 
when, whether and why such identities matter (Brubaker et.al 2006; Fenton 2007; McCrone and 
Bechhofer 2015; Skey 2010). Yet despite the importance of such findings, scholars studying 
everyday nationhood and national identification have yet to attend to the experiences of what I 
refer to as ideological others; members of the ethnic majority who are symbolically cast as 
outsiders and/or threats to the nation due to their lack of conformity to prevailing national ideals. 
In using the term “ideological” here, I do not mean that sexuality is meant to be seen as an 
ideology. What I am saying is that the basis of exclusion for some, including but not limited to 
sexual minorities, is based on the idea that they do not conform to traditional ideologies of the 
nation. Thus, as the previous chapters demonstrated, ideological others who do not fit the narrow 
model of “Polishness” advocated for by the Right and Far-Right are therefore de-nationalized 
because of their “otherness.” 
As I reviewed in the introduction, there is a long tradition of research that has examined 
the intersection of nationalism and sexuality (Bunzl 2001; Graff 2010; Mosse 1985; Parker et.al 
1992). However, it has tended to focus on the ways in which non-normative sexualities are 
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construed and constructed as incompatible with the “nation” through policies and discourse. Less 
research has been conducted examining how sexual minorities themselves understand and 
navigate their relationship to national identity given such exclusion. The primary objective of 
this chapter is thus to extend research on everyday nationhood and national identification by 
focusing on the experiences of sexual minorities.75 Focusing research in this way will add to our 
knowledge of how symbolic boundary work is conducted within an ethno-national community 
(Zubrzycki 2014) by showing how such boundary work is done at the intrapersonal level.  
Before continuing, however, it is important to specify my claims. Primarily, I am not 
arguing nor trying to demonstrate that national identification for Polish sexual minorities is 
harder and/or easier because of their sexual orientation. In other words, I do not present a causal 
argument in which I claim that sexual minorities in Poland feel more or less Polish because of 
their sexual orientation. While one interview subject discussed the ways in which his national 
identification has changed as he came to terms with being gay, national identification is often too 
complex of a process to understand as being impacted by any one variable (i.e. one’s coming to 
terms with their sexual orientation). The primary purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate the 
processes of national identification among members of a stigmatized community that is also part 
of the ethnic majority and how for some, such identification leads to a mental reframing of the 
symbolic boundaries of national identity.  
I will first detail the various ways in which my respondents depict the current context 
surrounding LGBT issues in Poland, as well as how they characterized the role of the Church in 
Polish society. Doing so allows us to see the extent to which the elite level discourses criticizing 
                                               
75 Thus, as Michael Skey has claimed; ‘a further issue that requires greater scrutiny is the notion of the 
ethnic majority’ (2010: 731). 
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sexual minorities and advancing a constricted, Catholic model of “Polishness” enter into the lives 
and minds of those interviewed, and how respondents interpret the current debates over all things 
“LGBT” in Poland today.  
 
Everyday Life  
 In my conversations with respondents about the current atmosphere surrounding LGBT 
issues in Poland, I noticed a nearly unanimous concern over the ways in which conservative 
politicians and Church officials spoke about “LGBT ideology.” Darek, a 29-year-old PhD 
student in Philology at Kraków’s Jagiellonian University, spoke at length about how he believes 
the environment for sexual minorities in Poland has become less secure in the last few years 
since Law and Justice has been in power. When I asked him why he believed “LGBT ideology” 
has become such a salient issue, he told me that he believes the ardent focus on “LGBT” is 
primarily an electoral strategy: 
First thing, I think it’s a government strategy…in Polish mythology there is 
some norm that we have to protect the Polish family. And so they think that 
gay people are the…biggest enemy of the Polish family. So, four years ago the 
public enemy was immigrants, and probably every four years the Right will 
need some [new] enemies (Interview conducted in English).  
 
According to Darek, the LGBT community is currently serving as a new scapegoat that the Right 
can use to mobilize voters. However, even though Darek notes that there is a trend for the Far-
Right to use minority populations as scapegoats, he does not believe these trends are innocuous. 
This reality became clear to him as he was working on a project that involved interviewing gay 
men and women in Kraków:  
Four years ago, I started a project conducting interviews with gay people in 
Kraków from the 1950s and 60s…because I wanted to document the history of 
gay Kraków. And four years ago when I started there was a better atmosphere 
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for it. And now some people don’t want to meet me in public spaces because 
they feel they could have some problems when someone hears that they’re gay. 
And that is a problem. You can’t talk about things that are normal in public 
places. 
 
Darek’s comments here are striking, as they demonstrate how the Far-Right’s trenchant attacks 
on the LGBT community are making it more difficult for some gay Poles to feel comfortable 
discussing their sexuality with him, which as he notes was not as difficult four years ago. 
Importantly, the discomfort he notes is not related to taking part in pride manifestations or 
walking on the street holding the hand of a same-sex partner, but more simply discussing one’s 
sexuality in a private conversation. Thus, for some, public spaces are becoming less secure 
venues for open conversation. Darek later told me that one of the reasons he chose the café he 
did for our conversation was because he knew the staff and environment well, and could feel 
comfortable speaking there.  
 Max, a 21-year-old transgender student studying sociology at the same university in 
Kraków, spoke of the ways in which conservative discourse targeting sexual minorities has 
caused a number of problems for the LGBT community: 
What really disappoints me, and what’s really hard for me to understand about 
Polish people, is that they don’t really react.  I mean, they don’t really see how 
bad it turns out for all LGBTQ people…because we are treated by the 
politicians as some kind of issue or problem…not only a problem but 
something that destroys the community. Especially since we live among them 
and we don’t really blend in.  We just live…and it’s really hard for me to 
understand why someone would say we are plague (Interview conducted in 
English, emphasis added).  
 
Max raised numerous important points in this brief statement. He begins by noting the general 
apathy of the Polish population to the pressures and stresses that sexual minorities in Poland now 
must face. What is essential in his statement is the claim that most people, due to the ways in 
which “LGBT ideology” is discussed in the public sphere by conservative politicians, tend to not 
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see LGBT people as individuals, but as part of a broad ideological threat. As Max said, in the 
words of the Right-Wing politicians, sexual minorities are not referred to as people, but rather as 
a force or a problem that serve the function of destroying the Polish community despite their 
desire to simply live. Max then told me that given the increasingly difficult atmosphere for 
sexual minorities in Poland, many are choosing to leave: 
It’s really hard to live here generally…and I think most young people that are 
LGBTQ, if they are not activists and they do not have enough energy…they 
will just move somewhere else. 
 
Indeed, the idea of leaving Poland for a country that is more tolerant came up in many 
conversations. Marcin, a 27-year-old computer programmer living in Warsaw, who has never 
lived abroad, told me during our conversation how he often thinks about leaving Poland due to 
the ways in which Law and Justice treat minorities. This topic came up unprompted as we were 
discussing Law and Justice and the actions of the Far-Right in Poland.  
They’re doing things really fast, and they’re very effective in what they do.  
So, basically, everything now is more connected with being Polish, with being 
Catholic, and they don’t care about other groups.  I mean, that’s the general 
feeling. I’m happy that we’re in the European Union because I can travel 
without really much bureaucracy or whatever, and I don't know…. it’s still in 
the back of my head just to move away from Poland someday and live a 
normal life in a country that would appreciate me for who I am (Interview 
conducted in English).   
 
The point Max makes about emigration and the statement of Marcin’s speak to an important 
point about LGBT migration, and as scholarship has shown (Binnie and Klesse 2013), a number 
of Poles have chosen to flee Poland due to feeling oppressed for their sexuality76. Although all of 
                                               
76 In addition, many Poles have emigrated to countries such as the UK for economic reasons. The outflow 
began to increase after Poland’s accession to the E.U. in 2004 and has continued steadily since. 
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my respondents lived in Poland during the time of our interview, a number of them had lived 
abroad for either school or work at some point in their lives. Those who had lived abroad were 
able to offer a perspective into what living as an openly gay person was like in Poland compared 
to in another, often more socially liberal, country. An illuminating example comes from Marek, a 
35-year-old microbiologist who now lives in Kraków after completing his PhD in Ireland. Marek 
spent 6 years living in Ireland for his studies. When I asked him to describe the major 
distinctions between living as a gay man in Poland and Ireland, he quickly illustrated the 
differences: 
Everything in Poland is more homophobic and more heterosexual. Everyone in 
Ireland was more politically correct when speaking, even when joking and 
messing around. But here…very derogatory speech is normal. This is what I 
see (Interview conducted in English).  
 
Marek then went on to detail what these differences meant to him now that he was living in 
Poland full time once again: 
It’s really strange because I had the freedom back in Ireland where I could say; 
okay I went with my boyfriend for a nice dinner last night or we went to a 
movie, etcetera.  And here I cannot say anything like that, and I’m all the time 
biting my tongue not to say too much or to give out too much information, 
because then I can see that it could influence my future career promotion-wise 
[...] Something like that, you know… simple things that could make your life 
harder than easier.  So I don’t lie, but I cut off the information where I could 
say something more about my life (emphasis added).  
 
This statement shows the extent to which Marek was more comfortable being fully open 
regarding his sexuality while living abroad in Ireland. What is most striking, however, is how his 
statement seems to take for granted the idea that a gay person cannot be as open about their 
sexuality in Poland as they could in another country such as Ireland. This is most clearly 
illustrated when he states that in Poland, he cannot say anything regarding a date night with his 
 107 
boyfriend. Of course, Marek is capable of making such statements in Poland, but as he states it 
would not only be received poorly and lead to uncomfortable situations, but he feels it could also 
negatively impact his career prospects. Rather than test the waters, Marek claims that he must 
continually bite his tongue in order to avoid letting certain aspects of his identity be known, 
giving up a sense of freedom and openness he knew for years while living in Ireland. 
Krzysztof, a 33-year-old art curator in Kraków who also lives part time in Milan with his 
Italian partner, noted similar experiences. At first, he was up front with me about thinking that he 
would not be a good case for my research, given that he was intimately involved in the art world 
in Kraków, which he characterized as a safe space for those identifying as non-heteronormative 
in any way. However, only moments later he noted some distinct differences between living as 
an openly gay man in Poland versus Italy or London: 
I don’t know if I’m a good person to interview actually, because my life is 
quite different. I live and work in an art environment and I live in Kraków and 
abroad in Italy…But here in Kraków where I’m working…the request is to 
maybe not speak too much about your personal life…yeah. So, basically now I 
understand your point that Poland is an interesting case now…when I’m in 
London or in Milan and other European cities, I feel totally free (Interview 
conducted in English, emphasis added).  
 
Given his extensive travels for his work and the fact that he works in the art world, Krzysztof is 
able to disconnect himself from some of the major issues facing gay Poles in his daily life. As he 
states, his life is different and as such he is generally able to live more freely than other non-
heteronormative Poles, such as Marek. Yet as he continues, he admits that even in his line of 
work in Kraków there are requests for him to be less open about his personal life. Krzysztof is 
therefore, after only some brief reflection, able to come to the conclusion that in Poland he is not 
able to live “totally free” as he is in cities such as Milan or London.  
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 Sylwia, a 24-year-old working in tourism in Kraków, never lived abroad but discussed 
how she often thinks about other countries when considering the situation of sexual minorities in 
Poland. She expressed frustration at the fact that there has been progress regarding increased 
rights and protections for sexual minorities abroad, but that in Poland such progress has not 
happened: 
It’s not good at all.  I mean, it’s difficult for all of us because you know… you 
see that everywhere in the world things are improving and there is marriage 
equality and everything, and in Poland it’s uh… it’s not moving.  It’s maybe 
even going backwards a little because there is so much hate in politics from the 
highest politicians…I think it’s quite trendy to be against gay people 
(Interview conducted in English). 
 
The “hate” from elite politicians Sylwia mentions often trickles down to the local level, making 
local officials uncomfortable dealing with representatives of LGBT organizations. Mateusz, a 
40-year-old corporate lawyer who spends his spare time volunteering for a small LGBT non-
profit in Kraków, described to me some of the awkward interactions he has had with public 
officials when arriving to represent the organization in a legal capacity. Up to this point, our 
conversation had been about the process of his coming out, but then quickly shifted to his 
experiences dealing with local officials. 
Well, I do a sort of coming out almost every day actually. For example, when 
meeting with the deputies of the local council, you just show up and you say 
‘hello, I am from LGBT organization’ and this is like a sort of coming out. The 
funny thing is, though, if you look at their faces (laughs) after you say you are 
from an LGBT organization they expect, you know, that you will have glitter 
everywhere, rainbows everywhere, or wearing a dress or some sort of leather. 
And suddenly a guy in jeans and a shirt who looks like anybody on the street 
shows up and they think, are you for real? (Interview conducted in English)  
 
Although this interaction is not something that personally harmed Mateusz, and indeed is 
something that he found humorous, it provides a useful window into how elite level political 
 109 
discourse concerning LGBT ideology can impact the biases of local officials whose role is to 
help facilitate important resources such as permits and licenses for events and access to public 
spaces. In this case, Mateusz constantly sees and experiences the biases and stereotypes of such 
officials when trying to do his job.  
 The impacts of anti-LGBT political discourse were also felt by 19-year-old Arthur, a 
student and volunteer for the same organization as Mateusz. According to his narrative, coming 
out to his parents was particularly difficult given the recent focus on LGBT ideology amongst 
conservative politicians.  
The hardest part was coming out to my mom and dad, because it’s hard to talk 
about the reaction in the media and what’s going on in the media in Poland 
regarding LGBT. For example, politicians and what they say in the media. So I 
had a problem with coming out and I wasn’t sure how to get ready for it. So, I 
had been thinking for probably more than one year how to come out (Interview 
conducted in Polish, my translation).  
 
Fortunately for Arthur, his parents accepted him after he came out to them. However, his 
statement demonstrates that the increasingly hostile discourses surrounding the LGBT 
community in Poland made him think that he had to choose between embracing his sexuality or 
maintaining a relationship with his parents. This psychological dilemma was aptly captured in 
my conversation with Krzysztof, the art curator in Kraków.  
I remember when this government started…I felt like some things were 
changing and the feeling of security was breaking. But for me it’s not about the 
things happening, it’s more about your personal psychology. You start to 
question yourself…is what I am doing ok or not?  
 
The respondents in this section show that the conservative, elite-level discourses targeting the 
LGBT community are readily felt on the ground by many non-heteronormative Polish citizens. 
In addition, a number of respondents discussed the role of the Church in Polish politics and 
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society. While I did not specifically ask respondents about the role of the Church, a number of 
them mentioned, often eagerly, what they understood as the problematic and deleterious 
relationship between the Church and the state in Poland today.  
Klaudia, a 27-year-old journalist living in Kraków, mentioned precisely this issue with no 
hesitation when I asked her what she thought was the most important change to positively impact 
LGBT rights in Poland. 
I want to separate the church and state…things are really, really bad because 
the Catholic Church in Poland is in an incredibly high position and it’s, oh my 
God it is unbelievable…so it’s important right now but I don’t know how it is 
even possible. But right now it’s all connected with the Church and its really 
bad because they impose their way of thinking onto all Polish people, and it’s 
very sad (Interview conducted in English).  
 
Klaudia’s comments provide a concise summary of the sentiments shared by a number of 
respondents regarding the role of the Church in Polish politics and society; frustration coupled 
with a sense of uncertainty on how to move forward. Anna, a 22-year-old University student 
living in Poznań, provided some insight into why she believed the Church still has such a strong 
grip on Polish society. 
I think they want us to think there isn’t a relationship [between the Church and 
state], but there is, especially with the current government. I think they help 
each other a lot in different matters. I think it is also connected with our history 
and traditions. Christianity and Catholicism brought us together throughout the 
years, so I think that’s the whole reason why we are so afraid to leave it. They 
are afraid Poland will fall apart without it.  It’s the main thing that is keeping 
us together, I guess (Interview conducted in English, emphasis added).  
 
Anna’s point here is important because it refers precisely to the kind of rhetoric used by Far-
Right politicians and the conservative wing of the Church, which frames any criticism or 
perceived criticism of Catholicism as an attack on Poland and an attempt to destroy the Polish 
nation. Thus, according to Anna, the idea that separating Poland from Catholicism will be the 
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downfall of Polish civilization is one that gets stuck in the minds of many Poles, making the idea 
of any future without a strong Catholic Church not only unfavorable, but dangerous. Romek, a 
37-year-old lawyer living in Kraków, told me how he believed the strength and reach of the 
Church had made it more difficult for people to express any kind of sexual diversity. 
People are still very much, I would say, afraid of speaking about sexual 
diversity; afraid or maybe ashamed.  It is changing, progressive media and 
influential media are promoting, I would say, a good picture of sexual diversity 
and LGBT people, you know…But still, you know, I you have to remember… 
I’m always underlining when meeting with foreigners that the Church is still a 
huge power here (Interview conducted in Polish, my translation).  
 
Even though Romek believes there have been some positive developments for sexual minorities 
through progressive media, he stopped this discussion to remind me again just how powerful the 
Church is in Poland. These comments suggest that even though he believes there is some 
momentum for sexual minorities, the power of the Church and their resistance to this progress is 
not something that can be taken for granted. He further illustrated this point as our discussion 
continued. 
If you look at polls, you can still see that around 45% of Poles go to church 
every Sunday.  So you can imagine how influential the institution of the church 
is when approximately 20 million Poles go to the church every Sunday, and 
they are listening to the often anti-progressive ideology.  So, this is one of the 
main obstacles in overcoming this prejudices or openness in terms of sexual 
diversity in Poland. 
 
Bartek, a young activist and employee of the Campaign Against Homophobia (KPH), was able to 
offer a clear view into the relationship between the Church and conservative parties as he told me 
why politicians fear going against the church. 
The stubbornness I would say, is kind-of related to Poland being a conservative 
country.  I mean, politicians imagine it to be very conservative, and also the 
church – the institutionalized church, not the parishes – has a very strong sense 
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on the issues like family and how the family should be regulated…so the 
church is very strong, and even if the church as an institution doesn’t do much, 
there are many politicians who feel that mission to be kind of church 
representatives unofficially in politics.  They act according to what the Church 
would think about the issue.   
 
According to Bartek, even though the institutional Church does not take certain actions in the 
political sphere, many conservative politicians act on behalf of the Church when debating and 
implementing policies. Importantly, he notes that Poland is not necessarily a conservative 
country, but rather it is politicians and the Church who believe Poland is and should remain so. 
He then spoke about his first serious interactions with the Church as KPH was facing criticisms 
for their campaign (discussed in the previous chapter) titled “Let Us Offer a Sign of Peace”: 
That was the first time, I think, that the church reacted so strongly about 
something that we did. We had strong alliances and partnerships in that project 
with the Catholic community.  Three of the biggest Catholic magazines gave 
patronage to the campaign, and a number of really well known Polish 
theologians and Catholics were very involved in supporting the campaign. So, 
it made the church angry and they feared that we might be getting the support 
also from places that were not expected at all. That showed us that even though 
there is not much room for dialogue with the church as an institution, we still 
have access to those people that matter, who have influence in the community 
(Interview conducted in English). 
 
Bartek’s reflection on this campaign are important as they illustrate that not all Catholic Poles 
adhere to the dictates of the predominately conservative institution of the Church. While the 
overall institution is still very powerful, Bartek’s comments show that for some Polish Catholics, 
even those in important positions in society, the LGBT community is not seen as a threat to 
Poland and Polish national identity. These reflections serve as an important reminder that one’s 
adherence to Catholicism does not necessarily make them critical of advancing rights for sexual 
minorities, and that the true struggles are primarily due to the institutionalized Catholic Church’s 
anti-progressive narratives which still have a far reach in both Polish politics and society. 
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 In the following section, I demonstrate the various ways in which respondents understood 
and identified with their ‘Polishness’. 
 
National Identification(s) Amongst Polish Sexual Minorities  
Struggles Over National Identification   
A number of interview subjects struggled to identify with their ‘Polishness’. Such 
difficulties were evident in my conversation with Beata, a thirty-eight-year-old translator living 
outside Warsaw. Beata, now divorced, was once married to a man and has two young children. 
She confided to me that she has always had a sense of being ‘different’, yet given her strict 
Catholic upbringing, it was not until her late twenties that she could truly understand why: 
So, I was -- in my -- my family was very, very Catholic.  We lived with my 
grandma since I was six.  I was an only child, and basically my grandma set 
the rules. So I was forced to go to church and to pray every day and I just took 
it as whatever it was.  It was my life…so, I did not really entertain the thought 
of different sexuality or sexual orientation…. I remember in high school, I 
really had a big crush on my English teacher who was a female, and my friends 
-- my girlfriends -- they actually had a nickname for me which basically meant 
a lesbian.  I was so ashamed and so angry at them, I completely did not 
associate myself with being a lesbian at all.  I just didn’t see -- I just liked the 
teacher, but nothing else (Interview conducted in English). 
 
Although her narrative began with reference to herself — ‘I’ —, Beata quickly changed the 
subject of the conversation from herself to her family. This hesitation suggests that the sense of 
religiosity felt in her youth was not something embraced independently, but rather something 
imposed upon her that she must consciously work to separate herself from. Yet even several 
years later her immediate response is to state that she was religious in her early life. Beata’s 
statement regarding her former crush on a female English teacher is also telling. Although she 
was feeling strong emotions towards her instructor, in her mind the idea that such attraction may 
be stemming from her sexual orientation did not occur to her. Instead, she was simply left with 
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confusing emotions, as her strict religious upbringing and the pressures of peer ridicule 
precluded her from even entertaining the idea that she might be gay. Our conversation then 
shifted towards her feelings regarding Poland and what Polish national identity meant to her.  
I: From your understanding, what does it meant to be Polish? 
B: Right now -- right now, I do feel Polish. The fact is that I criticize my 
government, my country, a lot, but I’m allowed to do it… So, that’s my sort of 
being Polish. But to tell you the truth, any sort of patriotic feelings are being 
hijacked by extreme nationalist groups.  And it’s almost -- it’s almost shameful 
for me to carry a Polish flag, or to have any sort of Polish symbols on my 
clothes, because that’s basically what I associate with hooligans… I had a 
friend from Brazil who lived here with me for eight months, and she wanted to 
get something typically Polish. They had baseball caps with the Polish emblem 
and she asked me to buy one for her and I refused.  I said, ‘Absolutely not.  
You’re not going to be wearing that because this basically is being associated 
with so many things that we both were against.’  With xenophobia, with 
homophobia, with anti-Semitism, with any sort of basic phobia to anything that 
is a little bit different. 
 
The first four words of Beata’s statement are telling. Although she claims to feel Polish right 
now, the implication is that her subjective sense of ‘Polishness’ is not a given. A consistent sense 
of national identity, which some argue can be essential to feelings of ontological security (Skey 
2010) appears to be absent. Although she claimed to still feel Polish, and thus did not fully 
eschew her national identity, Beata’s identification with ‘Polishness’ took significant 
justification.  
Further, according to Beata, traditional Polish symbols had been hijacked and 
transformed into icons of extremism. For her, the symbols being discussed —Polish baseball 
caps with the national emblem— carried with them the idea that being Polish meant being a 
hostile, xenophobic nationalist, and therefore they were seen as offensive and alienating. Yet her 
Brazilian friend, who did not understand these products as being associated with such 
exclusionary ideals, instead simply saw a souvenir. Beata therefore noted a sense of shame that 
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accompanied any utilization of traditional Polish symbols that are often accompanied by feelings 
of patriotism and national pride. Yet for her, any involvement with national symbols —be it 
carrying a flag or wearing a ‘patriotic’ article of clothing— given their association with Far-
Right nationalism, may be understood as an assault on her sexual identity, one that is at odds 
with prevailing articulations of Polish national identity.  
Waldek, a 30-year old artist living in Kraków, told me something similar. 
I: What, in your view then, does it mean to be Polish?   
W: Um to be honest, I never, I never felt…okay, I know that I’m Polish and 
I live here, but I never felt like, I’m not a nationalist person, let’s say.  I’m not 
nationalist, there's a better word…I’m not patriotic.  Because I don’t…I would 
like to be.  I really would like to be, and I would like to be proud of my 
country.  I would like to, I don’t know, feel that I want to fight for my country, 
but I don’t, because I don’t have any reason to do that (Interview conducted in 
English).  
 
This sentiment is telling, as it implies that despite some yearning to feel strongly ‘Polish’, 
Waldek has been unable to find any justification to do so. Even though the initial question was 
about what, in general, it meant to be Polish, his response did not address this inquiry. Rather, 
Waldek immediately moved into a discussion of how he himself has never felt a strong sense of 
Polish identity, even though he would like to feel, as he states, proud of his country. Although he 
did not articulate precisely why he struggled with his connection to ‘Polishness’, Waldek’s 
decision to be so forthright about disavowing any relation to nationalism and patriotism —
despite his desire to be patriotic—  implies a strong sense of alienation from Polish national 
identity, an identity to which he cannot easily connect himself.  
Karol, a 30-year-old travel agent and tour guide living in Kraków, expressed a similar 
sentiment in our conversation.   
I: In your view, what do you think it means to be Polish?   
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K:  Right now, I’m really ashamed that I’m Polish, given what’s been going on 
in the last couple of months.  So, it is also a difficult question and would have 
been definitely easier to respond to that question a couple of years ago. 
I: Do you think that your sexuality has anything to do with this?   
K: To some extent, yes, but on the other hand, I still have friends who are not 
gay and they also see it more or less the same way as I see it. I actually never 
really suffered much from being a member of this oppressed minority, but still 
I think that in a lot of cases, it helped me to think in a more positive way about 
other people. But, even if I was straight, I’d be seeing most of the cases more 
or less the same way. But, it’s also hard to say because I’m gay and am not 
straight and I will never be straight (Interview conducted in English).  
 
Taken together, my conversations with Beata, Waldek, and Karol illustrate the sometimes 
alienating effects of prevailing, conservative understandings of national identity for sexual 
minorities in Poland. Yet this is not to say, of course, that it is simply because of their sexual 
orientations that they struggled to identify with ‘Polishness’, as there are numerous possible 
explanations for difficulty feeling part of this collective, national identity. It is certainly possible 
that a number of heterosexual Poles feel similar constraints, and as Karol states, he has many 
heterosexual friends who feel the same way as him. Thus, while these individuals do indeed 
struggle to identify with their “Polishness,” it would be hasty to claim that their sexuality is the 
driving force behind these struggles. Instead, such cases demonstrate that sexuality may actually 
not play a major role in national (dis)-identification for some sexual minorities, suggesting that 
while citizens with marginalized identities may indeed have trouble identifying with their 
national identity, one cannot assume that such struggles are determined by the aspect of 
themselves that is marginalized. As the cases of Beata, Waldek, and Karol demonstrate, such dis-
identification may be more circumstantial, or tied to more general liberal leanings.  
Marcin —the 28-year-old computer programmer living in Warsaw— however, stated that 
coming to terms with his sexuality did make it more difficult to identify as Polish. 
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From the start, I was raised like – maybe not like extremely to be focused on 
nationality, but generally, I was like – I would say I was patriotic, I was proud 
of my country, its achievements, and all that comes with that.  But, I’ve got to 
say that when the years went on and I was more aware of the political 
situation, I was more aware of my own sexual identity, it’s like I feel that the 
right-wing extremists are really – they’re like stealing, or like taking for 
themselves the national symbols... they’re supposed to be for everyone. I tend 
to identify national symbols with them… so whenever I see a Polish flag, I like 
wonder is it going to be something about hating gays or hating, I don’t know, 
Muslims, or whatever.  And it usually is, which is sad. (Emphasis added) 
 
Marcin’s emphasis on how his perceptions changed over time is important as it underscores his 
evolving understanding of what it means to be Polish. Further, it shows how given these changes, 
the ease with which he could identify with his “Polishness” has also changed. As he states, 
throughout his childhood, he was raised to be proud of the various achievements of his country, 
and therefore felt patriotic. Although not ardently focused on nationality, he could claim his 
Polish national identity with pride and therefore embraced national symbols. In these times, 
national symbols and the national identity they represented were reinforced by feelings of 
patriotism and pride, and thus the national icons that symbolized these patriotic ideas were not 
seen as oppressive.  
However, as he became more politically aware and, most importantly, conscious of his 
own sexual orientation, Marcin’s understanding of what it meant to be Polish, in addition to how 
easily he could identify with ‘Polishness’, began to change. As his understanding evolved, 
national symbols and the national identity they buttressed were harder to imbue with positivity 
and pride, and were increasingly interpreted as brands of far-right nationalists, ones he could no 
longer brandish. Identifying with his national identity, one that he claims he used to be proud of, 
therefore became more difficult with time. While as a child Marcin’s understanding of his Polish 
national identity brought with it feelings of national pride and belonging, as he became more in 
touch with his sexual orientation —one that, according to traditional Polish mythology is both a 
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threat to Poland and in stark opposition to true ‘Polishness’—  these positive associations began 
to diminish. Marcin made this point even clearer in the following exchange; 
I:  Do you feel Polish in your daily life? 
M: I’d say it definitely changed.  I find myself not really associating myself 
with Poland that strongly.  I feel more like I was born here, but this country 
doesn’t really care about me and I’ve got to say I don’t really care that much 
about this country, either.  So, yeah, it changed.  I remember that it wasn’t like 
that from the start.  So, I guess just this constant reminder of not being equal to 
heterosexual persons, I guess it made me just not really associate with that as 
much as I would normally do or as I would like. (Emphasis added).  
 
Marcin’s desire to identify as Polish has been hampered by the constant reminders that 
homosexuality and ‘Polishness’ are commonly framed as mutually exclusive categories. Given 
the widespread narratives that marked him as being ‘less Polish’ due to his sexual orientation, 
Marcin has grown increasingly alienated from his national identity. This is particularly troubling 
for him because as he states, he would like to associate himself more with ‘Polishness’. 
However, the ‘constant reminder’ of being an unequal part of the national community makes the 
process national identification a far more difficult task.  
 A few respondents voiced their frustrations with the current state of Poland in similar 
ways to Marcin and the other respondents above, but found it much easier to denounce their 
‘Polishness’. Jakub, a 40-year-old actor living in Kraków, also spoke of the hostile environment 
in Poland and how he has distanced himself from identifying with his Polish identity.  
I: What does it mean to you to be Polish? 
R: Frankly, I cannot tell you now.  I’m so un-Polish at this point, I cannot tell 
you.  Certainly this is an anti-Semitic country.  And certainly, it is very – it’s 
not okay to be gay.  You know, it isn’t.  And, I mean, most generally speaking, 
any difference is looked down upon.  I had this conversation here with a guy – 
I think he was Australian, but he lives here and he teaches and he speaks 
perfect Polish.  But, he made an interesting observation that different people in 
Poland are grouped here only because they’re different.  I mean, the mentality 
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is so us and them that people who really don’t have much in common other 
than being different from the norm are grouped together (Interview conducted 
in Polish, my translation).  
 
Unlike Beata and Marcin, Jakub is quick to denounce his ‘Polishness’ even to the point of 
considering himself “un-Polish.” While he does not directly link his lack of identification with 
his sexual identity, it is important to note how adamantly Jakub distanced himself from being 
Polish at the outset of his response before describing how he understood Poland. Further, 
immediately after he states that he is “un-Polish,” he goes on to discuss the exclusionary aspects 
of Polish society, suggesting that it is due to such hostility to “otherness” that he not only has 
issues with his Polish identity, but considers himself “un-Polish.” Indeed, given that the Right 
has deemed him an ideological other, adopting this “un-Polish” mindset may help Jakub find a 
more stable sense of identity and allow him to live more comfortably within Poland’s borders.  
 Darek, the 29-year-old PhD student in philology at the Jagiellonian University in 
Kraków, also discussed his rejection of not only his Polish identity, but the idea of identification 
in general. Early in our conversation, he told me how he generally tries to avoid lumping himself 
into any category or identify with anything too strongly. Therefore, when I asked him what it 
meant to be Polish, he responded; 
Like I said, I’m trying to refuse all kinds of identity…for me, what is most 
important is a focus on knowledge and science and understanding what is 
important for others. I think this is what is important in my life, not some kind 
of identity.  
 
Darek did, however, acknowledge that this was a position he had come to after much careful 
thought and deliberation, as his family was religious and he spent a lot of time going to Church 
as a child. 
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It was a process. I went to Catholic school and it was…it had very strict rules. 
And I started thinking more about myself…. I never was patriotic. I was more 
religious. But when I started to think about religion, about Christianity, about 
Catholicism, and I read the bible etcetera, I found many points I did not agree 
with. And then year after year everything in my brain started changing, and 
soon I stopped with Church and started to read more and more books. And for 
me that was…well then I didn’t need any religion.  
 
The points Darek make here are important, because even though he is not talking about Polish 
identity directly, he is discussing how he distanced himself from what is considered by many to 
be a pillar of Polishness; Catholicism. His statement is also important because it illustrates how 
important intellectual curiosity was in helping him move away from conservative modes of 
thought that would force him to be critical of his non-heteronormative identity. This point 
became even more clear when he told me how important reading and research, particularly in 
gender studies, were for him as he came to terms with his sexuality. 
For me the crucial thing was that I had an interest in gender studies. And 
gender studies helped me to realize my own personality…so for me my 
research and my studies were very helpful in letting me know more about 
myself and help me say that I am normal. Because in my childhood…my times 
with peers in high school…I didn’t know why I chose this way of living that 
was known as unusual. That’s why when I was in Lublin…I got depression 
and tried suicide once…and I tried, you know, psychotherapy, but nothing 
helped me like my studies and that’s why I’m…myself. And I am trying to 
help other people like me.  
 
In this powerful statement, Darek shares that it is because of his research and work in fields such 
as gender studies that he is able to feel more comfort and security living as a sexual minority in 
Poland. In his early life, while he was still involved with the Church and did not have contact 
with academic fields such as gender studies, it was very difficult for him to accept himself due to 
how negatively non-heteronormative sexualities were framed. However, once he discovered 
gender studies and other intellectual traditions, Darek was able to break out of a cycle of self-
loathing and depression and accept, as he states, himself, without any labels or the need to 
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identify with something. As is evident from his statements, finding such self acceptance would 
not have been possible had he remained actively involved with the Church. Indeed, according to 
Darek, the exact opposite was true, as his research and studies helped him in battling depression 
and suicidal impulses more than anything else.  
While the respondents just discussed either struggled with identifying with their Polish 
identity or openly eschewed it, such sentiments were not unanimously felt among respondents. In 
the following section, I will discuss reframing as a strategy some used in order to broaden the 
symbolic boundaries of national identity and therefore make their relationship to Polish national 
identity easier to navigate.  
 
Reframing “Polishness” 
Some respondents were able to avoid the same kinds of struggles that were evident with 
Beata, Marcin, Waldek, and Karol, but not because they identified with the traditional model of 
Polish national identity. Rather, it was because they either reframed the boundaries of 
‘Polishness’ as premised on more general and inclusive criteria, or reframed their own 
relationship to ‘Polishness’ more generally, often by also identifying more strongly with a 
cosmopolitan identity. The following excerpt from my conversation with Adam, a 20-year-old 
college Freshman and activist living in Poznań, is a clear example of the latter approach: 
I: How would you describe or define what it means to be Polish?   
A: So, I don’t feel Polish.  I think that I am cosmopolitan. But, some of the 
habits, some of the traditions, some of the other schemes of behavior and of 
opinions and routines in my mind are without question Polish…but I try to not 
to identify as a Polish person because I think that it’s too oppressive… I prefer 
to create a world without barriers, and I think that by doing that, or in wanting 
this world, I should refuse my Polish identity…but I don’t want to do that, 
yeah? (Interview conducted in English) 
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Like Waldek above, Adam is quick to answer the initial prompt by claiming that he does not feel 
Polish, even though my question asked how he would define or describe what it means to be 
Polish. However, as he continues in his response, it becomes clear that such a dissociation is not 
easy for him. As he states, there are basic mental frameworks that, having grown up in Poland, 
are impossible to avoid. Therefore, in some ways, he is ‘without question’ Polish. However, 
despite these deeply ingrained schemas, Adam also feels the need to actively disengage from his 
Polish identity, as he believes it to be oppressive and contradictory to the barrier-free world he 
envisions and desires. He therefore first and foremost identifies as cosmopolitan, while also 
acknowledging that he does not desire to renounce his “Polishness.”  
Thus, while identifying strictly as Polish might prove difficult for Adam, thinking of 
himself as also being cosmopolitan is a strategy that gives him the ability to maintain a more 
stable sense of identity. Much like an individual navigating familiar streets is able to walk more 
calmly and easily than one navigating an unfamiliar neighborhood, Adam is able to more easily 
navigate life as a gay man in Poland by reframing his identity as being more intimately tied to 
cosmopolitanism than ‘Polishness’, even though doing so is by no means an easy task. As 
Miller-Idriss and Rothenberg (2012) have aptly pointed out, people often have complex and at 
times contradictory relationships to the nation and their national identity. 
A number of respondents echoed Adam’s sentiments. Mateusz, a 26-year-old doctoral 
student living in Wrocław, told me (after I asked him what it meant to be Polish): 
So, I’m cosmopolitan.  I don’t view myself as very Polish.  I love Poland 
because I love the people I know in Poland, I love Polish cities, I love Polish 
literature and culture and so on and so on, and maybe this is being Polish.  
Being involved and being engaged  in Polish culture, Polish society and so on.  
In those terms, I am Polish (Interview conducted in English, emphasis added).  
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Much like Adam, Mateusz does not completely eschew his ‘Polishness’. Yet despite 
acknowledging strong and positive emotions for particular aspects of Polish culture, he very 
clearly identifies first and foremost as cosmopolitan while still retaining a sense of his Polish 
identity. However, as his statement shows, it took a great deal of conscious deliberation to arrive 
at this conclusion, as he initially claims to not view himself as very Polish. Though Mateusz can 
and does identify as Polish, this process requires some redefinition in which he reframes what 
being Polish means on terms of his own choosing. His immediate response, however, is still to 
state that he identifies as cosmopolitan.  
Romek, the 37-year old lawyer living in Kraków- shared similar ideas, yet claimed that 
his Polish identity came first:  
My identity is as a Pole in the first place.  But equally or maybe just lower, I 
think I’m just a person of Western culture…a person who really shares the 
views of an open society with open values.  
 
Although Romek does not use this term in his response, he still underscores the importance of 
living in an ‘open society’, which is one of the primary tenets of cosmopolitanism. Therefore, 
while Adam, Mateusz, and Romek all have their own unique responses to the questions 
regarding their national identification, they all share a commitment to cosmopolitan values.  
A similar logic is evident in the following excerpt from my conversation with Kuba, a 30-
year-old museum curator living in Wrocław; 
I: Would you say that you feel Polish?  
R: Yes.  I think… I think yes.  I feel Polish, but my Polish-ness is written with 
a small letter, not with a big letter, like Polish Poland and you even have to, 
you know, stand up when you say Poland.  No, for me Polish-ness is like the 
everyday life… so this is the way I would like to understand Polish-ness.  Like 
that you know people and people know you, and you are not available but 
eager to help some other people and to do something together (Interview 
conducted in English).  
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While Kuba does not identify as cosmopolitan, he has found a way to associate comfortably with 
‘Polishness’ by reframing what being Polish means to him. Given this reframing, he is able to 
easily and quickly say that he feels Polish when asked. As his statement demonstrates, being 
Polish does not require displays of patriotism or national pride. Rather, for Kuba, it is enough to 
be a good neighbor and everyday citizen, traits that he believes are what should constitute 
‘Polishness’ in the first place. Similar to Mateusz above, changing the stakes in this way makes it 
easier for him to more easily and tacitly identify as Polish. Ewa, a 40-year-old former academic 
who now works at a small bank in Warsaw, said something similar:  
There are two purposes of patriotism… one is, you know, that national one, 
that sort of a big one. And the other one is let’s pay taxes, let’s care about 
environment, let’s be good to our neighbors, let’s support local, let’s say, 
schools, libraries, communities.  Let’s support good causes and so on.  And 
those are forms of, let’s say, they called modern patriotism, not war patriotism.  
And I could support it, but it isn’t specifically Polish….so it’s a citizen 
approach (Interview conducted in English).  
 
As Kuba and Ewa emphasize, being Polish can simply mean being a thoughtful and caring 
citizen, an idea that is not, as Ewa states, specifically Polish. Ewa’s sentiment is important, as it 
illustrates how one’s ‘Polishness’ need not be constituted by one’s adherence to a conservative 
and mythologized ideal, and emphasizes the crucial place of everyday actions happening in the 
present; actions nearly anyone can engage in. Reframing the symbolic boundaries of Polish 
national identity in this way may therefore serve as a means by which Polish sexual minorities 
can find new meaning in their national identity. With this newfound, reframed meaning, they can 
more easily and proudly identify with their ‘Polishness’ because it is now an identity they have 
defined on their own terms.  
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Conclusion   
While research on everyday nationhood has been instructive in showing the ways in 
which ordinary individuals navigate and interpret the nation and national identity (Brubaker et.al 
2006, Fox and Miller-Idriss 2008, Miller-Idriss and Rothenberg 2012), it has not focused 
explicitly on how more vulnerable and stigmatized members of the ethnic majority —what I 
have termed ideological others— navigate their relationship with national identity. As a result, 
the everyday nationhood literature has often reified the notion of “ordinary” citizens as well as 
the concept of the “ethnic majority.” My examination of the experiences of Polish sexual 
minorities and their relationship to “Polishness” therefore serves as an initial attempt to help 
broaden this literature by underlining that there is wide variation among those “ordinary” citizens 
who compose a given nation’s “ethnic majority.”  
My interviews demonstrated that some respondents struggled to identify with their 
national identity, but that such struggles are not necessarily determined by their sexual 
orientation. These respondents tended to cite a concern that Polish national identity was being 
increasingly associated with Far-Right extremism, making it nearly impossible for them to feel 
connected to their Polishness. Other respondents were able to more easily identify with their 
“Polishness,” but not because they identified with prevailing conservative notions of Polish 
national identity. Rather, it is because they engaged in a process I refer to as reframing, in which 
they redefined what “Polishness” meant to them in their own terms. Reframing, I argue, is an 
important strategy by which sexual minorities can find meaning in their national identity and 
belonging to their national community despite a political climate that marks them as enemies of 
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the nation and thus outside the symbolic boundaries of national belonging77. In addition to 
reframing, other respondents were able to more easily and comfortably identify with their 
“Polishness” because they also embraced a cosmopolitan identity. 
In the following chapter, I explore how such efforts at reframing the boundaries of 
national identity in Poland has involved the strategic use of national symbols through aesthetic 
revolt.
                                               
77 This point follows McCrone’s claim that ‘those on the margins...whether in national or ethnic terms, 
offer the social scientist much better opportunities for understanding that identities are, in essence, 
negotiation codes used as people attempt to steer paths through processes of acceptance and affirmation,’ 
(2002: 31). While this argument is well taken, such research has yet to focus on ideological others. 
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Chapter 4: Reclaiming “Polishness” Through Aesthetic Revolt 
 
 
This chapter examines how the recent actions of Polish LGBT activists constitute an 
aesthetic revolt that is contesting the boundaries of “Polishness” by fundamentally reimagining 
some of the primary pillars of a conservative, Catholic model of Polish national identity. In order 
to explore activists’ efforts to reclaim and reframe Polish national identity, I begin by discussing 
and analyzing Poland’s pervasive national sensorium (Zubrzycki 2011) and the ways in which 
sexual minorities have been engaging with salient national symbols in order to advocate for both 
the inclusion of sexual and other minority groups as well as a renewed conception of Polish 
national identity. They achieve these ends through what Zubrzycki has called an “aesthetic 
revolt,” the process by which social actors strategically rework core national symbols and icons 
by materially manipulating them, potentially transforming national identity in the process (2013: 
428). I extend Zubrzycki’s concept by showing how aesthetic revolts can take different forms as 
well as by underlining the importance of focusing on actors’ perceptions when examining the 
complex process of aesthetic revolt.  
By emphasizing the importance of both the intrapersonal and the material in aesthetic 
revolt, my approach is similar to William Sewell Jr’s (1992) program to overcome the duality of 
structure and agency by detailing the interdependence of both. In Sewell’s formulation, social 
actors are not merely passive receptors of social structure, but have the capacity for creative 
social action which can then lead to social change. In order for social change to come about, 
there must be an interaction between intrapersonal cultural schemas and material resources, the 
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latter of which he argues are the physical embodiment of the former (1992: 19). Consequently, 
Sewell argues that structures are best conceived of as being constituted by mutually reinforcing 
schemas and sets of resources and that the meaning of a given resource “is largely a consequence 
of the schemas that inform their use” (1992: 11). Thus, for Sewell, structural change is the result 
of the complex interplay between both aspects of human cognition (schemas) and external, 
material objects (resources).  
Following Sewell, my analysis of aesthetic revolt in Poland considers the mutually 
constitutive relationship between material objects and human minds, thereby heeding the claim 
that “the semantic potential of cultural symbols depends on the meaning construction potential 
embodied in persons” (Lizardo 2016: 202, cf. Shore 1996)78. Such a perspective therefore would 
insist that it is not the properties of material objects themselves that make changes in 
signification possible (cf. Zubrzycki 2014: 446), but that a change in signification —and by 
extension broader social change— is made possible when an array of material objects (or a 
single material object) is reinterpreted “in terms of cultural schemas other than those that initially 
constituted the array” (Sewell 1992; 19). 
 I first discuss the concept of the national sensorium and demonstrate the importance of 
particular national symbols and icons in Poland as well as their pervasiveness in the Polish 
public sphere. I also provide essential background information on the aspects of Poland’s 
constitution that prohibit defaming or criticizing national symbols as well as insulting religious 
sentiments. I then focus on three controversial events in which national symbols were targeted by 
LGBT activists and their allies. The first concerns the attempt to prosecute two activists who 
                                               
78 From this, it would follow that any analysis of the power of material objects must take into account that 
the meaning and subsequent power of these objects is the result of “motivated mappings between external 
form and cognitive meaning” (Lizardo 2016: 200). 
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reinterpreted Poland’s coat of arms —by replacing its traditionally red background with a 
rainbow background— on a banner they carried at an equality march in the summer of 2018. I 
then analyze the controversy surrounding the arrest of Elżbieta Podleśna, a psychotherapist and 
LGBT activist, for creating posters featuring Our Lady of Częstochowa —Poland’s most sacred 
and venerated icon— with a rainbow colored halo. Finally, I conclude the chapter with an 
examination of the actions of a recent movement known as Stop Bzdurom (Stop Nonsense), 
whose members have faced arrests and criminal charges for hanging rainbow flags on famous 
Polish statues and icons. I argue that in all of these instances, activists are engaging in a 
particular form of aesthetic revolt focused on reframing and reclaiming the symbolic boundaries 
of Polish national identity.  
 
Historical Background of Poland’s National Symbols and Sensorium 
For Zubrzycki, the national sensorium is driven by “historically constructed, contingent, 
and contested systems of myths” and composed of a nation’s mythology “crystallized in material 
culture and embodied in various practices and performances” (2011: 22). To pay attention to a 
nation’s sensorium means to take seriously the impacts that images, sounds and other sensory 
modalities have on socializing individuals and collectives to feel as if they are part of an abstract, 
imagined community known as a nation (Anderson 1983). Through consistent exposure to 
sensory stimuli related to the nation —reciting and hearing the national anthem in school, seeing 
national flags hanging on buildings, consuming products that feature vestiges of the nation— 
people come to know themselves as being part of a national community. This is not to say, 
however, that consistent exposure to national symbols, songs, and other features of the national 
sensorium always lead to ardent nationalism. Rather, the concept of the national sensorium is 
meant to emphasize the important role that symbols and materiality play in forging national 
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identities. Further, as Zubrzycki notes, “the extent to which they can shape national identity, 
frame the understanding of the present, or mobilize towards nationalist action depends on the 
specific historical contexts in which they are deployed” (2011: 22). This chapter will therefore 
emphasize the broader historical context in which sexual minorities are mobilizing national and 
religious symbols to reframe and reclaim Polish national identity.   
While the national sensorium can inspire ardent nationalism or simply a more pacified 
sense of national belonging, it is also a means by which activists can criticize and subvert 
existing understandings of national identity through aesthetic revolt (Zubrzycki 2013). Although 
the Polish national sensorium consists of many objects, sights and sounds, in this chapter I will 
focus specifically on national symbols and their role in political protest.   
Though all nations have their symbols, they may have a greater semiotic force in some 
nations than in others. Such is the case in Poland because of the country’s political history79. Due 
to a 123-year period of partitions between Austria, Hungary, Prussia, and Russia that began in 
1772, Poland did not exist as a sovereign state until the end of the First World War. As 
Zubrzycki (2011) has argued, due to the lack of a centralized state and tangible borders 
demarcating Poland from other countries during the nineteenth century, symbols served as 
tangible representations of the nation and became an increasingly important means by which 
Poles could retain a sense of national identity and belonging. These symbols were used in rites 
and rituals and “facilitated affective attachment to, and support for, the idea of Poland” (2011: 
33). By wearing a cross on a necklace or hanging religious iconography in one’s bedroom, 
                                               
79 This is not to say, of course, that other nations do not take their national symbols and icons seriously 
nor that they do not utilize them as a way to signify allegiance to and support of the nation. What I am 
underlining here is the idea that because of Poland’s specific and unique history, symbols for some time 
were the primary means of identification with the nation and with national identity.    
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individuals could understand themselves as belonging to a broader national community even 
though one did not exist geopolitically. Thus, in the Polish case, national symbols played an 
exceptionally essential role in “rendering abstract ideas concrete, and creating affective bonds 
among subjects, as well as between subjects and the stateless nation” (2011: 34).  
Before proceeding to my analysis, however, it is important to discuss the relationship 
between national and religious symbols in Poland, as some of the most important symbols in 
Poland are also religious in nature. The confluence of the religious and the national is due to 
Poland’s centuries old mythology that locates the birth of the first Polish state in the 10th century 
as occurring when Prince Mieszko I converted to Christianity. Mieszko’s conversion —along 
with other salient historical events that will be discussed below— thus provided the fuel for the 
eventual myth of Poland’s inherent Catholicism. Given the tight associations between Polish 
national identity and Catholicism, traditionally religious symbols such as the cross are 
understood by many as symbols representing the nation and Polish national identity. The nearly 
seamless association between the religious and the national is evidenced in the following 
quotation taken from a televised transmission of the state funeral for Polish composer, pianist, 
and statesman Ignacy Jan Paderewski in 1992: 
Today’s celebration has a special religious and national meaning. These two 
elements are so intertwined in Polish history that it is not possible to 
distinguish of separate them. It is remarkable that there are no national symbols 
that would not also be religious at the same time (quoted in Mizielińska 2001).   
 
As this statement demonstrates, it is difficult to distinguish between the religious and the national 
in Poland. Further, it shows that the influence of the Church and Catholicism lies not only in the 
realm of political discourse —as exhibited in Chapters 1 and 2— but also in the realm of 
symbols. While this chapter is focused on examining the role and use of national symbols in 
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political protest, it is essential to note the close associations between nation and religion in 
Poland when it comes to constituting what is considered a national symbol. Thus, in what 
follows I will consistently be referring to “national” symbols when discussing icons like the 
cross or Our Lady of Częstochowa80 although such symbols can also be interpreted as simply 
being religious. While for an American or Italian such symbols may belong solely to the realm of 
religion, in Poland they are also understood as reflections of national identity. 
Due to the important role that symbols played in affectively bonding members of the 
stateless nation, national symbols continued to serve a crucial role in both political and social 
realms once Poland regained nationhood in 1918. A key example is the usage of religio-national 
symbols in protests against the totalitarian socialist state following the Second World War. Jan 
Kubik (1994) has shown how symbols and ceremonies played a crucial role in the Solidarity 
movement in the 1980s, and that they were an important element in the construction of political 
power in the years preceding the fall of the Soviet Union. In a similar but different vein, 
Zubrzycki’s (2006) examination of Poland’s “war of the crosses” showed that religious symbols 
—specifically that of the cross—  and culture played a central role in heated debates over Polish 
national identity in the years following the collapse of state socialism in Poland.  
Given the historical and contemporary importance of the connection between Catholicism 
and the nation in Poland, numerous scholars have written about the evolution and fusion of 
religious and national symbols in Poland and the important role they’ve played in demarcating 
the boundaries of national identity. In a recent genealogy of the symbol of the cross in Polish 
political consciousness, Magdalena Waligórska (2019) demonstrated how this pervasive symbol 
has been important for centuries and has taken on different meanings throughout its historical 
                                               
80 I detail the significance of this particular symbol in the following section.  
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usages. She argues that while in the middle 19th century the cross represented progressive and 
egalitarian values, after the First World War it became more strongly seen as a territorial marker 
meant to demarcate Poles from non-Poles. In her study of Polish lesbians, Joanna Mizielińska 
(2001) claimed that important aspects of Polish nationalism can be gleaned by examining 
national symbols and images. Through her analysis, she critically argued that the use of national 
symbols has “helped to create a Polish identity in opposition to the Others presented in textbooks 
and the dominant nationalistic discourse/canon” (2001: 284), thereby claiming that national 
symbols in Poland often serve as a potent means for oppression and exclusion.  
The tight association between religious —and specifically Catholic— symbols and the 
nation is therefore not universally accepted but hotly contested. Geneviève Zubrzycki (2006) 
demonstrated the polarizing nature of these symbols in her analysis of a controversial event in 
which groups of Polish nationalists erected and displayed hundreds of crosses outside the 
Auschwitz concentration camp. According to those responsible for the display, the purpose of 
the spectacle was to mark the site as one that represented the martyrdom of Poles killed during 
the Second World War, and thereby claim that Poland is an intrinsically Catholic nation. As 
competing factions fought intensely over the placement of these crosses, Poles were forced to 
actively rethink what Polish national identity and its associated symbols such as the cross meant 
to them. The cross has also been a point of contention in contemporary Polish politics, as the 
symbol has hung over a rostrum in the main hall of this parliamentary building since 1997. 
Although various politicians have called for its removal on the grounds that the Polish state 
ought to remain secular, the symbol has not been removed and remains a testament to the strong 
influence of Catholicism in Polish politics and public life. In addition, it shows the important 
place that national symbols play in professions of Polish national identity.  
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Given the elevated status of national symbols in Poland as well the important role of 
Catholicism, the Polish constitution contains an article specifically addressing the defamation of 
national symbols as well one concerning insulting religious feeling. These articles, respectively 
articles 137 and 196 of the criminal/penal code, read: 
Whoever publicly insults, destroys, damages or removes the emblem, banner, 
flag or other state mark, shall be subject to a fine, the penalty of restriction of 
liberty or the penalty of deprivation of liberty for up to one year.  
Whoever offends the religious feelings of other persons by publicly insulting 
an object of religious worship, or a place designated for public religious 
ceremonies, is liable to pay a fine, have his or her liberty limited, or be 
deprived of his or her liberty for a period of up to two years. 
 
While some of the language surrounding what actually constitutes an “insult” in these laws 
remains vague, what is clear is the desire to protect Polish national identity —specifically a 
traditional and religious conception of it— through the threat of formal legal sanctions. 
Commonly known as the “insult laws,” they are frequently utilized and are often controversial. 
Many critics of the insult laws have claimed that they violate individual citizens’ freedom of 
expression, and as such they have been subject to numerous debates and controversies. Critics 
claim that although numerous countries across Europe have similar laws for defamation and 
insult, Poland is unique because its legal system consistently enforces them (Moran 2018). Some 
have gone so far as to claim that since these laws still exist, contemporary Poland has yet to shed 
some of the most troubling totalitarian aspects that were present during the years of state 
socialism81 (Yanchukova 2003, Griffin 2015).  Indeed, in a 2015 review of Poland’s legal 
system, the Helsinki Human Rights Foundation cautioned against these insult and defamation 
                                               
81 Restrictions on speech were severe during Poland’s state socialist period. Freedom of expression was 
severely restricted, and it was possible to receive a prison sentence of up to seven years for defaming 
Soviet authorities (see Yanchukova 2003 for more details).  
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laws, claiming that they would discourage people from addressing sensitive subjects due to the 
fear of fines or jail time and thereby produce a chilling effect on society. However, despite 
drawing international scrutiny and criticism, Poland’s insult and defamation laws remain 
strongly enforced.  
 Perhaps one of the most controversial aspects of these laws is that they appear to apply 
most strictly when criticism is directed towards powerful political officials (Moran 2018). 
Specifically insulting the president, for example, is a separate offense that can carry a 
punishment of up to 3 years in prison. Thus, in 2018 an elderly man was criminally charged for 
placing a t-shirt which said “Constitution” (a reference to the movement opposing the Law and 
Justice party) on a statue of late Polish President Lech Kaczyński. In 2006 police actively 
pursued a homeless man who had claimed, in a drunken state, that Lech Kaczyński was a thief. 
Although during his court hearing the man claimed he did not recall the statement due to his 
inebriated state, he still faced criminal charges. Most recently, during a peaceful protest in the 
small town of Łowicz, a man was apprehended for brandishing a banner that read “We have an 
idiot for president.”  
 Numerous citizens have also been arrested for the crimes of defaming national symbols 
and/or religious sentiment. A particularly significant case of the latter occurred when famous 
Polish pop star Doda claimed in an interview that she was “more likely to believe in dinosaurs 
than in the bible…because it is hard to believe in something that was written by someone wasted 
from drinking wine and smoking weed” (National Post, 1/19/2012)82. Following these statements 
and a trial, Doda had to pay a fine of 5,000 Polish zloty (approximately 1,300 USD). Numerous 
cases such as the one against Doda have also been brought against Nergal, the front-man of 
                                               
82 https://nationalpost.com/holy-post/polish-pop-singer-fined-for-insulting-bible, Accessed 17 Oct 2020.  
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Polish black metal band Behemoth. In a particularly controversial case, Nergal was formally 
charged for destroying a bible while performing a concert in the Polish town of Gdynia, during 
which he also claimed that the Roman Catholic Church is the most murderous cult on the planet. 
More recently, young poet and writer for progressive magazine Political Criticism (Krytyka 
Polityczna) Jaś Kapela was arrested for a poem he wrote which altered the Polish national 
anthem. In his poem, which was meant to criticize Poland’s decision not to accept refugees, 
Kapela wrote that given Poland’s wealth, it should not hesitate to accept refugees. Nowhere in 
his poem was he directly critical of Poland or the nation’s anthem. However, a court ruled that 
his poem defamed the national anthem —considered a national symbol— and he was forced to 
pay a significant fine.  
 
 
Figure 4.1:  Behemoth concert poster. Lead singer Nergal was charged with the crime of desecrating a 
national symbol for featuring a rendition of the Polish Eagle with an inverted cross. There is also no 
crown on the eagle, and the title of the poster reads “Poland Unfaithful,” a direct contradiction of the 
nation’s motto, Polonia semper fidelis (Poland always faithful). Image taken from: 
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https://www.behance.net/gallery/43404981/BEHEMOTH-Rzeczpospolita-Niewierna, Accessed 15 Oct 
2020 
 
Thus, while national symbols hold an important place in the hearts and minds of many 
Poles, it remains difficult to voice any criticism of Poland and traditional understandings of 
Polish national identity through the use of national symbols because of the strength and 
consistent enforcement of the insult and defamation laws. These laws therefore help to reify the 
notion that Polish national identity not only should be, but always has been premised on 
conservative, Catholic values. Defying the insult laws is therefore often framed as an attack on 
Poland and Polish national identity. In what follows, I provide a detailed account and analysis of 
recent attempts by Poland’s LGBT community to utilize national symbols in an aesthetic revolt 
in order to reframe and reclaim the symbolic boundaries of Polish national identity.  
 
Polish Sexual Minorities and Aesthetic Revolt 
The Rainbow Eagle and Flag: Expanding “Polishness” through Symbolic Manipulation   
 The summer of 2018 was an important time for Poland’s LGBT movement and 
community. LGBT Equality marches, generally only held in the largest and more progressive 
cities, were beginning to be organized in smaller cities and towns, some of which are highly 
conservative. While in the summer of 2017 seven Equality marches were held in primarily major 
cities, in 2018 fifteen marches were held throughout Poland83. Importantly, some of these 
marches were organized in small, conservative towns that either had few resources for sexual 
minorities or were outright hostile to the idea of advancing gay rights. In these towns, common 
criticisms were that the LGBT community was not truly representative of Polish sexual 
                                               
83 In 2019, there were 25, and it is likely that the number would have increased in 2020 if it were not for 
the Covid-19 pandemic.  
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minorities, but rather an interest group forcing a progressive, liberal agenda that conservative 
Poles did not want. Thus, in the weeks leading up to some of the marches, conservative 
politicians were vocal in criticizing what they saw as threats to public morality through the 
promotion of same-sex relationships. The mayor of the small and conservative town of Lublin, 
for example, initially attempted to prevent the city’s march from occurring by citing concerns 
over security84. However, despite the varied controversies leading up to them, all of the marches 
planned for the summer of 2018 were held, though not without incident.  
 While the Equality march in Lublin provoked controversy both before and after its 
occurrence, the most significant and consequential Equality march held in 2018 (and arguably 
throughout Poland’s history of Equality marches) was held in the city of Częstochowa. Located 
in the southern region of Poland, Częstochowa has a population of approximately 220,000 and is 
the thirteenth largest city in Poland. What makes it unique, however, is that it is home to the 
Jasna Góra monastery, a sacred site not only for Polish Catholics but for Roman Catholics 
around the globe. The monastery, established in 1382, draws thousands in pilgrimage every year. 
As such, Częstochowa and the sacred site of Jasna Góra within it have been important symbolic 
markers of the Polish nation’s imbrication with Catholicism for centuries and for many continue 
to signify the essence of Polish national identity85.  
                                               
84 Critics of this decision claimed that this excuse was the same as the one given by former Polish 
president Lech Kaczyński in his attempt to prevent the 2004 and 2005 marches from occurring in 
Warsaw. In addition, they claimed that the decision was made only because Lublin’s mayor was coerced 
to do so by Przemysław Czarnek, the regional governor (a controversial member of the Law and Justice 
party who often shares his homophobic views on social media).  
85 Among many other reasons, the site of Jasna Góra is important because of Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński’s 
“Pledge of Jasna Góra, which he wrote in 1956 during a three-year prison sentence for being seen as a 
threat to the stability of Poland’s state socialist regime. The pledge focused on his gratitude to Our Lady 
of Częstochowa as well as for his hope for a free Poland, and became a cornerstone of Catholic devotion 
in Poland. It also contained profound yet subtle political themes, as during World War II and Poland’s 
period of state socialism, pilgrimages to the shrine were banned and strict penalties were imposed for 
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  Given the sacredness of Jasna Góra and Częstochowa to Catholic Poles, the idea of an 
LGBT Equality march there was highly controversial and generated heated criticism from the 
beginning. For many conservative politicians, commentators and members of the clergy, the 
decision to hold an Equality march in the holy city was deemed a direct provocation. Thus, when 
speaking of the march, the archbishop of Częstochowa said the following:  
[We are witnessing] the confrontation of those who have rejected God and a 
Christian civilization…we will not accept the desecration, the mockery against 
God, we will not accept the social hatred that those who are not only the 
enemies of the Church but also the enemies of Poland want to sow86.  
 
As this quotation shows, any criticism of the Church is perceived as also being a criticism of 
Poland. In the words of this archbishop, and in the sentiments of the Polish Right and Far-Right 
more generally, one who rejects God and is not a devout Catholic is by definition not a legitimate 
Pole. Such statements therefore promote the logic of “good, real Poles” versus the “bad, false 
Poles” on the basis of one’s adherence to conservative, Catholic values. Further, the archbishop’s 
use of the terms “desecration,” “mockery” and “social hatred” are important, as by using them he 
is sending the message to his followers that the LGBT community’s actions and presence in 
Częstochowa can be understood as nothing but a harmful act driven by anger and contempt. 
However, while the LGBT community may be attempting to criticize the Church, they are not 
doing so simply because they are driven by “social hatred.” Rather, contrary to the words of the 
Archbishop, their criticism is focused precisely on combating hatred and exclusion. While the 
LGBT movement is indeed critical of the Church, its goal is not to rid Poland of Catholicism but 
                                               
attempting to access it. Jasna Góra is therefore a site that holds tremendous religious and political 
significance for many Poles.  
86 https://visegradpost.com/en/2019/07/01/the-international-lgbt-offensive-in-catholic-poland/, Accessed 
16 Oct 2020.  
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to expand the boundaries of Polish identity so that being a “good Catholic” and a “good Pole” 
need not exist in opposition to the idea of LGBT rights and equality.   
Additionally, numerous conservative periodicals and magazines spoke critically of what 
many referred to as the “LGBT offensive,” claiming that their efforts were not only attacking and 
undermining traditional Polish values, but also causing deep rifts in Polish society between 
progressives and conservatives. Conservative magazine Do Rzeczy, for example, published an 
article whose title read “Equality March in Częstochowa: Homopropaganda will not arrive at 
Jasna Góra.” Throughout the text the term “equality” is consistently placed in parentheses, 
implying a common line of attack the Polish Right often levies against the LGBT community; 
although they claim to advocate for equality, justice, and rights, their true mission is the 
destruction of traditional Polish values and the destruction of normalcy.  
Although the idea of a LGBT Equality march in the holy city of Częstochowa was 
controversial enough, the planned route made it even more so87. The march was originally 
designed to conclude in a park near the entrance to the Jasna Góra monastery, where activists 
were hoping to hold a celebration as well as meet with Pauline monks. Thus, while the march 
was able to proceed without issue at the outset —the jeers and taunts of small groups of counter 
protestors notwithstanding—  demonstrators were faced with formidable opposition once they 
approached the park near Jasna Góra. Some opponents to the Equality march laid down in the 
middle of the road leading up to the park in order to prevent it from advancing. They were 
eventually removed by police. However, citing a need to protect public safety given the number 
                                               
87 To make matters worse, the Equality March was held on the same day as a large conservative Catholic 
event known as the “Radio Maria Family Pilgrimage.”  
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of counter-protestors blocking entry to the park, the police ultimately decided to prevent the 
Equality march from ending in its chosen location.  
Although the the decision to prevent the march from reaching the base of Jasna Góra was 
allegedly in the interest of public safety, it was nevertheless an important symbolic gesture. 
While —after some debate— the city was willing to let the march occur through its streets, it 
would still not allow its participants to enter a sacred Polish site, showing a desire to maintain a 
strict boundary between the LGBT community and an important national symbol. Further, this 
boundary was made tangible via the presence of Far-Right protestors blocking the march from 
accessing the park. Blocking the participants from entering the park near Jasna Góra thus 
signaled that once the LGBT community started coming into contact with important Polish 
symbols, there would be absolutely no tolerance for them.88 
The decision to prevent the march from reaching the base of Jasna Góra was praised by 
the Church and political Right and decried by progressive politicians and activists. Do Rzeczy, 
for example, published an article claiming that the decision to keep the march from reaching its 
desired endpoint was an important move in order to protect the sacred symbol of Jasna Góra89: 
Many commentators saw the choice of this place for this type of event as a 
provocation…this march is a form of violence against a symbol that is 
important to Polish traditions. The organizers chose this place on purpose to 
cause a scandal and provoke, otherwise they would have chosen a different 
part of the city. In 1956…the Jasna Góra Vows of the Polish Nation took 
place, where Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński was held in isolation, great religious 
                                               
88 It is of course possible to argue that many on the Right have no tolerance for the LGBT community in 
any case. However, as the rest of the chapter will make clear, these sentiments become most pronounced 
when it comes to important national symbols.  
89 In another article published two days prior to the march, editor-in-chief of Do Rzeczy criticized the 
march as “a form of rape on a symbol important for Poland.”  
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ceremonies were held. This is a special place, a zone that must not be violated 
(Do Rzeczy 7/8/2018).90 
 
This excerpt is instructive for numerous reasons.  First, the author frames participants in the 
Equality march as provocateurs, claiming that the sole reason they chose to end their march at 
the base of Jasna Góra was to cause a scandal and provoke the Church. Relatedly, the author 
refers to the march as a “type” of event that is in and of itself meant to be a provocation. In both 
statements, the implication is that Polish sexual minorities are by definition outside of and 
against anything that can be considered traditionally Polish. In order to emphasize the place of 
sexual minorities as outside agitators who care nothing for the good of Poland, but rather wish to 
see it destroyed, the author alludes to famous moments in Poland’s history that underscore the 
importance of the Jasna Góra monastery, and assumes that the Equality march is meant to be 
nothing more than an affront to this important history and by extension Polish national identity. 
As is usual in conservative accounts of the LGBT community, the march is framed as a Trojan 
horse; one that feigns to be about equality but in reality is an attempt to bring about the 
destruction of Catholic Poland and traditional Polish culture.  
 This brings up an important point. On the one hand, the critics of the equality march are 
correct, as the ultimate goal of the march is to criticize the traditional models of Polish national 
identity that are premised on conservative Catholicism. However, what this interpretation misses 
is that the desire to reframe Polish national identity is not driven by a distaste for or lack of 
respect for Catholicism in general, but rather a disavowal of the ideologies of exclusion that have 
                                               
90 https://dorzeczy.pl/kraj/69879/marsz-rownosci-w-czestochowie-homopropaganda-nie-dotrze-na-jasna-
gore.html, Accessed 16 Oct 2020.  
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been promulgated by the Church and conservative politicians in Poland for decades.91 The 
ultimate goal, then, is not to completely disavow and dispel religion from Polish life, but rather 
to emphasize that being Catholic is not the primary indicator of “Polishness.”  
 Critics on the Polish Left also weighed in on the events in Częstochowa, echoing these 
sentiments. In a scathing critique of conservative criticisms of the Equality march, Jan Hartman, 
a philosopher and journalist writing for the center-left magazine Polityka, wrote that “the 
equality march in Częstochowa serves not only to defend the rights of LGBT people, but also to 
demonstrate that Catholicism is not beyond the reach of criticism and protest” (Poliytka, 
7/8/2019).92 Thus, while the Equality march was not an attempt to destroy traditional 
understandings of Polish national identity, it was a means by which ideological others such as 
Polish sexual minorities could attempt to criticize those traditional aspects of “Polishness” that 
would deem them as incompatible with traditional understandings of Polish national identity. 
Further, Hartman’s analysis denounces the hypocritical nature of the Church and conservative 
politician’s decisions to label only those actors and actions that go against their agenda as 
insulting to Polish identity. He therefore goes on to criticize the hypocrisy of the Church and its 
priests for condemning the LGBT community and its march while accepting the sale of cheap 
religious kitsch and paraphernalia (such as t-shirts and buttons featuring the Polish Eagle and 
other important icons) near the gates of the monastery, nor the marches of nationalists carrying 
torches at Jasna Góra on Poland’s Independence Day.  
                                               
91 There are numerous LGBT rights organizations in Poland that have religious affiliations and advocate 
for the place of sexual minorities in the Catholic Church. See Mikulak 2019 for a discussion of these 
groups.  
92 https://www.polityka.pl/tygodnikpolityka/mojemiasto/1755580,1,pierwszy-marsz-rownosci-w-
czestochowie-a-kosciol-judzi-dalej.read, Accessed 16 Oct 2020.  
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 Even though the controversy over the path and endpoint of the march was palpable, what 
drew even greater national attention was the sighting of a gay couple marching with a Polish flag 
with the red portion replaced with the LGBT rainbow (Figure 4.2).   
 
 
Figure 4.2: Activists with Rainbow Eagle Flag. Holding the banner would soon catapult them into a 
national controversy. Image taken from: https://www.pinknews.co.uk/2018/07/09/prosecute-lgbt-poland-
national-symbol-white-eagle/, Accessed 16 Oct 2020.  
 
The Polish Eagle —the national coat of arms— is an important and pervasive symbol in 
Poland and its history goes back to the nation’s founding. According to national legend, the 
mythical founder of Poland, Lech, came across a majestic white eagle when traversing through 
the terrain that is now known as Greater Poland. Once he encountered the eagle, legend has it 
that the bird expanded its massive wings as the sun was setting, creating the famous image of the 
grand eagle among a red background. After this encounter, Lech was so inspired by what he saw 
that he decided to establish the first Polish city at the site where he saw it spread its wings. Ever 
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since, the eagle has been a symbol standing for courage, strength, and nobility. During the 
partitions, for example, the eagle served as an important reminder for Poles to seek 
independence. Once Polish independence was regained in 1918, the white eagle became the 
nation’s official coat of arms. The story of the eagle remains an important part of Polish 
mythology, and both its origin story and what it has come to symbolize are well known to all 
Poles.  
 
  Figure 4.3: Traditional Polish Eagle.  
 
Given the importance of the eagle in the Polish national imagination, its appearance 
among a rainbow background at Częstochowa’s first Equality march was controversial. Several 
images were taken of the banner that day, which prompted Law and Justice member of 
parliament Joachim Brudziński to condemn its appearances in a Twitter post. His post contained 
several images of the banner and the activists carrying it, and read that those carrying the banner 
must be prosecuted for profaning a national symbol. In addition to his post, hundreds of others 
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took to Twitter to condemn that actions of the two activists and praise Brudziński for calling for 
their arrest. In addition to Brudzińksi’s letter to the prosecutor’s office in Częstochowa, six 
individuals —two anonymous— filed a complaint regarding the use of the “rainbow eagle.”  
 Shortly after Brudziński’s announcement that the activists holding the rainbow eagle 
banner would be prosecuted, there was also an outpouring of support for the activists online and 
outrage at Brudziński’s actions. Within a few days, thousands of people had adopted new images 
on their social media accounts featuring the words “Rainbow Does Not Offend” (Tęcza Nie 
Obraża), which soon became an important slogan for Poland’s LGBT movement. Further, within 
a few days of the march in Częstochowa, an organization called Democracy Action (Akcja 
Demokracja) took up a petition to send to MP Brudziński in which they ardently argued that the 
rainbow is not a sign of offense but of inclusion. Over 10,000 Poles signed the petition, which 
read: 
We, the undersigned, inform that we publicly wear t-shirts with an eagle on a 
rainbow background and we flaunt this sign on badges, stickers, and posters. 
Both the rainbow- a symbol of love, freedom, equality, and tolerance, and the 
emblem of the Polish state of which we are citizens, are important symbols for 
us, the combination of which represents the 2 million in the Polish LGBT+ 
community. We consider it absurd to conduct [legal] proceedings against 
participants in the Equality march in Częstochowa who were carrying the flag 
with this beautiful symbol. In a gesture of solidarity with them, we know about 
the possibility of publicly committing the crime of ‘insulting the state 
emblem’, knowing at the same time that we have not insulted it, because the 
RAINBOW DOES NOT OFFEND!93  
                                               
93 https://teczowyorzel.pl/historia-teczowego-orla, Accessed 17 Oct 2020.  
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Figure 4.4: Activists Supporting the Rainbow Flag and Eagle. The large banner in the center reads: 
“Rainbow Does Not Offend…10,000 Signatures.” In the corner is a sign that reads “God is Gay.” Taken 
from: https://teczowyorzel.pl/historia-teczowego-orla, Accessed 17 Oct 2020.  
 
In the end, the case against the two activists in Częstochowa was dropped, but the political life of 
the rainbow eagle was just beginning. Since its initial appearance in Częstochowa, the rainbow 
eagle has become a symbol of resistance and pride for the Polish LGBT community as well as an 
important target for the Polish Right.  
Importantly, some conservative commentators have used the rainbow eagle as foil for the 
traditional red and white eagle. In the most recent presidential elections, incumbent and Law and 
Justice member Andrzej Duda was challenged by a number of candidates, the most formidable 
being Mayor of Warsaw Rafał Trzaskowski who had become a controversial figure for many on 
the Polish Right because of his support for Poland’s LGBT community as well as other liberal 
and progressive reforms. Duda, on other hand, ran on a platform dedicated to combating “LGBT 
Ideology” and preserving the idea of the “Polak-katolik.” Thus, when discussing the election, 
Law and Justice party member Bogdan Rzońca stated: 
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In these elections, a real, Polish White Eagle and a tiny rainbow bird stood 
against each other. Behind President Andrzej Duda stands his program, Polish 
and conservative traditions and values. Rafał Trzaskowski presents only the 
anti-signature. Therefore, he will lose the elections miserably94 (Do Rzeczy 
7/9/2020, emphasis added)95.  
 
For many on the Polish Right, the rainbow eagle therefore has come to symbolize an “anti-
signature,” a blatant attack on traditional Polish norms and values represented by the “real 
Polish” white eagle. What is most important in this statement, however, is Rzonca’s claim that 
there is a difference between “real” Poles who support the traditional white eagle, and by 
implication “not real” Poles who support the “rainbow eagle,” bringing further attention to the 
idea that there is a sharp distinction between those who can and should be considered “truly” 
Polish. The rainbow eagle has therefore become a new, crucial focal point in the continued 
struggle over Polish national identity. 
On the other hand, rather than retreat due to the threats and critiques from conservative 
politicians like Brudziński and Rzońca, LGBT activists and their allies have continued to march 
with the rainbow eagle icon at Equality marches throughout Poland, continuing the effort to 
reframe and reclaim the boundaries of Polish national identity. The icon has since become an 
important feature at many LGBT rights manifestations within Polish borders. Importantly, the 
image has also made appearances outside of Poland. In September of 2020, the image of the 
rainbow eagle was projected onto the façade of the European Commission building in Brussels 
as a sign of protest against Poland’s “LGBT Free Zones.” The projection, which was organized 
by two prominent Polish LGBT rights organizations, also included text that read “We are not an 
                                               
94 It is worth noting that Duda won the presidential election by a very narrow margin (51/49), thus 
exhibiting the deep divide in Polish politics and society.  
95 https://dorzeczy.pl/kraj/146417/w-tych-wyborach-walcza-wspanialy-orzel-bialy-i-malenki-teczowy-
ptaszek.html, Accessed 17 Oct 2020.  
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Ideology. We are Citizens of Poland.” The motivation for this banner was to contest the claims 
from the Right and Far-Right that “LGBT” was nothing more than an ideology or cultural trend. 
Given this reality, a movement on social media began in which members of the LGBT 
community posted the hashtag #We are people, not and ideology (Jesteśmy ludżmi, nie 
ideologia). 
While the action in Brussels was roundly criticized by Law and Justice party members as 
yet another instance of the LGBT community profaning national symbols, a spokesperson for the 
Campaign Against Homophobia (one of the organizations responsible for the projection) claimed 
that “placing a rainbow on the façade of the European Commission building was not a 
profanation of national symbols…national symbols are also national symbols of the LGBT 
community” (Polishnews, 9/24/2020)96.  
 
Figure 4.5: Image of Rainbow Eagle on E.U. Commission Building in Brussels. The text reading “We 
are not and Ideology, we are citizens of Poland.” Taken from: https://www.polishnews.co.uk/brussels-
polish-flag-with-rainbow-colors-on-the-building-of-the-european-commission-the-reaction-of-pis-meps/, 
Accessed 17 Oct 2020.  
                                               
96 https://www.polishnews.co.uk/brussels-polish-flag-with-rainbow-colors-on-the-building-of-the-
european-commission-the-reaction-of-pis-meps/, Accessed 17 Oct 2020.  
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This statement is an important one, and demonstrates how and why the utilization of the 
rainbow eagle is an example of aesthetic revolt, or “the dual process by which social actors 
contest and rework iconic symbols in the public sphere; those symbols acquiring, through those 
material manipulations, significations that push forward the articulation of new identities and 
provide momentum for institutional reforms” (Zubrzycki 2011: 428).  In the instances described 
above, LGBT activists took an important national symbol of Poland and reworked it so that it 
would stand for something that includes not only those Poles who adhere to the tenets of a 
conservative, Catholic Polish identity but ideological others such as Polish sexual minorities. 
Through their material manipulations of the Polish flag and eagle, a traditional national symbol 
has been modified and is able to take on new meaning. Two different interpretations of the eagle 
therefore now exist in the Polish public sphere, each standing for distinctive visions of Polish 
national identity.   
Further, and most important for the argument being advanced here, the aesthetic revolt 
involving the Polish flag and eagle is different in form than that detailed by Zubrzycki in her 
study of the Quiet Revolution. In this case, all of the activists involved have not been calling for 
a complete disavowal of Polish symbols and advocating for a completely new model of 
“Polishness,” but rather are working with and modifying the existing model to better fit their 
progressive values. By modifying the symbols in this way, the activists are showing that while 
the symbols are still meaningful and important to them, their traditional form has become too 
imbricated with the exclusionary and nationalist cultural schemas promulgated by the Right and 
Far-Right. Thus, in order to reclaim Polish national identity for ideological others like Polish 
sexual minorities, they are engaging in a form of aesthetic revolt emphasizing the reframing of 
salient national symbols instead of their outright rejection. 
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The Intrapersonal Aspects of Aesthetic Revolt  
The reworking and utilization of national symbols —namely the Polish flag and eagle— 
was something that numerous respondents discussed during our interviews. The statements from 
these respondents show the importance of attending to actors’ perceptions and understandings of 
the material objects utilized in aesthetic revolts in addition to the objects’ own materiality and 
the material manipulations of the symbols themselves. Irma and Maria, two lesbian activists who 
I met after the 2018 Pride in Kraków, clearly articulated the significance of modifying such 
symbols and how doing so is an important means by which sexual minorities can reframe the 
boundaries of Polish national identity both in their own minds and in society more generally. In 
our conversation, Irma and Maria claimed that embracing and reframing national symbols was 
one of the most important mechanisms by which sexual minorities could salvage Polish national 
identity for themselves as well as other excluded minority communities. However, as Irma’s 
statement shows, engaging with national symbols in this way was not always easy for her:  
My mother got me a Polish flag a few years ago, and I got it and put it in the 
back of room, like the end of the basement.  Because I didn’t… like it was in 
my mind, I only imagined, you know, the Right being nationalist with the flag. 
I didn’t have the connection in my head that I could actually hang it or hold it 
somewhere.  And then a few years passed and I’m marching with a [Polish] 
flag (Interview conducted in English, emphasis added).  
 
In this important statement, Irma claims that she had initially seen the Polish flag as an icon of 
exclusion which did not elicit any positive emotions nor afford any positive actions. Yet after 
some time, she found renewed meaning in the flag which allowed her to more easily identify 
with and utilize it in public demonstrations.  This mental reframing of a formerly oppressive 
symbol therefore encouraged her to approach both the Polish flag and what it means to be Polish 
differently. Importantly, in this case, there was no need for material manipulation or any form of 
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subversion of the symbol itself. Rather, the only change that occurred was within Irma’s own 
mind, as the symbol she could now wave with pride was the same one —with no material 
alterations— that she previously hid in the closet. Irma’s statement therefore demonstrates the 
important role that internal, mental struggles can play in the initial realization of aesthetic revolt, 
as in order to understand the flag as something she could utilize and eventually manipulate, Irma 
had to —using Sewell’s language— reinterpret the flag in terms of a new cultural schema.  
While it was not clear from our conversation which cultural schema now informed her 
interpretation of the flag97, what is clear from her statement is that the meaning evoked by the 
symbol was no longer negative and associated with exclusion, but positive. Thus, as she states, 
for some time she could only imagine the Right waving the flag and the flag representing 
exclusionary nationalism. However, this connection soon changed for her, allowing her to 
embrace the flag with renewed enthusiasm and reframed meaning. The mental reframing of a 
polysemic symbol can therefore be seen as an important initial step in one’s engagement in 
aesthetic revolt, as before one engages with and manipulates a symbol they must see it as 
something that they can engage with and manipulate.  
However, while these intrapersonal changes can be an important precursor to one’s 
decision to engage in aesthetic revolt, in order to catalyze broader societal changes, the material 
manipulation of such symbols becomes more important (Zubrzycki 2011). Thus, Irma and Maria 
then informed me that they had taken their mobilization of the Polish flag further by stitching it 
to a rainbow flag, which they now display at parades and pride marches. By manipulating 
national symbols in this way, and thereby engaging in aesthetic revolt, Irma and Maria are also 
                                               
97 Although, given her statement, one could infer that the cultural schema that now informs her 
interpretation of the flag is one of openness and inclusion.  
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attempting to reframe Polish national identity and reclaim it as being inclusive of sexual 
minorities and other minority communities. Therefore, in addition to finding ways to reframe 
what it means to be ‘Polish’ in their own minds much like those discussed in the previous 
chapter, activists like Irma and Maria are working to reframe the symbolic boundaries of Polish 
national identity through aesthetic revolt. As they say:  
I: We’re mainstreaming the rainbow, showing that the Polish flag and Rainbow 
flag do not exclude each other. 
M: That we are citizens as well.   
I:  We thought this was a great idea and mostly bigger demonstrations 
happened here in Warsaw.  So we basically --- really all of them wear their 
Polish flag and the rainbow flag showing that we’re here and we support you. 
 
By engaging with and manipulating salient national symbols in a critical way, Irma and Maria 
are effectively doing what respondents like Beata and Marcin believe needs to be done; 
reclaiming those national symbols, and the national identity that they represent, that have been 
‘hijacked’ by the Far-Right (Bourdieu 1991; Verdery 1993)98. For activists like Irma and Maria, 
such acts of aesthetic revolt are an important way to demonstrate that national symbols need not 
be understood as signifying a strictly conservative national identity, but can be framed and 
understood as being inclusive of sexual, and other, minorities. Further, what Irma and Maria 
discuss here is not an act of rejecting a dominant symbol. Rather, they emphasize that they are 
mainstreaming their modified symbol and by extension advocating for a renewed and more 
inclusive vision of Polish identity. This subtle but important distinction shows that engaging in 
aesthetic revolt does not necessitate the outright rejection of national symbols, but can be done 
                                               
98 In addition, by using the term “citizens” in this statement, they are embracing a civic notion of 
“Polishness” as opposed to the ethnic one advocated by the Right and Far-Right.  
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by tweaking and modifying them. As such, activists like Irma and Maria —as well as the 
activists in Częstochowa— are not focused at all on exclusion, but entirely on inclusion.  
 
 
Figure 4.6: Rainbow Eagle/Rainbow Polish Flag Among Polish Flag. Image taken from: 
https://notesfrompoland.com/2020/05/20/elections-are-a-choice-between-white-and-red-poland-and-
rainbow-poland-says-ruling-party-official/, Accessed 18 Oct 2020.  
 
My conversation with Franek —a 40-year-old German teacher living in Kraków— 
further demonstrated just how malleable the meaning of cultural objects like national flags can 
be.  
I: How do you feel about Polish symbols? 
F: I don’t feel much about it, but – it’s so strange. When PiS came to power 
and we started to go to demonstrations and so on, it was the first time I was 
thinking of the flag and the Polish national anthem as something that I 
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identified with. Before, liberal people or leftists didn’t care about national 
symbols…they are not nationalists. Nationalists are singing [the] national 
anthem all the time and they were carrying flags, and I was – it was my 
association with patriotism, like Right, conservative, aggressive people.  So, 
the symbols were, for me, the symbols of oppression. But, when I started to 
demonstrate, I thought, okay, okay, it’s –then, I feel something for the symbols.  
So, it changed with PiS coming to power.  Strange, isn’t it? And I even bought 
a flag for demonstrations.  And, I wasn’t ashamed of singing national anthems 
during these manifestations (Interview conducted in English, Emphasis added).  
 
Much like Irma, Franek saw the Polish flag as a sign of oppression for much of his life, and 
therefore did not associate himself with it nor could he take any pride in displaying it. As he 
states, brandishing national symbols and chanting national anthems were the actions of 
aggressive, Right-Wing nationalists, not those who maintained liberal ideals. However, as his 
statement demonstrates, once one has interpreted such symbols in terms of a new cultural 
schema, the valence of these symbols can change. Thus Franek, much like Irma and Maria, now 
saw the flag as something he could wave in order to reclaim “Polishness” from the dictates of the 
Right and Far-Right.  
Other respondents also echoed what activists like Irma and Maria stated about reclaiming 
national symbols. Jan, a 30-year-old graduate student told me that while he did not have much 
feeling for symbols, he felt that it was important to try to reclaim them from being associated 
solely with the Far-Right and particular segments of Polish society.  
I’m not big on symbols, especially national symbols. I feel attached to Poland 
and I respect our flag, but I’m not the kind of person who would wave a 
flag…I would never wave a Polish flag, never other than at Pride. But right 
now…pretty much all the symbols are associated with the Right. So you 
cannot wave a flag, a Polish flag, because Polish symbols have been hijacked 
by the extreme Right. But I also want to wave a Polish flag at Pride and 
actually last year in Warsaw we did…yeah, so I want to reclaim the symbols, 
Polish symbols….so they do not belong only to one group of people. You 
know, to a section of Polish society and not to everyone (Interview conducted 
in English, emphasis added).  
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In addition to articulating his desire to reclaim national symbols from the Right, Jan makes the 
important point that he would only march with a Polish flag if at a Pride manifestation. Doing so 
demonstrates his desire to subvert exclusionary conceptions of Polish identity by showing the 
compatibility of the Polish flag and the LGBT community. In the context of Pride, he can wave a 
Polish flag and advocate for the interpretation of “Polishness” in terms of a new cultural schema; 
one driven by the acceptance and inclusion of a Pride gathering and not one driven by ethno-
nationalism and exclusion. However, outside of the context of Pride the national flag is still 
bolstered too strongly by the exclusionary schema of “Polishness” advocated by the Right, which 
precludes him from wanting to wave it anywhere else.   
Marcin, the young computer programmer from Warsaw, made similar comments 
regarding the need to reclaim national symbols from the Far-Right: 
You see now, the whole 20th century has been a real struggle for Poland, and I 
think it increased the need to identify as Polish significantly…and with the 
nation and all the symbols. So there is this strong patriotic thing going on with 
the current government. They’re very focused on the past…and I think it is 
really important that we also recognize the symbols and that we identify with 
them as well so that they cannot steal them from us. So they cannot make them 
theirs.   
 
While Marcin’s comments are similar to those of Irma, Maria, Jan, and Marek, he adds the 
important point that given Poland’s struggles throughout the 20th century, there might be an 
increased desire amongst Poles to identify with their ‘Polishness’. However, as both he and Jan 
state, at this time the the symbols that are meant to signify that national identity are increasingly 
being hijacked and reserved for a small portion of Polish society; those that adhere to strictly 
conservative, Catholic values. Therefore, by engaging in aesthetic revolt and reframing the 
boundaries of national identity in the process, activists like Irma and Maria and concerned 
citizens like Jan and Marcin are working towards envisioning a Polish identity that is inclusive of 
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LGBT identities as well as other identities that don’t fit the model of the “Polak-katolik” that has 
been the bastion of ‘Polishness’ for over a century.  
 
Aesthetic Revolt and the Rainbow Madonna  
 While the advent and utilization of the rainbow eagle and rainbow-infused Polish flag has 
been an important aspect of aesthetic revolt on the behalf of Polish sexual minorities, their revolt 
was pushed even further in the summer of 2019 when activist and psychoanalyst Elżbieta 
Podleśna chose to manipulate one of Poland’s most sacred icons; Our Lady of Częstochowa, also 
known as the Madonna. Although Our Lady of Częstochowa is a religious icon, because of 
Poland’s intimate ties to the Catholic Church and the specific history of the icon, it is considered 
by all Poles as an important national symbol. Veneration of the symbol is thus deeply rooted in 
Polish history and culture, and it is estimated that seven hundred shrines exist throughout the 
country devoted to it (de Busser and Niedzwiedz 2009).  
Although the image of the Madonna can be traced back to the 1st century AD, it becomes 
particularly significant in Polish history and culture beginning in the middle of the 17th century. 
According to Polish mythology, during the Battle of Jasna Góra in 1655, Mary’s divine 
assistance helped the Polish army vanquish the invading Swedish army. This event has since 
been interpreted as a major turning point in the war with Sweden, and ever since then the image 
of the Madonna has been associated with strength and the defense of Poland. The symbol 
became increasingly important during Poland’s partition period. Importantly, during this time the 
symbol of the Madonna came to be a representation of “Polish Catholic identity vis-à-vis the 
non-Catholic nature of the most oppressive foreign powers…Protestant Prussia and Orthodox 
Russia” (de Busser and Niedzwiedz 2009). The image therefore became an essential symbol of 
Poland’s ardently Catholic national identity. Further, due to her miraculous role in vanquishing 
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Poland’s non-Catholic enemies in Polish mythology, Our Lady of Częstochowa was recognized 
by Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński in 1966 as the Queen of the Poles as well as the commander-in-
chief of Poland’s armed forces (Porter 2005; Zubrzycki 2006). Because of Poland’s long history 
of invasion and exploitation by surrounding territories, the image came to represent hope and the 
promise of salvation in the face of injustice and thus remains an essential element of Polish 
culture (Jakubowska 1990).  
 
Figure 4.7: Traditional image of Our Lady of Częstochowa. 
 
The image of Our Lady of Częstochowa, given its important and sacred nature to Poland 
and conservative understandings of Polish identity, would therefore appear to many as a symbol 
that is off limits for any form of subversion or even alteration. Yet Elżbieta Podleśna’s actions in 
late April of 2019 challenged these assumptions. Podleśna, who lives in the small Polish town of 
Płock, originally came up with her rendition of the image as a form of protest against a local 
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church in her community that had featured an Easter display mentioning “LGBT” and “Gender” 
as sins. As a response to these images placed in front of the Płock church, she placed an image of 
her newly created rainbow Madonna around the city as well as directly on the church’s property.  
 
 
Figure 4.8: Image of the Rainbow Madonna. taken from: https://qspirit.net/polish-rainbow-virgin-mary/, 
Accessed 17 Oct 2020.  
 
Podleśna’s message was not well received by the Church nor the Polish Right, and calls 
for her arrest on the basis of insulting religious feeling were immediate. One Prior, who was 
quoted in conservative periodical Do Rzeczy, stated: 
Today, even honest believers are indignant at the blasphemy against the 
mother of Jesus. The godless have exceeded the limits of decency…to mock 
Mary, who is worshipped by several hundred million people around the world, 
who appears to the faithful and speaks, showing the way to conversion and 
penance, is evidence of some kind of obnubilation. It is interesting that all of 
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these blasphemers think that this is their freedom to do as they please (Do 
Rzeczy, 5/2/2019)99.  
 
The Prior’s statement is directly in line with the conservative critiques of the LGBT community 
detailed in the first two chapters of this dissertation. That is, he makes a clear delineation 
between the “godless” and the good Poles who devoutly covet the image of the Madonna. 
Further, the image of the rainbow Madonna is characterized as an attempt at mockery when, as I 
will discuss below, its meaning and significance is far greater.  
 In another critical assessment of the rainbow Madonna discussed in Do Rzeczy, the image 
was decried as simply another instance of “Christianophobia” that have been mounting in Poland 
over the years. The article, citing a letter from the Ordo Iuris Center for Religious Freedom, 
stated:  
There is no doubt that the profanation of the image of the Black Madonna is a 
crime offending religious feelings. It is therefore the duty of the prosecution to 
conduct proceedings in these cases. It is all the more important as we are 
currently witnessing a growing “Christianophobia” in Poland, which must be 
strongly opposed (Do Rzeczy, 5/14/2019)100.   
 
The calls for Podleśna’s arrest were resounding, and after a few weeks Podleśna was detained 
after authorities raided her home and found numerous copies of posters containing the image of 
the rainbow Madonna101. Yet her arrest, while pleasing critics on the Right, instigated massive 
protests across the country and also drew international attention. Amnesty International and 
                                               
99 https://dorzeczy.pl/kraj/102542/bezboznicy-przekroczyli-granice-mocny-wpis-ojca-knabita.html, 
Accessed 17 Oct 2020.  
100 https://dorzeczy.pl/kraj/102684/ordo-iuris-profanacja-wizerunku-matki-bozej-to-przestepstwo.html, 
Accessed 17 Oct 2020.  
101 Two other women, Anna Prus and Joanna Gzyra, were also arrested for helping Podleśna hang posters 
of the rainbow Madonna. They were all three acquitted on March 2, 2021.  
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Human Rights Watch, for example, both issued statements condemning the Polish government 
for Podleśna’s arrest.  
Yet while the Polish Right saw Podleśna’s actions as an attempt to mock the sacred 
image of the Madonna, and thereby insult the feelings of religious Poles, the story from the other 
side was quite different. When later asked about her actions and motivations, Podleśna stated: 
Nobody should be excluded from society. Sexual orientation is not a sin or a 
crime and the Holy Mother would protect such people from the Church and 
from priests who think it is okay to condemn others…I refuse to be told to shut 
up because there is a chance you will provoke someone else. Wake up, 
defenders of human rights. Leave your offices, go out and say it is not fair 
(BBC, 5/14/2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-48257706, 
Accessed 18 Oct 2020).  
 
What stands out as particularly important in this statement is that Podleśna is in no way 
criticizing the Madonna, her legacy or what she stands for. Indeed, she claims that she sees the 
Madonna as a helpful figure that would protect all of those communities that are condemned as 
dangerous to Poland by the Right and Far-Right. Her statement is thus an affirmation of the 
legacy of the Madonna; an icon that is meant to be a protector of all Polish people, not just those 
who adhere to a highly conservative, Catholic national identity. What she is condemning is the 
narrow ways in which the legacy and meaning of the symbol of Our Lady of Częstochowa have 
been interpreted and mobilized by the conservative sects of the Catholic Church and the Polish 
Right for centuries. In this way, Podleśna has catalyzed a modified symbol to be utilized in 
Polish sexual minorities’ aesthetic revolt that is attempting to chip away at exclusionary ethno-
nationalist conceptions of Polish national identity. Importantly, much like the activists utilizing 
the rainbow eagle and rainbow-infused Polish flag, such actions constitute a form of aesthetic 
revolt that does not rely on the wholesale rejection of a national icon and the national identity it 
 162 
upholds, but instead focuses on modifying and reframing a symbol in order to reclaim Polish 
national identity for sexual and other ideological minorities.  
 
Symbolic Re-workings and New Sacralities 
 Despite Podleśna’s arrest and attempts by the Polish Right to censor the image of the 
rainbow Madonna, the image only became more popular amongst progressive Poles. Soon after 
the news broke about her possible arrest, citizens took to the streets in protest and began sharing 
the reinterpreted icon on social media accounts and across the internet more broadly. Some 
activists began to refer to the new rendition of the Madonna as “Our Lady of Equality,” 
explaining that the image was never meant to be an insult to the Church, but was rather a stand 
against the discrimination and stigmatization of Polish sexual minorities by the Church, Right, 
and Far-Right. A member of the organization called Warsaw Freedom Activists thus said the 
following regarding the actions taken against Podleśna in Płock:  
We do not agree with indoctrinating towards hatred and segregation. The way 
in which Catholic priests present and explain the world is not an internal matter 
of the Church, as it concerns and affects not only its followers. What happened 
in the Płock church is not internal…because it is happening all over Poland 
(NaTemat, 4/30/2019)102. 
 
From the perspective of the Warsaw Freedom Activists, the primary point of Podleśna’s image 
was to show that the Catholic church did not hold a monopoly on the icon of Our Lady of 
Częstochowa or on explaining how the world should operate. In this powerful statement, they 
underscore the fact that discrimination against sexual minorities in Poland is ubiquitous, and that 
the Church has been complicit in its perpetuation. The image of the rainbow Madonna therefore 
                                               
102 https://natemat.pl/271483,teczowa-maryja-aktywistki-tlumacza-o-co-chodzi-z-matka-boska-
rownosciowa#, Accessed 18 Oct 2020.  
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quickly became an important symbol for those who wanted to imagine a new national identity 
for Poland, one that was not overtly critical of the Church but one that could openly criticize 
institutions that continued to maintain positions advocating for the exclusion and stigmatization 
of certain groups and identities. This sentiment was succinctly captured by American author and 
minister Kittredge Cherry —a lesbian who began a website that advocates for sexual minorities 
in the Catholic Church— in a letter directed to Poland’s Minister of Interior showing support for 
Podleśna after her arrest:  
Dear Minister of Interior,  
Stop legal action against Elżbieta Podleśna for “offending religious 
sentiments” with the rainbow Madonna of Częstochowa. This arrest offends 
MY religious sentiments as a queer Christian minister…sexual orientation is 
not a sin and the Holy Mother would protect LGBT people and other outcasts 
from discrimination.  
…I pray for you with the words of the Rainbow Christ prayer, which is 
honored by LGBT people of faith and our allies worldwide:   
Rainbow Christ, you embody all the colors of the world. Rainbows serve as 
bridges between different realms: heaven and earth, east and west, queer and 
non-queer. Inspire us to remember the values expressed in the rainbow flag of 
the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer community. Rainbow Christ, 
you light up the world. You make rainbows to promise to support all life on 
earth. In the rainbow space, we can see all the hidden connections between 
sexualities, genders, and races. Like the rainbow, may we embody all the 
colors of the world! (QSpirit.net, May 16 2019)103.  
 
Cherry’s words clearly articulate the intended message of the rainbow Madonna, and also 
highlight why the physical image of the rainbow is so important to the LGBT community. Not 
only is a rainbow a collection of multiple colors, suggesting diversity and inclusivity, but 
rainbows as physical phenomena span great distances and appear to serve as bridges. This 
                                               
103 https://qspirit.net/polish-rainbow-virgin-mary/, Accessed 18 Oct 2020.  
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metaphor is a powerful one, and it means that by infusing these traditional national symbols with 
rainbows, the ultimate goal is to bring Polish citizens together, rather than divide them through 
narrow definitions of “Polishness.”  
 
 
Figure 4.9: Activists Supporting Podleśna and the Rainbow Madonna. The words read “Free Ela,” in 
reference to Podleśna’s arrest. Image taken from: https://www.dw.com/en/poland-furor-over-rainbow-




Figure 4.10: Activists Supporting Podleśna and the Rainbow Madonna. The words “Rainbow does not 
offend.” The image was taken during the covid-19 pandemic, well over a year after the initial controversy 
over the Madonna. Image taken from: https://apnews.com/article/trials-




Since Podleśna’s arrest, the image of the Rainbow Madonna has become pervasive at 
Equality marches throughout Poland, albeit to the continued dismay of conservative politicians 
and members of the clergy. Thus, when the town of Płock held its first Equality march only 
months after the controversy with the rainbow Madonna, a local conservative Catholic group 
wrote a letter to the city’s president condemning him for allowing the march. In the letter, among 
other things, they make clear that the rainbow is not seen by them as a symbol of inclusion, but 
one that tramples on Polish traditions: 
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With disbelief and sadness, we received the information that you decided to 
take the honorary patronage of the Equality March organized by the LGBT 
community. Our amazement and indignation are all the greater that you made 
this decision after a series of profanations and scandalous events that took 
place during the parades in other Polish cities. They offended thousands of 
Christians and scandalized hundreds of children… [such acts] not only insult 
the symbols and objects of religious worship protected by law, but are also a 
slap in the face of all those who respect Polish culture and tradition (Do 
Rzeczy 8/7/2019)104.  
 
However, despite the resistance from conservative groups, the image of the rainbow Madonna 
has persevered and remains and important symbol, garnering support from many Poles. Much 
like the case of the Polish eagle, the enthusiastic embrace of the rainbow Madonna shows how 
aesthetic revolt need not entail a complete rejection and disavowal of a given national symbol 
and the national identity it upholds. Indeed, in this case, Podleśna and fellow activists still 
recognize and respect the icon of Our Lady of Częstochowa, but in a modified form.  
The modification of the Madonna also suggests that some Poles, following Podleśna’s 
lead, are beginning to carve out a new sacred register of Polish national identity. In her 
discussion of the national sensorium, Zubrzycki (2011) posits two ideal typical modes in which 
individuals and groups can apprehend national mythology; sacred and profane. Those 
approaching through the sacred mode hold national mythology closely and could not imagine 
altering or criticizing it, as doing so would feel immoral. Contrarily, the profane mode allows for 
some critical distance as mythology is interpreted as “an oft-commodified thing to be used 
playfully or even ironically by national actors” (2011: 52). However, the case here shows that 
while national actors might apprehend a national symbol through the profane mode, 
apprehending it in this way may be an attempt to create a new sacred register rather than simply 
                                               
104 https://dorzeczy.pl/kraj/110324/marsz-rownosci-w-plocku-pod-patronatem-wladz-opozycjonisci-z-
okresu-prl-protestuja.html, Accessed 18 Oct 2020.  
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criticize or profane the mythology. Thus, although Podleśna saw the icon of the Madonna with 
enough of a critical distance to modify it, she was not engaging in mockery or desecration 
(despite the accusations from the Right and Far-Right). Rather, her manipulation demonstrated a 
desire to reimagine and recreate certain symbols that have become associated with the narrow 
and exclusionary model of Polish national identity promulgated by Law and Justice and other 
conservative, Catholic parties and organizations. The same point applies to the activists in 
Częstochowa. By manipulating symbols in this way, these activists are not disengaging from and 
criticizing “Polishness” wholesale, but are instead reimagining them so that the symbols can 
once again exist as something that they feel close to and perhaps once again see as sacred. The 
process of aesthetic revolt can therefore be a means by which social actors transform national 
symbols in order to feel a closeness to their national identity once again.  
 
Accelerating the Aesthetic Revolt   
 In the summer of 2020, LGBT activists in Poland associated with a small queer collective 
known as Stop Bzdurom (Stop Nonsense) came onto the scene with full force. The collective, 
which was initially formed in 2019, is primarily focused on campaigns that help young members 
of the Polish LGBT community who are struggling due to the Polish Right’s continued attacks 
on “LGBT ideology.” Their primary objective has been to combat misinformation regarding 
sexual minorities that may prevent young members of the LGBT community from coming out 
and accepting their sexuality. The name “Stop Nonsense” was derived from a criticism of a 
campaign launched by a Far-Right organization called “Stop Pedophilia,” in which the 
organization claimed that the LGBT community were pedophiles intent on converting young 
children to homosexuality.  
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The Far-Right organization, known as the “Pro Foundation” (Fundacja Pro) because of 
their strong “pro-life” viewpoints, is well known throughout Poland for small vans it charters to 
drive around Polish cities displaying anti-LGBT slogans. Such vans are particularly common 
sights at Equality marches, as are their information tents where they hand out homophobic 
literature. The organization’s website is one of the primary sources of misinformation that the 
Stop Bzdurom movement seeks to address105. Although a number of LGBT organizations in 
Poland have tried to stop the vans, their efforts have largely failed due to the fact that in Poland, 
laws concerning hate speech do not include sexual minorities.  
 
 
Figure 4.11: Anti-LGBT Bus of the “Pro” Foundation. It reads: “The LGBT wants to teach children: At 4 
years, masturbation. At 6 years, consenting to sex. At 9 years, first sexual experiences and orgasm.” 
Image taken from: https://ilga-europe.org/sites/default/files/Poland-Anti-LGBT-Timeline.pdf, Accessed 
20 Oct 2020.  
 
                                               
105 One of the primary ways StopBzdurom does this on their webpage is by exposing outdated and/or 
debunked research that groups like Fundacja Pro utilize in their arguments, such as that of University of 
Texas sociologist Mark Regnerus. In addition, Stop Bzdurom claimed a domain name that is very close to 
the domain name of Fundacja Pro in order to reroute internet traffic to their webpage.   
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Prior to the summer of 2020, those involved with the Stop Bzdurom collective engaged in 
some actions but none that drew much attention. Controversy began in July, when activists 
associated with the collective tied a rainbow flag to a statue of Jesus Christ that stands in front of 
the Church of the Holy Cross on Warsaw’s most important avenue. This particular statue holds 
an important place in Polish social and political history. Created in 1858, the sculpture was an 
important early assertion of Poland’s fealty to Catholicism. It became famous, however, during 
World War II when the Nazi’s decimated nearly 90% of Warsaw. Despite the widespread 
destruction brought by the Nazis, the statue of Christ remained mostly intact, and a now famous 
photo depicts the statue lying among rubble. The statue has since come to symbolize both Poland 
and Polish Catholicism’s ability to withstand even the most oppressive and aggressive attacks.  
 
 
Figure 4.12:  Statue of Christ Among Ruins after World War II Bombings. Image taken from: 
https://rmx.news/article/article/lgbt-activists-vandalize-statute-of-jesus-christ-in-warsaw-polish-pm-
morawiecki-condemns-bigotry, Accessed 20 Oct 2020. 
 170 
 
Figure 4.13: Stop Bzdurom Activists Placing Rainbow Flag on Statue of Christ. Image taken from: 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-poland-lgbt-rights-trfn-idUSKCN2522YV, Accessed 20 Oct 2020.  
 
The outcry from the Church and Polish Right was immediate and was composed of both 
sadness and anger. Conservative magazines such as Do Rzeczy, Nasz Dziennik, and Bulletin KAI 
published opinions speaking to the pain that this action caused parishioners and members of the 
clergy, appealing to the need to prosecute those responsible with offending religious sentiments. 
Additionally, the religious organization Center of Life and Family began a petition that 
demanded Mayor of Warsaw Rafał Trzaskowski to withdraw his support for the LGBT 
protections bill he had recently signed. Bulletin KAI endorsed their petition in a brief article 
where the authors also called for Trzaskowski to withdraw support for the protections bill: 
… Is Warsaw a city where LGBT activists can act with impunity? Yes, 
because they have the official support of President Rafał Trzaskowski, who 
signed the "LGBT + Declaration" over a year ago. With such a declaration 
supporting them, homoactivists have consent to aggression, acts of vandalism 
and profanation (eKAI, 7/31/2020)106.  
 
                                               
106 https://www.ekai.pl/profanacja-figury-chrystusa-napelnila-bolem-parafian-i-mieszkancow-stolicy/, 
Accessed 20 Oct 2020.  
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Other reactions went as far as to call the LGBT community and those who participated in 
hanging the rainbow flag as primitives and barbarians. An article published in Do Rzeczy the 
following day read:  
There are boundaries, the crossing of which excludes any conversation. The 
primitives that “embellished” the figure of Jesus crossed that boundary…the 
offensive of leftism continues. Today it is all the more symbolic as the target of 
the attack, on the eve of the anniversary of the outbreak of the Warsaw 
Uprising was the statue of Christ…this is an assault! The rainbow…is an 
attack! (Do Rzeczy, 7/30/2020)107. 
 
In a similar vain, when giving a statement regarding the events, Prime Minister Mateusz 
Morawiecki referred to the actions of activists who hung the rainbow as “barbaric” and 
intolerant, a statement that some on the Left interpreted as an allusion to the actions of the Nazis 
when they destroyed Warsaw decades earlier: 
The basic condition of any civilized debate about tolerance is to define the 
limits of this tolerance. Can you justify any, even the most iconoclastic 
behavior, by fighting for your vision of the world? Does the end justify the 
means? Definitely NO…In Poland, we will not make the mistakes of the West. 
We all see what tolerance of such barbarism leads to (TVP, 7/29/2020)108.  
 
In a response to Morawiecki’s statement, one activist involved with Stop Bzdurom wrote: 
The rainbow flag is part of the city’s identity. We decided to show that we are 
here. When I saw Morawiecki’s post, I was shocked. This is the level of 
absurdity that that surprises me…these monuments and figures are important 
to us because we are Polish. The action was a provocation. It wasn’t meant to 
offend anyone (Oko Press, 9/30/2020, emphasis added)109.  
                                               
107 https://dorzeczy.pl/kraj/148768/aktywisci-lgbt-sprofanowali-figure-chrystusa-powstala-petycja-do-
trzaskowskiego.html, Accessed 21 Oct 2020.  
108 https://www.tvp.info/49182753/premier-morawiecki-komentuje-w-nocna-akcje-anarchistek-w-
warszawie-dotyczaca-pomnikow-wieszwiecej?fbclid=IwAR1EEk0XDL_q-TSxPNWB--4dn2cfwcB-
7kV3B9_yAo5y5LU3sVmV6OP2Seo, Accessed 21 Oct 2020.  
109 https://oko.press/morawiecki-to-barbarzynstwo-aktywistki-to-szturm-na-homofobie-prawnik-to-nie-
byla-profanacja/, Accessed 21 Oct 2020.  
 172 
 
The comments made by Morawiecki and the conservative columnist for Do Rzeczy show an 
attempt by the Polish Right to frame protestors as radical and anti-Polish. As the latter argues, he 
sees the actions of the Stop Bzdurom activists as an assault and attack on Polish identity, as if the 
activists involved are not themselves citizens of Poland. However, the sentiments shared by the 
activist involved with the collective demonstrate that they are not trying to insult these icons but 
rather reframe and reclaim them. By hanging a rainbow flag on such an important national icon, 
the activists are not rejecting it but rather are stating that Polish sexual minorities are still Polish 
despite their sexuality and the narrow vision of “Polishness” espoused by the Right and Far-
Right. Through engaging in aesthetic revolt and reworking the physical forms of these icons, the 
Stop Bzdurom activists are attempting to reframe the symbolic boundaries of Polish national 
identity and what “Polishness” can mean.  
 Within days of the event at the Warsaw church, a number of progressive and even centrist 
politicians came to defend the action. Sylwia Spurek, a progressive politician and activist who 
was elected to represent Poland in the European Union in 2019, spoke of the importance of the 
rainbow as a symbol of acceptance and respect. She echoed the activists’ sentiments that by 
hanging a rainbow on this icon, protestors were advocating for themselves as Polish citizens who 
have been repeatedly attacked by Law and Justice and the more conservative factions of the 
Polish clergy. Former Prime Minister Donald Tusk, a centrist member of the Civic Platform 
party, also refused to condemn the actions of the collective, stating that “as the head of the 
European Christian democrats, I would like to remind you that Jesus has always been on the side 
of the weaker and the harmed, never on the side of the oppressive power” (Do Rzeczy, 
 173 
7/30/2020)110. Thus, as opposed to seeing the rainbow as an affront and an insult to ‘Polishness’, 
advocates on the Left characterize it as a symbol that is part and parcel of what Polish identity 
should be about; inclusivity and the desire to protect the most vulnerable.  
 Despite the controversies that the actions of the Stop Bzdurom movement incited, they 
did not stop with the symbol of Jesus, and rainbow flags were soon hung on other significant 
statues throughout Warsaw. Some of the icons targeted by protestors included a statue of 
Copernicus, a monument dedicated to a commander of the 1794 Warsaw uprising Jan Kiliński, 
as well as on the Warsaw mermaid, an official symbol of the city of Warsaw that is featured on 
its coat of arms.  
 
 
Figure 4.14: Copernicus Statue with Rainbow Flag. Image taken from: https://time.com/5878424/poland-
lgbt-protests-police-brutality/, Accessed 22 Oct 2020.  
 
                                               
110 https://dorzeczy.pl/kraj/148804/tusk-o-prowokacji-srodowisk-lgbt-jako-szef-europejskich-
chrzescijanskich-demokratow.html, Accessed 21 Oct 2020.  
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Figure 4.15: Warsaw Mermaid Statue with Rainbow Flag. Image taken from: 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/08/07/poland-crackdown-lgbt-activists, Accessed 22 Oct 2020.  
 
In addition to adorning these icons with a rainbow flag, activists attached a note to each figure 
they had targeted, which read:  
This is an assault! The rainbow…is an attack! We decided to act. As long as 
I’m afraid to hold your hand. Until the last homophobic van disappears from 
our streets. This rainbow is a manifestation of our difference. As long as the 
flag will scandalize someone and will be “inappropriate,” we promise to 
provoke…after all, no one will say that the Polish flag is inappropriate and 
offensive…this city is all of us.  
 
The opening words of this statement were meant to mock the criticisms of the initial actions on 
the figure of Jesus Christ. The remainder of this powerful statement, however, illustrate the goals 
of Stop Bzdurom’s aesthetic revolt; to not rest until the image of the rainbow is no longer 
presented by the Catholic Right as a threat to Poland, or as the symbol of a minority that is 
somehow not “truly Polish,” but as something entirely and obviously Polish. These words and 
the placement of rainbow flags on statues throughout Warsaw stake the claim that while not all 
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Poles are sexual minorities, all Polish sexual minorities are fully Polish and must be recognized 
as such. The rainbow, an essential aspect of Polish sexual minorities’ aesthetic revolt, therefore 
is the material manifestation of the cultural schema of “Polishness” that is premised on inclusion 
and the acceptance of diversity. By hanging it on important national symbols throughout 
Warsaw, the activists are striving to reclaim this identity for themselves and other marginalized 
groups. Further, and most important for the argument being put forth in this chapter, the actions 
taken by Stop Bzdurom —just like the actions taken by the activists in Częstochowa and by 
Elżbieta Podleśna— did not require a wholesale rejection of Polish symbols and the creation of 
an entirely new Polish identity. Rather, their aesthetic revolt was one centered on modifying and 
reframing these symbols in order to reclaim Polish national identity.  
 
Conclusion  
This chapter has detailed the important role that aesthetic revolt has played in recent 
actions taken by Polish sexual minorities to reframe the boundaries of “Polishness.” The concept 
of aesthetic revolt is important because it details the subtle ways in which the strategic 
manipulation of national symbols can lead to renewed understandings of national identity 
(Zubrzycki 2013). Through my analysis of three significant events, I elaborated the ways in 
which Polish LGBT rights activists have engaged with salient religio-national symbols in order 
to reclaim Polish national identity from the dictates of the Right and Far-Right and reframe what 
“Polishness” can mean. Contrary to the efforts of those whose political strategies involve 
circumscribing the symbolic boundaries of national identity, the actions taken by the activists 
detailed in this chapter are premised on a fundamental logic of inclusion. Thus, while they 
advocate for a dismantling of the exclusionary notions of national identity premised on 
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conservative, Catholic values, in so doing they are not advocating for a completely new national 
identity, but a renewed or reframed one.  
For this reason, my case differs from the model of aesthetic revolt Zubrzycki outlines in 
her analysis of the Quiet Revolution in Quebec. In her case, critics of the Catholic French 
Canadian identity did not seek to modify Catholic symbols, but to replace them altogether. Yet in 
all of the cases discussed in this chapter, activists were not outright rejecting the symbols of the 
Polish national sensorium, but instead modifying them to show that coexistence was indeed 
possible. There are, of course, also activists who would like to see Poland become an entirely 
secular and therefore completely eschew all religio-national symbols. However, the data 
collected for this chapter show a desire among many to not completely abolish and replace, but 
to reframe, the boundaries Polish national identity. Thus, Our Lady of Częstochowa was not 
dismembered but rather given a modified halo.  
This effort to promote coexistence was also evident in the interviews with activists and 
citizens who did not long for a completely new Poland, but a renewed one where they could 
embrace the symbols they used to admire in order to feel connected to both the symbols and their 
national identity again. Engaging in this manner of aesthetic revolt did not require a complete 
rejection of national symbols, but rather a reclaiming and reframing of them. Further, this 
chapter has helped to extend the concept of aesthetic revolt by emphasizing the important role 
that human interiority plays in the process. Given these findings, it will be instructive for future 
research on aesthetic revolt to consider these subtle distinctions when considering how activists 
engage with national symbols in order to effect social change.  
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Chapter 5: Robert Biedroń and the Expansion of “Polishness” Through 
Politics 
 
 In this chapter, I discuss and analyze the political career of Robert Biedroń, Poland’s first 
openly gay member of parliament and recent candidate for President of Poland. Although 
Biedroń’s status as an openly gay politician is highly significant, the primary purpose of this 
chapter is to demonstrate the ways that Biedroń and his social and political movement have 
engaged and challenged the boundaries of Polish national identity. They have done this, I argue, 
by attempting to fundamentally redraw the symbolic boundaries of “Polishness” by criticizing 
the strong place the Church has in politics and society. Thus, while chapter 3 showed how 
individual Poles were reframing Polish identity in their own minds and chapter 4 examined how 
this reframing has taken form through aesthetic revolt, this concluding chapter illustrates how 
such boundary work has also occurred in the realm of official politics. Through all of the 
sections in this chapter, I demonstrate how Biedroń and his movement have consistently 
advocated for a more inclusive vision of Polish identity, one that breaks away from the dominant 
model of the “Polak-Katolik” that has been elaborated in earlier chapters.  
 
Expanding “Polishness” through Political Activism  
During his time as a university student in the 1990s in the city of Olsztyn, Biedroń 
worked with the center-left Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), a political party that formed soon 
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after Poland’s democratic transition in 1991111. In and early interview, Biedroń claimed that one 
of the primary reasons he chose to get involved in politics was to help improve the status of 
sexual minorities in Polish society: 
As a teenage boy I came across a barrier in society that was impenetrable for 
me. Everyone expected me to have a girlfriend, not to walk with a boy holding 
hands. And I thought, there’s nothing wrong, I am not hurting anyone. And 
that probably somehow determined my path. That is why in 1998 I joined 
SLD…there, no one required me to hide my homosexuality (Żyicie Warszawy, 
9/12/2002)112.  
 
This important statement shows that from an early age, Biedroń was acutely aware of the 
restrictive symbolic boundaries in Polish society that worked to marginalize sexual minorities. 
As he states, he was aware of this “barrier” since he was a teenager, and decided to join SLD 
because it was the one party where he could be himself. His work with SLD therefore marked the 
beginning of his mission to expand the restrictive boundaries of national identity by advocating 
for the place of sexual minorities in Polish society.  
The article that published this interview was titled “A Brave Gay in SLD” (Odważny Gay 
z SLD). While the article was not critical of Biedroń’s decision to be open about his sexuality, it 
did remark upon the uphill battle he would face given Poland’s overwhelming social 
conservatism. He remained an activist for SLD for many years, despite unsuccessful attempts to 
represent the party in Warsaw’s city council in 2002 and as part of the Polish legislature in 2005. 
In addition to working with SLD during his college years, he worked with the local Olsztyn 
chapter of the Lambda Association, which at the time was the only major LGBT organization 
                                               
111 SLD has now fused with Biedroń’s former party Wiosna and another progressive party called Razem 
(Together).  
112 http://www.zw.com.pl/artykul/149033.html?print=tak, Accessed 8 Mar 2021.  
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operating in Poland. When Poland held its first LGBT Pride event in Warsaw in 2001—a small 
gathering of about 300 people— Biedroń was one of only two politically affiliated individuals to 
attend the march, demonstrating his early commitment to challenging Poland’s social and 
political norms.  
Biedroń’s political mission truly started to gain traction, however, in the newly 
burgeoning world of NGOs that had been steadily growing since Poland’s transition from state 
socialism. In September of 2001 Biedroń co-founded KPH and served as the organization’s 
president until February 2009. According to a document released by KPH in 2008, the primary 
goals of the organization throughout those initial years were to help foster tolerant attitudes 
towards sexual minorities in Poland, fight discrimination and bullying, and abolish instances of 
anti-LGBT prejudices in various institutions including but not limited to schools and the Polish 
legal system through legislation. Although many of these early efforts were not successful, they 
showed that KPH and Biedroń were eager to make LGBT issues —which up to this point were 
primarily framed apolitically— political issues. By doing so, they were bringing the struggle to 
realize rights for sexual minorities, and thereby expand the boundaries of Polish national 
identity, out of the realm of charity and into the realm of official policy113.  
 Thus, one of KPH’s founding statements said that the organization’s mission was highly 
political and specifically mentioned legalizing same-sex partnerships: 
                                               
113  Additionally, the organization ran several awareness campaigns, including the 2008 Festival for 
Rainbow Families, which was organized in Warsaw in order to show everyday Poles that families with 
same-sex parents existed and were similar to those that adhered to the heteronormative nuclear family 
model. It also helped organize the formation of a Queer studies course that featured prominent Polish 
academics who wrote on the topics of gender and sexuality. The course, which was run by KPH and the 
Equality Foundation, was motivated by the dearth of university level programs focusing on queer and/or 
gender studies in Poland. 
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Public discussion on gay and lesbian issues and increased social representation 
for all sexual minorities, as well as, most importantly, political lobbying that 
would lead to introducing the concept of same-sex partnerships (quoted in 
O’Dwyer 2018).   
 
Embracing the political challenge of introducing same-sex partnerships legislation demonstrated 
an early attempt on behalf of KPH to challenge the legitimacy of the Church and its place in 
steering Polish norms and laws that have worked to constrict the boundaries of Polish identity. 
Given that Biedroń already had some experience working with the center-left political party 
SLD, during his time with KPH he made sure that the organization took political lobbying and 
policy work seriously. According to early interviews with members of KPH conducted by 
Ireneusz Krzemiński and team of researchers in 2006, many of those involved with the 
organization credited Biedroń with its politically motivated goals (Krzemiński et.al 2006, cf. 
O’Dwyer 2018). However, realizing these goals in the early years of KPH proved difficult 
because of the lack of adequate funding for such organizations. Like many NGOs that existed in 
post-communist Europe, the internal organization was informal and funding scarce. Much of the 
labor in the earliest years of the organization’s existence was provided by volunteers, and given 
the blatantly political goals of KPH (unlike the goals of groups such as Lambda Warsaw that 
focused more on charitable works) it was unable to attain funding from government institutions. 
 Despite these difficulties, KPH managed to remain successful largely due to transnational 
ties, especially with E.U. institutions, particularly the International Lesbian and Gay Association 
(ILGA) of Europe. KPH soon became more active politically by introducing anti-discrimination 
measures in parliament and attempting to have the Sejm consider legislation recognizing same-
sex partnerships. Although Poland still does not collect data on hate crimes against sexual 
minorities, nor officially recognize same-sex partnerships, the politically motivated actions of 
KPH during Biedroń’s time as the organization’s president were some of the earliest attempts to 
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fundamentally reshape the boundaries of national identity through the advocacy of rights for 
sexual minorities. 
 However, as was detailed in chapter 1, KPH and its various initiatives were met with 
hostility by the Church, the Right and Far-Right, and conservative segments of Polish society. 
Thus, a lengthy article titled “Gays and Lesbians in Poland- a minority on the attack” published 
in eKAI in 2004, criticized the activities of KPH and Biedroń for trying to force society to accept 
homosexuality as normal. The article discussed and criticized many positions of LGBT rights 
organizations, characterizing them as a dangerous and threatening minority: 
The discussion on the postulates of gays and lesbians, the problem of tolerance 
towards minorities and their borders, or the rights and privileges of people with 
a homosexual orientation is becoming more and more popular in Poland…The 
conflict between this minority and the rest of society results from the fact that, 
using the rights that society has given them, it does not accept the norms in 
force and tries to change these norms with various methods, which in turn will 
lead to changes in civilization (eKAI, 6/15/2004)114.  
 
Resistance to the mission of KPH was therefore palpable as soon as it was clear the organization 
had politically motivated, legislative goals. These goals were seen as a threat to Poland. 
Importantly, this article directly refers to “borders” or “boundaries” when discussing sexual 
minorities (“granic” in Polish), implying a separation between them and the rest of Polish 
society. Yet despite the rampant backlash from the Polish Right, Biedroń continued his political 
mission to expand the boundaries of Polish identity until his retirement from the organization in 
2009.   
Soon after stepping down as president of KPH and cutting his political ties with SLD, 
Biedroń affiliated himself with the progressive Palikot movement. The Palikot movement proved 
                                               
114 https://ekai.pl/geje-i-lesbijki-w-polsce-mniejszosc-w-natarciu/, Accessed 10 Mar 2020.  
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to be Biedroń’s major vehicle to recognition in not only Poland but around the world, as he made 
history by becoming the first openly gay member of parliament in Polish history. This 
development was not only news in Poland, as numerous other countries published articles 
commemorating this important milestone in Polish history115. Once elected, Biedroń served as a 
representative of the Palikot movement —which later evolved into the party known as Your 
Movement (Twój Ruch)— until the end of 2014.  
Once a member of parliament, Biedroń expanded his progressive efforts by focusing not 
only on issues pertaining to the LGBT community, but also increased equality for women, 
making human rights issues in general more salient, and introducing protections for animals. 
Most important for our purposes, however, the Palikot movement and Biedroń along with it 
expressed a strong anti-clerical stance and believed that the role of the Church in Polish society 
should be diminished. Indeed, Biedroń is a known atheist and has been forthright with this 
perspective throughout his political career. Thus, in 2013, Biedroń alongside seven of his 
colleagues in the Palikot Movement filed a lawsuit in order to have the Sejm remove the cross 
that hangs above the main exit of the legislative chamber116. When asked about his decision to 
join in on the lawsuit, Biedroń stated that while he believes everyone has the right to practice 
their own religion, he did not find the chambers of a government that is supposed to serve a 
secular state to be an appropriate place to hang a cross. This perspective mirrored his sentiments 
on the topic when asked about the Sejm’s cross in 2012: 
                                               
115 The Palikot movement was also a vehicle for the election of Anna Grodzka, the first transgender MP in 
Poland and Europe.   
116 Part of the controversy regarding the cross is that is was placed in the legislative chamber 
surreptitiously overnight in 1997 by members of the now defunct political party Solidarity Electoral 
Action. It has been controversial ever since, and although the cross still hangs in the Sejm, progressive 
political parties still call for its removal.  
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I think that the president should avoid flaunting religion in public. This is a 
private matter. Of course, privately, each of us has and should have the right to 
practice our religion…[but] I believe the parliament should be a place where 
we respect our diversity. If in this parliament we serve the secular state, we 
follow the Constitution, then this cross should disappear (Wprost, 7/9/2012)117.  
 
Not surprisingly, Biedroń and the anti-clerical, socially progressive agenda of the Palikot 
movement were seen as highly controversial to the Polish Right and Catholic Church, and 
publications such as eKAI and Gość Niedzielny published numerous articles at the time 
condemning their agenda and initiatives. Biedroń’s increased notoriety as a progressive and 
openly gay member of parliament also frustrated conservative members of the populace, as the 
following letter to the editor of Gość Niedzielny demonstrates. The author of this letter expresses 
frustration that instead of showing footage of a pilgrimage to the city of Piekary Śląskie, the 
main program of TVP news instead focused on Biedroń and a pro-family policy he and Palikot 
were pursuing: 
What happened to the media, what happened to journalists? How far will we 
go in this sick […] political correctness? How long will we witness the 
creation of a reality that is sick, distorted and without God? How long with our 
silence will we allow the creation of an artificial caricature that is not the real 
face of our country? Beautiful pictures could be seen on the Silesian roads on 
Sunday! Parish pilgrimages that stretch for kilometers, thousands of cyclists, 
hundreds of coaches. And in Piekary itself… comforting words encouraging us 
to defend our roots, our traditions and our culture. To protect our children from 
homopropaganda and harmful attempts by the rulers. 
Unfortunately, in [the news] on the material about pro-family policy, none 
other than the declared homosexual MP - Robert Biedroń. Oh yes! This one 
knows how to raise children and the difficulties associated with it, like no one 
else! 
In the next pilgrimage to Piekary Śląskie, we have to wear rainbow scarves and 
dresses (Góść Niedzielny, 5/27/2013)118.   
                                               
117 https://www.wprost.pl/332710/biedron-krzyz-w-sejmie-to-paranoja.html, Accessed 10 Mar 2021.  
118 https://www.gosc.pl/doc/1572133.W-TV-zamiast-Piekar-Biedron, Accessed 11 Mar 2021.  
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This letter depicts the frustration felt by religious and conservative Poles that events such as 
pilgrimages, that to them represent an essential and important aspect of Polish identity, are not 
only being sidelined but replaced by a focus on “homopropaganda.” Further, as this letter shows, 
the primary figure in the center of this unwelcome transition is Robert Biedroń. Thus, at a time 
when Biedroń and the Palikot movement were attempting to redefine the boundaries of Polish 
national identity by introducing progressive legislation, advocating for the support of sexual and 
other minority groups in the public sphere, and criticizing the strong role of the Church in 
society, the resistance to this mission continued.  
 After the dissolution of the Palikot movement due to their parliamentary losses, Biedroń 
was elected mayor, in 2014, of the small northwestern town of Słupsk. Given that he was now in 
charge of overseeing the functioning of a city, his efforts at this time became mostly focused on, 
inter alia, issues such as solving the city’s budget issues. During his time as mayor, Biedroń was 
known for engaging earnestly with residents of Słupsk, and garnered attention for frequently 
holding meetings with constituents in public areas on a red couch. Although he did not seek re-
election once his term was up in 2018, citing a desire to return to the national stage, polls at the 
time put him at over 60% approval by the time he left office.  
While Biedroń’s tenure in Ślupsk was not centered on engaging with and expanding the 
boundaries of Polish identity as his time in the Sejm had been, it is still highly significant for the 
story being told here. Biedroń’s status as the first openly gay Polish mayor —as well as his status 
as having been the first openly gay member of parliament— was a consistent repudiation of the 
idea that those with non-heteronormative sexualities were harmful to both Poland and Polish 
identity and that all of Polish society was homophobic. Biedroń’s rise to political prominence at 
this time therefore showed many Poles that sexual minorities were not only obviously part of 
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Polish society, but that they could effectively work in positions of leadership for the betterment 
of the country. Thus, although Law and Justice still enjoyed support among a large segment of 
the Polish population at this time, Biedroń had —beginning with his time in the Sejm and 
continuing with his role as mayor of Słupsk— helped initiate a progressive movement focused 
on delegitimizing the restrictive visions of Polish identity maintained by much of the Church and 
the Polish Right.  
In order to continue carrying this message forward after his time spent in Słupsk, Biedroń 
began an initiative called “Brainstorming with Biedroń” that consisted of large meetings with 
Poles in different regions of the country. In these meetings, Biedroń and participants would sit 
together and think about ways that they could help realize a more progressive and open Poland. 
“Brainstorming with Biedroń” events became extremely popular and sometimes saw attendance 
in the thousands, and Biedroń referred to the gatherings as the start of a pro-democratic political 
movement (Alternative UK, 9/10/2018). Within a few short months, Biedroń and his allies 
announced the formation of the political party Spring (Wiosna) which would serve as the vehicle 
to help realize the goals of this inchoate movement.  
 
Criticizing the Catholic Nation   
 While the news of Biedroń’s new political party was not a complete surprise, as he had 
been discussing the possibility during his “Brainstorming with Biedroń” events, its official 
announcement brought excitement and optimism from progressives and liberals alike. Political 
scientist Aleks Szczerbiak, writing in his Polish politics blog, saw some hope that Spring would 
help to reinvigorate the Polish left which had practically disappeared from the electoral map after 
2005 (Szczerbiak 2019). Szczerbiak further noted that Biedroń had done much to try and 
distance himself from the standard political dichotomy of Left and Right, instead calling himself 
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a progressive who desires to start a grassroots movement and party. However, at the same time 
he noted that while Biedroń’s economically progressive agenda might be appealing to some 
traditionally conservative voters, his social liberalism would almost certainly be a non-starter for 
them. Thus, while excitement abounded with Spring’s initial launch, there was legitimate 
concern from the outset that the enthusiasm would soon die down and the party would collapse 
much like the Palikot movement had only a few years earlier119.  
 Despite the concerns from scholars and political pundits, Biedroń pushed ahead with a 
program which he claimed would bring about a new Poland. In addition to attacking Law and 
Justice, Biedroń focused his criticisms on members of the center-right Civic Platform who he 
argued were only committed to returning to the status quo that existed before Law and Justice 
came to power in 2015. While Spring’s platform deviated from that of the Civic Platform in 
many ways, the most significant and controversial aspect of it was the strongly anti-clerical 
stance which sought to undo the tightly knit and deeply rooted ties between Church and state in 
Poland. Such a move was at once practical, in that it sought to bring an end to state funding for 
the Church in order to redirect the funds elsewhere. Yet it was also an attempt to fundamentally 
redraw the boundaries of Polish national identity by attempting to undermine the legitimacy of 
the Polak-Katolik myth which helped to perpetuate narrow conceptions of “Polishness” that 
excluded ideological others such as Polish sexual minorities.  
 Given Spring’s strongly anti-clerical stance, it was not long before the platform and 
Biedroń drew vehement criticism from the Church and Polish Right. Thus, within days of the 
                                               
119 Numerous commentators, including Szczerbiak, noted that they were wary of a new party organized 
around a single individual, citing instances where such efforts in the past had seen little success. Further, 
there was much concern on the Polish Left at this time regarding Wiosna and it taking votes away from 
the primary opposition to Law and Justice, the Civic Platform.  
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party’s official launch, the Ordo Iuris published a series of objections to the platform, claiming 
that much of it was unconstitutional. In its criticism, the Ordo Iuris objected to four aspects of 
the platform on constitutional grounds: the push for less restrictive abortion laws, the liquidation 
of the “conscience clause” which allows doctors to deny performing health services to those 
inconsistent with their conscience (which many have argued leads to discrimination against 
sexual minorities), the introduction of same-sex marriage, and the separation of church and state 
(largely by removing religious education from schools). An article published in Do Rzeczy only 
days after the launch of Spring summarized the views of the Ordo Iuris regarding this final point:  
The postulate to oust religion lessons from public schools is directly 
inconsistent with the binding Constitution and the Concordat. Pursuant to the 
Basic Law, the religion of a church or other religious association with a 
regulated legal situation may be taught at school. At the same time, the right to 
use religious education within the public education system is related to the 
parents' right to religious and moral education of their children and the child's 
right to education (Do Rzeczy, 2/6/2019)120.  
 
Although it is beyond the scope of this chapter to analyze the legal arguments offered by the 
Ordo Iuris, they are nonetheless important because they demonstrate precisely how entwined 
Church and State are in Poland. What is ironic is that the institute, and those supporting their 
arguments, appear oblivious to the fact that Biedroń and Spring are criticizing precisely that 
these ideas are grounded in the nation’s founding document in the first place. It is highly unlikely 
that the strategists for Spring were completely unaware of the fact that these aspects of their 
platform went against certain facets of Poland’s constitution. Indeed, this was largely the point: 
to show that certain ideas that have been enshrined in Poland’s constitution were harmful to 
                                               
120 https://dorzeczy.pl/kraj/92585/powazne-zastrzezenia-ws-partii-biedronia-jej-program-narusza-
konstytucje.html, Accessed 12 Mar 2021.  
 188 
vulnerable minority communities and therefore needed to be altered at a fundamental level. In 
this way, Biedroń and Spring were attempting to not only stretch and soften the boundaries of 
“Polishness,” but redraw them around a fundamentally new conception of what being Polish can, 
and should, mean.  
Biedroń’s desire to reshape the boundaries of “Polishness” was evident at a Spring 
campaign event in Poznań, a large city in northwestern Poland, that I attended in early May of 
2019 at the height of campaigns for the European Parliament. Before being admitted to the large 
auditorium where Biedroń and the local Spring candidate for Poznań, Sylwia Spurek, were going 
to speak, I noticed several people wearing t-shirts with either the rainbow Polish eagle or a 
rainbow Polish flag. Further, while many of the volunteers for the event appeared to be young 
university students, there were also several seniors in the crowd. The event began with a long 
and enthusiastic speech from Biedroń, which focused almost entirely on how he believed it was 
time that the Church stop making all of the important social and political decisions for Poles. He 
used the term “pathology” numerous times in reference to the Church, and the idea that the 
Church was a harmful institution that was undermining the rights of many Poles —by restricting 
abortion access, criticizing sexual minorities and same-sex unions, and demanding an end to 
sexual education in public schools— was underscored intensely. Biedroń then spoke specifically 
about his desire to, following the arrest of Elżbieta Podleśna which occurred only 4 days prior to 
this event, abolish the article in the criminal code concerning the offending of religious 
sentiment. By doing so, Biedroń was showing his willingness to challenge and change some of 
the key laws that keep Polish society fused with the Church, which is exactly what the Ordo Iuris 
and his critics on the Polish right were afraid of.  
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In addition, Biedroń attacked the Church for the numerous pedophilia scandals that had 
recently been revealed involving Polish priests, an approach that I will further detail shortly. For 
now, however, it is worth noting that this criticism was passionately leveraged at this nationally 
broadcast campaign event, showing how eager Biedroń and Spring were to challenge traditional 
conceptions of “Polishness.” Importantly, throughout the entire speech Biedroń continued to 
proclaim that Poles were going to need courage in order to see this platform through121.  
Following Biedroń, progressive lawyer and feminist activist Sylwia Spurek122 spoke at length 
about how Spring was the right choice for those who wanted equality for Polish women. She 
consistently appealed to other countries in the European Union whose rights for minorities were 
far more progressive than Poland’s, and the need for Poland to “catch up” with its peers in these 
realms. To close, a young high school student spoke about the state of sexual education in 
Poland, which she referred to as a “joke” due to the fact that the Church still has so much 
influence over the curriculum. Throughout the entire event, participants waved both Polish and 
E.U. flags and loudly cheering for the proposals to make Poland a more progressive, tolerant, 
and above all secular nation.  
 Similar enthusiasm was palpable during the days I spent traveling through southwestern 
Poland with Biedroń and other Spring candidates on their tour bus. I visited a total of 5 cities 
with the campaign, and in each city the bus was greeted with excited supporters of all ages who 
were eager to take a photo with Biedroń once he emerged. When addressing his supporters in the 
city of Legnica, Biedroń emphasized that he was visiting smaller cities in order to show that not 
                                               
121 My field notes from this event note that the two most frequently used terms in this speech were 
“pathology” and “courage,” both in reference to the fight against the Catholic Church’s influence in 
Polish society.  
122 Spurek won her election for European Parliament and is still serving as an MP in Brussels although 
now with the Green party 
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only Warsaw mattered, and that all of Poland was important. After his initial address, Biedroń 
and the crowd of supporters walked to a nearby botanical garden. Poles of various ages were 
present at his address and joined in the walk, showing that Biedroń’s message resonated among 
citizens of various ages as well as those who lived in smaller cities. The desire to see a more 
progressive Poland no longer tied to the Church was therefore not only a sentiment felt in large 
and liberal cities such as Warsaw, Kraków, and Poznań.  
Yet while Biedroń’s comments regarding the separation of Church and state were cheered 
and applauded by the attendants at his various rallies and press conferences, this aspect of the 
Spring platform drew ire from the Polish Right. In an interview on TVP in early February 2019, 
a member of parliament from the Right wing, nationalist party Kukiz’15123 claimed that by 
advocating for increased abortion access and abolishing the conscience clause (which, as detailed 
above, allows medical practitioners to discriminate against patients on the basis of sexual 
orientation) Biedroń was ushering in a totalitarian regime: 
I hear that Robert Biedroń says, ‘I will defend the constitution’ and in the same 
breath says ‘I want to introduce a mechanism for a totalitarian state, 
eliminating the conscience clause for doctors…[but] the thing that absolutely 
shocked me, Robert Biedroń wants to introduce the kidding of unborn children 
up to the 12th week of pregnancy (Do Rzeczy, 2/10/2019)124.  
 
Thus, much like member of the League of Polish Families, Law and Justice and other Right-
wing groups in earlier years, the Kukiz’15 politician claims that the Church and conservative 
Poles are the ones under siege by the dictates of progressive politicians like Biedroń.  
                                               
123 This party, which has only had moderate electoral successes, was formed by former punk rock singer 
Paweł Kukiz. It is known for being anti-establishment, nationalist and in favor of Christian democracy.  
124 https://dorzeczy.pl/kraj/93106/rzymkowski-biedron-chce-panstwa-totalitarnego.html, Accessed 12 Mar 
2021.  
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Despite such criticism, Spring continued to focus on its anti-clerical message throughout 
the election campaign cycle. Biedroń soon began calling for specific actions against the Church, 
such as prohibiting the state’s financing of the Church, higher tax rates for the Church and for 
priests, and continuing the call for removing religious education from public schools. On Easter 
of 2019 one of the candidates for E.U. parliament on the Spring ticket Krzysztof Śmiszek —who 
is also Biedroń’s partner— posted a video on Facebook in which he stated that that instead of 
painting Easter Eggs, he was holding a meeting with the Spring youth group in order to discuss 
politics. The video features Śmiszek sitting on a beach with Biedroń and a group of young 
volunteers, and in it he says: 
Apparently, young people are not involved in politics and are not very 
interested in public affairs. See how many there are? This is Monday’s Easter 
Meeting of Spring [Wiosna]. We talk about politics instead of sacred eggs (Do 
Rzeczy, 4/23/2019)125.  
 
This statement is significant because to a large number of Poles, Easter is still considered the 
most important religious holiday in Poland. However, in this brief statement Śmiszek shows that 
he, Biedroń, and a number of their young volunteers would rather sit and discuss political issues 
than engage in the traditional, religious Easter rituals.  
 The attacks on the Church became the most ardent, however, near the end of the 
campaign after the release of the controversial film Tylko Nie Mów Niekomu (Just Don’t Tell 
Anyone) which documented several instances of sexual abuse in the Polish Catholic Church. One 
the film was released, the Spring campaign arranged multiple screenings, one of which I attended 
while following the campaign in the city Wrocław. The film focused on the lived experiences of 
                                               
125 https://dorzeczy.pl/kraj/100588/gadamy-o-polityce-zamiast-swiecic-jajka-znamienna-wpadka-
smiszka.html, Accessed 13 Mar 2021.  
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several Poles who had been sexually assaulted by priests, and in some instances documented the 
victims confronting the priests that had abused them. During the post-film discussion in 
Wrocław, numerous attendees pointed to the need to show the film to as many people as 
possible, and one older man stated that it was important that “Poland cannot be seen as needing 
the Church” (5/14/2019). In addition, numerous participants noted that one of the most important 
aspects of the film, in addition to sharing the stories of those who were victimized, was revealing 
how complicit the state had been in trying to cover up the abuse. The film proved to be an 
important tool for the Spring campaign in attempting to further delegitimize the place of the 
Church in Polish society.  
 Soon after the release of the film, Biedroń announced his desire to start a fund for all of 
the victims of the church. At a press conference, he stated that: 
Just Don’t Tell Anyone shows what has been swept under the rug for many 
years. Politicians who we trusted would guard our safety, the safety of our 
children, and the safety of our youth…today is the time of doomsday. If the 
political class does not rise to the occasion and does not do everything in our 
power to clarify the matter, to judge the guilty, and to compensate the victims, 
then we will lose all credibility in society. We, as ‘Spring’, have the courage to 
call a spade a spade. We will not give up, we will not kneel in front of any 
bishop, we will not be scared (cited in Do Rzeczy, 5/12/2019)126.  
 
This important statement shows that despite the Church’s status in Poland, Biedroń and Spring 
had no intent on relenting on their criticisms. Instead, given the gravity of the film and its 
revelations, Biedroń and Spring’s struggle against the Church became much stronger. Indeed, 
during the time I spent following the campaign in May of 2019, nearly every press conference 
and speech I attended were focused on the Church and on the film Just Don’t Tell Anyone. The 
                                               
126 https://dorzeczy.pl/kraj/102495/dzisiaj-przyszedl-czas-sadu-ostatecznego-biedron-chce-powolania-
komisji-ds-ofiar-kosciola.html, Accessed 13 Mar 2021.  
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first press conference I attended, in the small town of Opole, was set in front of a large Cathedral 
on a rainy Sunday morning. Before the press conference began I spoke briefly with Krzysztof 
Śmiszek, who informed me that filming in front of a Cathedral on Sunday was very important 
symbolically for their campaign. Biedroń and Śmiszek, along with several supporters holding 
different Spring signs and banners, were the focal point of the press conference and both gave 
speeches regarding the need to both end funding for the Church and hold it responsible for 
decades of hidden sexual abuse. In front of them stood a banner which listed Spring’s platform 
regarding the Church, and hanging on the banner were several pairs of children’s shoes.  
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Image 5.1: Wiosna event in Opole, May 2019. In addition to posters featuring the names of Wiosna 
candidates, participants held posters that read “Finally Change” (Nareszcie Zmiana) and “Secular 




Image 5.2: Wiosna Event in Opole, May 2019. The poster in the center of this this photo enumerates 
Wiosna’s platform regarding the Church, and the banner the young man in holding reads “Stop Financing 
of the Church.” Hanging on the poster are a few pairs of children’s shoes. Image by author. 
 
Once the speeches ended, a reporter asked Biedroń whether he was concerned that he 
would likely be seen as attacking Poland for his views on the Church. He responded that he 
wasn’t, as he was only attacking the Church. While Biedroń’s response to this question is 
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obviously important, the question itself is also highly significant. The reporter’s question 
demonstrated that although the Spring campaign is clearly leveraging its attack against the 
Church and not Poland more generally, many people still see the two as intimately related. 
Although the reporter did not necessarily share this viewpoint, his question made it clear that 
many Poles see an attack on the Church as an attack on Poland and Polish national identity. On 
the other hand, Biedroń responded by trying to quickly disentangle the two, as part of his mission 
and the mission of Spring has been to dislodge this implicit association in people’s minds.  
 The various proposals regarding the Church and Biedroń’s commentary regarding the 
pedophilia scandals were met with fierce backlash from the Polish Right as well as the Church. 
Law and Justice politician and member of the Constitutional Tribunal, Krystyna Pawłowicz, 
wrote on Twitter that Biedroń should “gallop on his knees, apologize for the blasphemy and 
convert…because the six colored rainbow will not save you” (cited in Do Rzeczy, 5/12/2019)127. 
In an opinion piece published in eKAI, Bishop Henryk Tomasik lambasted Spring’s anti-clerical 
platform saying that it was an insult to believers. In the same text, Tomasik went further and 
claimed if Spring’s platform were realized —particularly the aspects attempting to weaken the 
Church’s influence— it would effectively erase the history of Poland: 
If someone is spreading the slogan of separating the Church from the state, it is 
about separating believers from state structures. It is depriving believers of the 
right to participate in public life by professing their faith. The slogan about 
separating the Church from the state is an insult to believers, it is an insult 
against so many lay people who participate in building the Polish society. To 
disconnect the Church from the state also means to exclude the Mother of God 
                                               
127 https://dorzeczy.pl/kraj/102511/pawlowicz-do-biedronia-galopem-na-kolana-przepraszaj-za-
bluznierstwa.html, Accessed 13 Mar 2021.  
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from our history and from literature all religious elements (eKAI, 
2/18/2019)128.   
 
Despite their provocative campaign, Spring had only mild success once the election came to 
pass, electing only three people —Robert Biedroń, Sylwia Spurek, and sociologist Maciej 
Gdula— in E.U. parliament. Soon after the E.U. parliamentary elections, the party fused with 
SLD and another progressive party called Together (Razem) to form a coalition known as The 
Left (Lewica). Together, The Left managed to place nineteen people in the Polish parliament in 
the 2019 election. However, despite its modest electoral success in the E.U. parliamentary 
elections, the emergence of Spring and its strongly anti-clerical stance proved a highly important 
and controversial moment in Poland’s recent political history.  
 In 2020, The Left made Biedroń their candidate for President of Poland, but his 
nomination was quickly overshadowed once Mayor of Warsaw Rafał Trzaskowsi of the Civic 
Platform party announced his candidacy. Biedroń continued to level criticisms at both Law and 
Justice and the Civic Platform, and in an interview with OKO press, criticized both Trzaskowski 
and the Civic Platform for not boldly standing up for minority rights: 
If we are in favor of a woman’s right to decide about her body, also in terms of 
abortion, we must be aware that the Platform will not solve it. If we want equal 
rights for LGBT people, the Platform will not solve it. It does not want to 
because it is Right-wing. Of course, some of us fall for their rhetoric when they 
go to the podium and say ‘we are open and tolerant’…then the elections pass 
and nothing is resolved. I have fought for the rights of LGBT people many 
times and would lose because of the votes of the Civic Platform (Oko Press, 
6/19/2020)129.  
 
                                               
128 https://www.ekai.pl/bp-tomasik-oddzielanie-kosciola-od-panstwa-to-obrazanie-ludzi-wierzacych/, 
Accessed 14 Mar 2021.  
129 https://oko.press/biedron-duopol-po-pis-gniecie-prawa-osob-lgbt-i-kobiet-wywiad/, Accessed 14 Mar 
2021.  
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In addition, Biedroń not only maintained his criticisms of the Church, but went a step further in 
an interview with Polsat news by directly implicating John Paul II in the Church’s sexual abuse 
scandals. In the interview, he said: 
I would like us to talk more about the victims of the Church. It is the only 
institution that protects pedophiles in an organized manner. I would be glad if, 
for example, a square named after the victims of John Paul II was created, 
because it is the victims who deserve compensation (cited in Do Rzeczy, 
11/14/2020)130.  
 
Thus, instead of scaling back his criticisms and visions for a different model of “Polishness,” 
Biedroń has continued to reaffirm them, and criticizing John Paul II —Poland’s first and only 
Pope and one of the most celebrated figures in Poland— shows the dedication to this challenging 
mission.   
 
Conclusion 
 In this final chapter I have demonstrated how Robert Biedroń has been consistently 
challenging and attempting to reshape the boundaries of Polish national identity in the realms of 
activism and formal politics. His work with KPH began reshaping these boundaries by 
advocating for the rights of Polish sexual minorities, and his political work with both the Palikot 
movement and Spring worked to fortify this mission. This mission was taken further through 
efforts to not only question the role of the Church in Polish politics and society more broadly, but 
to fundamentally change the relationship between Church and state in Poland by greatly 
diminishing the role of the former. In doing so, Biedroń has criticized some of the most sacred 
ideas and figures in recent Polish history, making him and his movement a beacon of hope 
                                               
130 https://dorzeczy.pl/kraj/161259/biedron-cieszylbym-sie-gdyby-powstal-np-plac-imienia-ofiar-jana-
pawla-ii.html, Accessed 17 Mar 2021.  
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amongst progressives and an agent of chaos to the Church and Right. Crucially, given his status 
as an openly gay man, Biedroń has shown that sexual minorities in Poland not only exist, but can 
become central figures in the struggle to reshape the boundaries of what being “Polish” means 























On the morning of October 3rd, 2016, approximately 250,000 Polish women and 
progressive male supporters took to the streets to protest a near total ban on abortion in Poland. 
The proposed ban, which was introduced via a citizens’ initiative of pro-life activists and 
supported by the Catholic Church, sought to criminalize women who obtained abortions even in 
the case of rape or if the fetus was severely damaged (Narkowicz 2016). In what was referred to 
as the “Black Protest” (Czarny Protest), participants donned all black attire and flooded the 
streets of Polish cities to protest the proposed law. Soon after, images began surfacing online 
showing thousands of people gathered closely together in Warsaw’s historic old town holding 
umbrellas, and open umbrellas soon became an important symbol of the Black Protest 
movement131. Given the magnitude and tenacity of the demonstration, and the overwhelming 
societal support for it, the Justice and Human Rights Committee of the Sejm soon announced it 
would throw out the proposed policy.  
 However, the success of the the Black Protest in October of 2016 was far from the end of 
the fight for pro-choice groups in Poland and the organizing movement “Women’s Strike” 
(Strajk Kobiet) that helped to organize the Black Protest events. Thus, on the one-year 
anniversary of the protest, the organization “Save Women” (Ratujmy Kobiet) organized another 
                                               
131 At first, the umbrellas were utilized for practical reasons as the large protest in Warsaw occurred 
during an autumn rain. However, in order to show that they would not back down from their stance even 
after the initial ruling was thrown out, activists claimed that they “would not close their umbrellas,” 
thereby making open umbrellas a significant symbol of the movement.  
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protest in Kraków in order to solidify the message of the Black Protest as well as challenge 
petitions that had been circulating in order to introduce another restrictive anti-abortion bill 
(Kraków Post, 10/3/2017)132. The issue remains contentious today, as in January of 2021 the 
government announced it would begin enforcing a new law that made abortion illegal in the case 
of severe defects and potentially lethal illness in the fetus, which account for the majority of 
abortion cases in Poland133. Large scale protests organized by “Women’s Strike” and numerous 
other feminist organizations therefore continue to animate the streets of Poland and show that 
resistance to the ruling government’s strictly conservative and Catholic agenda remains 
dedicated despite formidable opposition.  
 While the umbrella has remained an important symbol of these protests and Poland’s 
feminist movement, another symbol commonly featured at such protests is the rainbow flag. 
Indeed, it has become common to see renditions of the primary symbol of the “Women’s Strike” 
(a silhouette of a woman’s head with a lightening bolt) with the lightening bolt decorated with 
rainbow colors. The struggle for women’s rights and LGBT rights in Poland are therefore 
intimately connected, both because they stand for increased recognition and rights for minority 
and vulnerable populations, but also because they both stand adamantly against the traditional 
and conservative understandings of Polish identity that relegate women and sexual minorities to 
the status of second-class citizens. Both the LGBT and feminist movement in Poland are 
therefore two important beacons of democracy in a country that has been experiencing 
democratic backsliding since the election of Law and Justice in 2015.  
                                               
132 http://www.krakowpost.com/18264/2017/10/abortion-ban-czarny-protest-anniversary, Accessed 19 
Apr 2021.  
133 Enforcement of this law followed a ruling by Poland’s constitutional tribunal in October of 2020 that 
ruled a 1993 law allowing for such abortions unconstitutional.  
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Figure 6.1: Women’s Strike Poster. The text reads “Only United Are We Invincible.” Image 
taken from: https://www.eska.pl/krakow/ogolnopolski-strajk-kobiet-30-10-2020-co-sie-bedzie-
dzialo-w-krakowie-mapa-google-aa-mYj1-TryS-576D.html, Accessed 19 Apr 2021. 
  
While Poland’s democratic backsliding has most notably included Law and Justice’s attempts to 
alter the judiciary, minority rights also factor greatly into the continued struggle to maintain 
Polish democracy. The Polish Right and Far-Right’s vilification of sexual minorities and 
women’s rights exhibit an ethno-populist impulse that has helped bolster the messages and ideas 
of extremist groups while delegitimizing and silencing the voices of the opposition as well those 
advocating for minority rights (Vachudova 2020). Such attempts were evident when Law and 
Justice politicians called for the arrests of Elżbieta Podleśna and other activists who, according to 
their interpretation of the criminal code, had profaned national symbols through their aesthetic 
revolt. Given the important roles that minority rights and representation play in the realization 
and maintenance of democracy (Benhabib et.al 1996), the rainbow flag has become a staple at 
pro-democracy demonstrations in Poland since Law and Justice first came to power in 2015.  
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Figure 6.2: Demonstration Opposing Law and Justice Featuring Rainbow Flags. Visible are 
several Polish and E.U. flags in addition to three rainbow flags. Image taken from: 
https://www.neweurope.eu/article/protests-grow-against-polands-new-government/, Accessed 19 
Apr 2021.  
 
 The story of Poland’s LGBT community and their attempts to expand the boundaries of 
national identity is therefore also one about the struggle for the maintenance of democracy in the 
context of encroaching authoritarianism. One need not look far from Poland to see how the 
gradual eradication of democratic norms, in countries such as Hungary, Russia and the United 
States, has emboldened censures and attacks on sexual minorities. Thus, following nearly a 
decade of democratic backsliding, Hungary’s parliament voted to end the legal recognition of 
transgender and interersex people, choosing to define gender as determined solely by biology. In 
addition to the introduction of formal legislation, Hungary’s ruling party recently forced a 
disclaimer onto a children’s book written by a noted LGBT activist. The disclaimer stated that 
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the book went against “traditional” family values for discussing non-heteronormative 
relationships and labeled it as “homosexual propaganda.” In Russia, federal law has prohibited 
the promotion of “homosexual propaganda” since June 11th, 2013134. Similar attacks are also 
currently occurring in the post-Trump United States as individual states attempt to pass anti-
transgender legislation that impinge upon the rights of trans citizens. Therefore, at the broadest 
level, this dissertation serves to underline the idea that minority rights and the acceptance of 
diversity are important aspects of a well-functioning democracy, and that the erosion of the latter 
often entails the gradual eradication of the former.  
 
Empirical and Theoretical Contributions  
My research has sought to understand how Polish sexual minorities navigate and 
understand their national identities in the context of ardent nationalist sentiment that frames them 
as enemies of and threats to the nation. In addition, I have explored how and why the utilization 
of salient national symbols, by both sexual minorities and their allies, in protests constitutes an 
aesthetic revolt that seeks to redefine the boundaries of Polish national identity. I concluded by 
showing how the work of Robert Biedroń and his social and political movement has also been 
instrumental in expanding the boundaries of “Polishness” both by advocating for sexual 




Everyday Nationhood, Nationalism, and Sexuality:  
                                               
134 This law, similar to the “stop pedophilia” bill recently introduced in Poland, punishesthe promotion of 
“nontraditional” sexual relations to minors, which critics often argue is a means to deprive children and 
young adults any information about LGBT people.  
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 The everyday nationhood tradition began as a way to study how ordinary, “everyday” 
members of a national community identify with the nation and national identity. In so doing, 
scholars interested in everyday nationhood moved away from the macro-analytic perspectives 
that had been the traditional approach to questions of nationalism and national identity. This 
traditional approach tended to examine nationalism as either a political ideology, the contingent 
outcome of modernization, a cultural construct realized through discursive practices, or “as a site 
for the material and symbolic struggles over the definition of national inclusion and exclusion” 
(Fox and Miller Idriss 2008: 536). While providing ample insights into the ways in which 
nationalism came to be from above, such research tended to neglect how, and the extent to 
which, nationalist projects and ideas entered into and impacted the lives of ordinary citizens. 
Thus, although scholars tended to agree that nationalism was a mass phenomenon, much of the 
scholarship on the topic had neglected the masses themselves as a focal point for analysis 
(Whitmeyer 2002).  
 This point is an important one, as much scholarship on nationalism tended towards 
having a top-down bias that often took for granted the idea that national subjects simply attuned 
themselves to the national messaging coming from political entrepreneurs (Fox 2018). As a 
result, national subjects were treated as “nationalist dupes” (Fox 2017; cf. Garfinkel 1964) 
instead of active agents who, although they might be somewhat constrained by culture and 
history, had minds of their own and did not necessarily fall in line with the national status quo. 
This notion therefore brought Eric Hobsbawm to claim that although nationalism is “essentially 
constructed from above, [it] …cannot be understood unless also analyzed from below, that is in 
terms of the assumptions, hopes, needs, longings, and interests of ordinary people, which are not 
necessarily national and still less nationalist” (1991:10). Following this reasoning, scholars 
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examining the “everyday” aspects of nationhood have uncovered numerous ways in which 
national subjects identify with the nation as well as how important their “nationness” is to them.  
 One of the shortcomings of this literature, however, is that it has often taken the idea of 
the “ethnic majority” for granted. As such, studies in the everyday nationhood tradition have 
tended to focus their analyses on national identifications among those who are considered as part 
of a given ethnic majority. Yet the concept of an “ethnic majority” is an elusive one, as not all 
members of this majority enjoy the same status and privileges. By studying them as if they do, 
scholars of everyday nationhood are bound to overlook some important aspects of subjects’ lived 
experiences and the ways in which they recreate, or do not recreate, nationhood. Some of the 
leading scholars in the everyday nationhood field have noted this trend. Thus, in the conclusion 
of his paper examining national identifications among the “ethnic majority” in England, Michael 
Skey claimed that “a further issue that requires greater scrutiny is the notion of the ethnic 
majority” (2010: 731). Further, in a recent reflection on the concept of everyday nationhood, Jon 
Fox noted that the tradition could certainly be criticized for “trading in crude binaries” (2018: 
865).    
My introduction of the term “ideological others” has therefore been an attempt to think 
through the muddled notion of the “ethnic majority” further. The case of Polish sexual minorities 
shows that although some groups are ethnically bound to the nation through citizenship and/or 
blood, they can still be framed as enemies of the nation and consequently “denationalized.” What 
constitutes an “ethnic majority,” then, is not always clearly demarcated through “objective” 
criteria such as one’s citizenship, and can often be the result of discursive practices that label 
some as “insiders” and others as “outsiders.” In its quest to examine the identifications of 
“ordinary” members of a given national community, the everyday nationhood literature has 
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reified the notion of the “ethnic majority” and overlooked the fact that not all members of this 
“majority” are created equal.  
In the case presented here, I demonstrated how Polish sexual minorities have been 
consistently framed as threats to the well-being of Poland by Right-wing and Far-Right groups. 
In some cases, they are framed not only as threats to the Polish nation but as not truly Polish. My 
case therefore shows that in practice, powerful political groups can often dictate what terms such 
as the “ethnic majority” can mean through discourse, as well as who ought to be seen as 
belonging to the nation and who ought to be seen as external to it. While the rich literature 
examining the intersection of nationalism and sexuality has explored this topic in various 
contexts (Bunzl 2004; Graff 2010; Mosse 1985), its primary empirical focus has consistently 
been the construction of the nation through discourse and not how stigmatized members of an 
ethnic majority themselves navigate their relationship to the nation given their exclusion. By 
examining the process of ideological “othering” as well as how ideological others navigate their 
relationship(s) to their national identity, my dissertation has blended insights from the everyday 
nationhood and nationalism and sexuality traditions in order to examine national identifications 
among Polish sexual minorities.  
My interviews demonstrated that while some respondents struggled to identify with their 
national identity because of its association with Far-Right nationalism, others found ways to 
reframe what being “Polish” meant to them. Some did so by claiming that while they still 
identified with aspects of Polish culture and identity, they also identified themselves as 
belonging to a broader, Cosmopolitan ideal. In a similar vein, other respondents were able to 
confidently identify with their “Polishness” because they reframed what being “Polish” meant in 
their own minds. For these respondents, being Polish was not necessarily tied to the 
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conservative, Catholic model espoused by Law and Justice and the Church, but rather was one 
driven by progressive ideals and values and thus open to interpretation and change. Further, the 
mental reframing of what the boundaries of “Polishness” could mean at an individual level can 
help to provide the fuel for respondent’s engagement in aesthetic revolt. 
 
Reframing “Polishness” Through Aesthetic Revolt  
 The concept of aesthetic revolt is a useful tool for cultural sociologists who want to 
understand and explain the role that cultural forms, such as national symbols and icons, play in 
social change. Zubrzycki, in her explication of the concept, argues that national identity can be 
“constructed and redefined…through popular rituals such as parades and protests where social 
actors manipulate and transform core symbols of the nation” (2013: 463). She adds that symbols 
are an important focal point of study because they “serve to focus, magnify, and exaggerate 
particular features of national identity, which allows social actors, in turn, to contest given 
representations and rearticulate new ones” (2013: 464). As such, social actors can use symbols to 
push forth normative claims about what the nation and national identity can and should mean.  
 I have argued that while Zubrzycki’s concept is helpful in demonstrating why symbols 
can play an important role in social change efforts, its initial articulation overlooked the 
important role of the internal, mental worlds of those actors engaging in aesthetic revolt. This is 
so because Zubrzycki’s study of the Quiet Revolution dealt with archival materials. Through in-
depth interviews, my study showed how individual interpretations of cultural objects can change 
and how these intrapersonal changes factor into the complex process of aesthetic revolt. By 
borrowing Sewell’s typology of the relationship between cultural schemas and material 
resources, I argued that before actors can engage with and manipulate a symbol in order to 
advocate for social change, they often must first be able to understand it as something that they 
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can utilize and manipulate. Thus, once some respondents were able to reinterpret the Polish flag 
in terms of a new cultural schema, they were more willing to utilize it in demonstrations as well 
as manipulate it in order to advocate for a reframed meaning of “Polishness.”  
 In addition to demonstrating the role that the intrapersonal can play in helping to realize 
aesthetic revolt, my dissertation also shows that such revolts can take different forms. While in 
Zubrzycki’s case protestors sought to completely renounce and redefine national identity through 
the beheading of St. John the Baptist and their criticism and reworking of other national symbols, 
the case presented here shows that aesthetic revolt need not necessitate the outright rejection of 
national symbols and their attendant national identity. Thus, in all of the cases discussed in 
chapter four, activists chose to reframe and reinterpret Polish symbols in order to show that 
Polish national identity can and ought to be one of openness and inclusion. This renewed 
understanding of what “Polishness” can mean is therefore represented through the rainbow eagle, 
Madonna, and the statues that had been modified by the Stop Bzdurom movement. 
Understanding aesthetic revolt in this way opens the door for many exciting new research 
questions, as future studies could explore why it is that certain forms of aesthetic revolt take 
place in certain times and places, as well as what factors help to enable or constrain the 
realization of particular forms of aesthetic revolt.  
Finally, the findings from this chapter help shed new light on an important ideal-type 
Zubrzycki articulated in her discussion of the national sensorium between the sacred and profane 
modes of apprehending national mythology (2011). While in the sacred mode national 
mythology is experienced as a deeply emotional and often overpowering force, the profane 
allows for a certain amount of critical distance from the mythology and the objects that 
encapsulate it. The sacred mode would thus be represented by those who worship and covet a 
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particular symbol or icon and see it as something that cannot be criticized or altered, while those 
apprehending national mythology through the profane register could easily criticize, manipulate 
or appropriate a symbol such as the Polish flag.   
Yet my data show that there is some gray area between these two registers, as a number 
of interview subjects, as well as those engaging in aesthetic revolt by reframing and reclaiming 
national symbols, fall somewhere in-between them. Given their actions and sentiments, many if 
not all of the activists and citizens discussed in chapter four feel enough emotional distance from 
national mythology that they can modify national symbols and not feel like they are doing 
something immoral. Yet on the other hand, many of them still want to feel a close emotional 
attachment to the nation, but struggle to do so given the ways in which the nation and national 
identity have been "hijacked" by the Right. As a result, they are not completely disengaging from 
the nation and national identity. Rather, by engaging in the less extreme form of aesthetic revolt 
discussed above, they are modifying the symbols so that they too can apprehend them as more 
sacred and feel a closeness to them again. Thus, what was once sacred to them but has been 
profaned because of its associations with the Far-Right, could become sacred again once it is 
modified to better adhere to their beliefs.  
 
Reframing the Symbolic Boundaries of National Identity 
 While the concepts of everyday nationhood and aesthetic revolt are essential aspects of 
this dissertation, the unifying thread is the idea of symbolic boundaries. Symbolic boundaries are 
integral to the story being told here as they are the “tools by which individuals and groups 
struggle over and come to agree upon definitions of reality” (Lamont and Molnar 2002: 168). 
The delineation of, and agreement on, symbolic boundaries therefore determines how individuals 
and/or groups will frame, parse, and interpret information and come to conclusions about what 
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certain concepts, such as national identity, should mean. The struggle over symbolic boundaries 
is therefore a normative one that can have important social and political effects. In chapters one 
and two, I showed both how and why the Polish Right has sought to constrict the boundaries of 
Polish identity by adhering to the mythologized notion of the “Catholic Pole.” I demonstrated 
how their attempts to maintain these narrow boundaries led to the denigration and stigmatization 
of Polish sexual minorities in various spheres of public life by framing them as threats to the 
nation and in some cases not truly Polish.   
I then explored how sexual minorities themselves have engaged the boundaries of Polish 
identity. Through my examination of sexual minorities’ national identifications, their aesthetic 
revolts, and Robert Biedroń’s efforts to redefine “Polishness” both by advocating for sexual 
minorities and attacking the status of the Church in society, my dissertation focused on the 
question of how the symbolic boundaries of national identity can be challenged within a single 
ethno-national community. Zubrzycki’s study of Polish “Philosemitism” (2016) began this task 
by examining the ways in which non-Jewish Poles engaged with the boundaries of Polish 
identity through their support of Poland’s Jewish community. She showed how this was achieved 
through three overlapping processes (the softening, stretching and reshaping of symbolic 
boundaries) occurring at micro, meso, and macro levels. Following Zubrzycki, my study also 
adopted micro, meso and macro perspectives in its examination of symbolic boundary work by 
scrutinizing individual national identifications, civic protests, and efforts on behalf of Robert 
Biedroń to expand rights for sexual minorities and challenge the dominant role of the Church in 
Polish society.  
The present study differed from Zubrzycki’s, however, as hers did not examine how 
Polish Jews themselves navigated and worked with the symbolic boundaries of national identity. 
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My research therefore contributes to this new line of inquiry by emphasizing how such symbolic 
boundary work also occurs at the intrapersonal level and by illustrating the relationship between 
boundary work as it occurs at the levels of the intrapersonal identifications and social and 
political activism. This connection was evident in my interviews with activists who, once they 
managed to reframe what “Polishness” meant in their own minds, were more willing and able to 
engage with national symbols and use them in demonstrations and protests in order to expand the 
symbolic boundaries of “Polishness.” The case under study here therefore shows that navigating 
and negotiating the boundaries of national identity is a complex process that often exists at the 
intersection of the psychological, sociological, and political. While the work here has provided a 
preliminary look at the connections among these various levels, further research will be needed 
to help better theorize the relationships between them.   
 
Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
 While my interviews with Polish sexual minorities has contributed to research on 
everyday nationhood and the relationship between nationalism and sexuality (Bratcher 2020), 
comparative research is needed in order to explore whether national identifications among sexual 
and other minority groups differ from those who do not belong to vulnerable or stigmatized 
groups (i.e. those in the “ethnic” or “ideological” majority). Such research could then better 
deduce whether sexuality or other features of one’s identity accounted for varying levels of 
national identification. In the case of Poland, for example, fruitful comparisons could be made 
between levels of national identification among ideological others and other members of the 
“ethnic majority” (such as Catholic Poles) or between different ideological others (such as Polish 
feminists and controversial academics or activists). Further, the current study did not focus on 
the extent to which other facets of people's identities (such as their social class and education 
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levels) might have impacted the ways in which they identified with the nation. By including 
these criteria, future studies might be able to tease out whether and why certain communities 
struggle more or less than others with their national identification(s). 
 Research could also move beyond examining a single case and examine the processes of 
national identification among ideological others in different national contexts (such as sexual 
minorities in Poland and those in Hungary). Such studies could also examine how these 
communities experience and interpret stigmatization and discrimination. Michèle Lamont and 
colleagues (2016) have already made some very useful steps in this direction by examining 
responses to stigmatization in the United State, Brazil, and Israel among ethno-racial minorities. 
The primary difference between their work and what I am proposing, however, is that I am 
emphasizing a focus on the experiences of those who are stigmatized on ideological grounds, not 
due to their ethnicity and/or race. 
Finally, research focusing on ideological others is not limited to exploring these 
communities' relationships to national identity. While my aims here were to understand how 
Polish sexual minorities navigated their relationship with “Polishness,” future researchers may 
want to examine the ways in which national projects create ideological others, who is lumped 
into these groups, and why. A possible example could be an analysis of Turkey's recent purge of 
academics. In this case, scholars could focus primarily on elite-level discourses used to frame 
intellectuals and academics as being threats to the Turkish nation. Another relevant site of 
research would be contemporary Brazil, as president Jair Bolsonaro has taken aim at intellectuals 
and academics who are at ideological odds with his plans for the future of Brazil. Of course, the 
chosen focal point of analysis will depend on the larger national context. 
In addition, my research has only begun to scratch the surface on the relationship 
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between the intrapersonal and the material in aesthetic revolt. Thus, when possible, future 
research on the topic would do well to conduct in-depth interviews with activists and others who 
have engaged in aesthetic revolt, asking them questions about the symbols they are utilizing, 
what they mean to them and how these meanings have evolved over time. In-depth interviews 
would help researchers further understand the motivations behind actors’ utilization of certain 
symbols in certain times and places. Relatedly, further research on aesthetic revolt would benefit 
from comparative analyses that would enable scholars to ask questions regarding why certain 
forms of aesthetic revolt either occurred or did not occur in particular contexts and historical 
junctures. Thus, what were the circumstances that led to French Canadians’ outright rejection of 
a Catholic understanding of national identity? Why did they reject this vision of national identity 
outright, while those in the Polish case chose to work with and modify existing models of 
“Polishness”?  
Theoretically, scholars examining the relationship between the intrapersonal and the 
material in aesthetic revolt could also benefit from engaging with the burgeoning literature 
examining the intersection of culture and cognition. Doing so could provide researchers with rich 
concepts and vocabulary to describe and explain the processes occurring as actors interpret and 
engage with cultural objects such as national flags and other significant symbols. While I have 
touched on one of these ideas by including Sewell’s articulation of cultural schemas (1992) in 
my analysis of aesthetic revolt, research in the field of culture and cognition has greatly 
improved upon such concepts (Frye 2012; Lizardo 2017; Martin 2011; Strauss and Quinn 1997; 
Shore 1998). As an example, a recent study examining “neural binding” (Taylor et.al 2019) 
conducted by Terence McDonnell and his students takes insights from cognitive neuroscience 
and applies them to research on cultural objects. The application of neuroscientific concepts such 
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as “indexicalization” and “binding”, they argue, can help cultural sociologists “understand 
cultural objects as an ongoing accomplishment through processes of indexicaling and 
innovating” (Taylor et.al 2019: 11). Adopting concepts from fields such as cognitive 
neuroscience and the philosophy of mind could therefore assist those sociologists interested in 
the effects of cultural objects, and culture more generally, by providing them with concrete, 
neuroscientifically grounded ways to think about how meaning is generated, maintained, and 
transformed both within and outside the confines of the human mind.  
However, this does not mean that sociologists should simply adopt the ideas and theories 
of these sciences uncritically, as doing so could result in the reification of neuroscientific 
knowledge. Thus, as Victoria Pitts-Taylor has aptly noted, the primary question is not whether 
social scientists should embrace the neurocognitive turn, but how they should approach the 
knowledge gained from research in the cognitive and neuro sciences (2014: 996). The truly 
exciting path forward would therefore be a two-way street in which sociologists and neuro-
cognitive scientists both criticized and learned from the complexities and contradictions within 
each discipline. This is especially true for those interested in culture, which exists just as much in 
our minds as it does outside of and around us (Mohr et.al 2020). Thus, while the neurocognitive 
turn should be embraced, social scientists must ensure that instead of blindly accepting the 
concepts stemming from the cognitive and neuro sciences, that they “approach knowledge about 
the brain and cognition as complex, embedded, and situated….and are willing to admit the 





In a recent debate article published in Nations and Nationalism, Jon Fox reflected on 
research in the everyday nationhood tradition and remarked that from the start, its primary 
objective had been to examine “nationhood as a practical accomplishment, where actors 
creatively and willfully invoke and manipulate nationhood for their own purposes” (2018: 864). 
Nationhood from this perspective is therefore something accomplished through people “doing 
things with nationalism” (2018: 864).  My study has demonstrated how Polish sexual minorities 
have engaged the nation and national mythology in order to reinterpret what being Polish means 
to them, thereby manipulating nationhood for their own purposes. Personal reflection and 
engaging in acts of symbolic manipulation have helped many find new ways to identify with 
their “Polishness.”  
Yet what this also shows is that “Polishness” —at least for the majority of those 
interviewed— remains a highly significant object of identification. Thus, while the renewed 
visions of national identity discussed by my interview subjects and demonstrated by those 
involved in aesthetic revolt involved openness, progressiveness and tolerance, for most of them 
this new vision was still a national vision. Indeed, even those who spoke of Cosmopolitanism 
held onto aspects of their “Polishness.” Although they liked the idea of being global citizens, 
they still struggled to disengage from the deeper, more viscerally felt aspects of their Polish 
identity. This dissertation therefore serves to remind us that although there may be attempts in 
the name of inclusivity to reframe and redefine what national identity can and should mean, the 
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